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SUMMARY 
In 2004, President Bush addressed the nation and presented NASA’s new vision 
for space exploration. This vision included the completion of the International Space 
Station, the retirement of the Space Shuttle, the development of a new crew exploration 
vehicle, and the return of humans to the moon by 2020. NASA’s Exploration Systems 
Architecture Study (ESAS) produced a transportation architecture for returning humans 
to the moon affordably and safely. This architecture requires the development of two new 
Shuttle-derived launch vehicles, an in-space transportation vehicle, a lunar descent and 
landing vehicle, and a crew exploration vehicle for human transportation. The 
development of an in-space propellant transfer capability could greatly improve the 
performance, cost, mission success, and mission extensibility of the overall lunar 
architecture, providing a more optimal solution for future exploration missions. The work 
done in this thesis will analyze how this new capability could affect the current NASA 
lunar architecture, and will outline the value proposition of propellant refueling to NASA. 
 A value proposition for propellant refueling will be provided to establish why an 
architecture that utilizes propellant refueling is better equipped to meet the goals of the 
Vision for Space Exploration than the current baseline design. The primary goal 
addressed in this research is the development of a sustainable and affordable exploration 
program. The value proposition will outline various refueling strategies that can be used 
to improve each of the architecture Figures of Merit. These include a decrease in the Life 
Cycle Cost of both the lunar and Mars exploration campaigns, the ability to more than 
double the mission payload that can be delivered to the lunar surface during cargo 
 iv 
missions, improving the probability of successfully completing each lunar mission, 
decreasing the uncertainty, and therefore risk, experienced during the development 
process, and improving the extensibility of the exploration architecture by utilizing a 
greater portion of the lunar program for future crewed mission. The ability to improve 
these Figures of Merit provides NASA with a more valuable architecture because NASA 
is able to achieve a greater return on its large initial investment. 
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The goal of this thesis is to present a comprehensive analysis of the potential 
value of a propellant depot in Low Earth Orbit for future space exploration. The use of 
this capability provides a means to mitigate the performance concerns with NASA’s 
current exploration architecture design (circa 2008) by providing an improvement to near 
term and long term architecture payload capability, thus providing a more affordable and 
sustainable long term exploration program. The following sections will provide the reader 
with an understanding of NASA’s current exploration goals and how the introduction of 
propellant refueling can help achieve these goals.  
 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
 NASA’s charter is “To understand and protect our home planet, To explore the 
universe and search for life, To inspire the next generation of explorers …as only NASA 
can. [1]” In order to achieve the second goal, NASA has spent a large percentage of their 
budget in an attempt to develop a reliable and affordable space transportation system. To 
date, NASA has yet to demonstrate an exploration architecture that meets both of these 
goals. The Apollo program had few budget constraints with its $150B budget but failed 
to produce a sustainable architecture, and the program was cancelled after the sixth moon 
landing. The goal of the current Space Transportation System was to provide reduced 
space access cost at greater reliability and safety, but even with its cost over runs, missed 
CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION  
2 
both cost and safety goals by a order of magnitude. The latest exploration architecture for 
NASA’s Vision for Space Exploration will attempt to bring together aspects of both 
designs: large payload capability, lower cost per pound and higher safety. The current 
design utilizes mostly expendable hardware similar to the Apollo architecture in order to 
lower the development cost. The design also utilizes Shuttle-derived components that 
help to lower the initial development cost and take advantage of proven and reliable 
systems. There is, however, much speculation as to whether this architecture can achieve 
the performance goals of future exploration programs while maintaining high reliability 
at a sustainable cost. This present analysis indicates that the introduction of Low Earth 
Orbit (LEO) propellant refueling can provide a greater payload capability and a lower 
Loss of Mission (LOM) probability. It may also be possible to lower the life cycle cost of 
the architecture by utilizing the increase in payload capability to decrease the required 
number of launches to perform a lunar mission. 
 
1.1.1 NASA’S SHIFT IN DESIGN STRATEGIES 
 In order to truly understand the challenges that NASA faces with its current 
Visions for Space Exploration, one must understand how the priorities have changed 
since the last time NASA devoted itself to an exploration program of this magnitude. 
During the Apollo program, NASA’s first priority was completing the task of landing a 
human on the lunar surface before the end of the 1960’s, while cost was considered a 
secondary factor. During this period NASA had its highest annual operating budget, 
about 175% of its current funding levels [2]. The overall mission success for the Apollo 
architecture was predicted to be 0.4043 [3] while the demonstrated value was 0.857 [4], 
3 
not including missions prior to Apollo 11. The only mission failures were a malfunction 
of the fuel cell on the Service Module (SM) and a second stage engine failure during the 
Apollo 13 mission; the reliability of the remaining architecture components demonstrated 
a 100% reliability during these seven missions. The Apollo program reached its goal of 
landing a human on the lunar surface by the end of the 1960’s, but the architecture cost 
was not sustainable as the NASA budget fell dramatically after its peak in 1964. NASA’s 
yearly budget profile is provided in Figure 1. This budget profile shows that NASA’s 
budget fell to 15 percent of its peak 1960’s level in the years following the first human 
lunar landing. The last human lunar landing occurred at the end of 1972, [4] and NASA’s 
budget has remained less then 1 percent of the total federal budget ever since. In order to 
re-establish NASA’s human space presence beyond LEO, a more reliable and affordable 
architecture needs to be developed.  
 
 
Figure 1: Historical NASA Budget and Percentage of Federal Budget [2] 
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In the post-Apollo era, NASA’s design goals became more cost- and reliability-
centric. NASA turned to the airline industry for this model, making the assumption that, 
if the system was designed to operate like an aircraft, then it would provide a more 
reliable and cost-effective solution. This idea gave birth to the Space Transportation 
Systems (STS). This system consists of the Space Shuttle Orbiter, the External Tank, and 
two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB); the External Tank is the only aspect of the system that 
is not re-usable, though the SRBs are over-hauled after each launch, and the Orbiter is 
overhauled every six to eight flights. The Space Shuttle is launched vertically and returns 
via an un-powered glide. A draw back of the Space Shuttle is that it must go through an 
extensive series of repairs after each flight due to the extreme conditions that it 
experiences during each mission and lack of adequate performance margins. These 
inspections and repairs require a large work force and many months to complete. The full 
annual operations cost of the Space Shuttle are on the order of greater than $4B, even 
when launched only a few times per year [5]. These repairs have kept the Space Shuttle 
from reaching its initial low cost operating estimate of $8M - $12M per flight. The Space 
Shuttle is scheduled to be retired in 2010 after the completion of the International Space 
Station (ISS). It will give way to a new expendable launch system which takes design 
aspects and lessons learned from both the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs to achieve 
NASA’s goal of a long-term sustainable human space exploration program.  
 
1.1.2 A SUMMARY OF THE EXPLORATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE STUDY 
 In 2004, President George W. Bush announced a new Vision for Space 
Exploration in which he provided NASA with the goal of developing a new exploration 
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architecture to replace the current Space Transportation System. This new architecture 
would continue to meet the needs of the International Space Station in addition to 
providing a continuous human presence on the lunar surface and transportation for future 
exploration missions   
 The Space Shuttle will continue operation until the completion of the 
International Space Station in 2010, at which time it will be retired from operation. The 
new crew exploration vehicle must be operational by 2014 in order to continue its support 
the needs of the International Space Station. Initial lunar surface exploration missions 
should begin no later than 2020. This Vision marked the end of the Space Shuttle era and 
opened a new chapter in human exploration. The goal of this new architecture will be to 
accomplish a greater range of missions than the Apollo and Space Shuttle programs while 
achieving a higher reliability and remaining within NASA’s planned budget profile, 
which may increase only at the rate of inflation. This is a difficult problem that will 
require the development of a very versatile and efficient architecture. The development 
and implementation of propellant refueling technologies may provide the architecture 
with the additional capability that it needs without a significant increase in the life cycle 
cost. 
 The Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) [6] was conducted in the  
summer of 2005 in response to the 2004 announcement by President George W. Bush 
that NASA would be redirecting its focus to returning humans to the moon by 2020. The 
study lasted approximately 90 days and established the initial baseline architecture for 
continued detailed studies to meet the needs of the Vision for Exploration.  The goals of 
this study were to:  
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• Assess the top-level Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) requirements and plans that 
will enable the CEV to provide crew transport to the International Space Station, 
and that will accelerate the development of the CEV and crew launch system to 
reduce the gap between Shuttle retirement and CEV Initial Operational Capability 
(IOC). 
 
• Define the top-level requirements and configurations for crew and cargo launch 
systems to support the lunar and Mars exploration programs. 
 
• Develop a reference exploration architecture concept to support sustained human 
and robotic lunar exploration operations. 
 
• Identify key technologies required to enable and significantly enhance these 
reference exploration systems, and reprioritize near and far-term technology 
investments. 
 
 The Exploration Systems Architecture Study team analyzed a variety of different 
launch vehicles and mission elements in an attempt to consider as many valid architecture 
options as possible. The different solutions were evaluated based on seven design 
reference missions (DRMs) and compared against five evaluation criteria called figures 
of merit (FOMs). The DRMs included three ISS crew and/or cargo missions, three lunar 
crew and/or cargo missions, and one Mars crew and cargo mission. The five FOMs 
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included: safety and mission success, affordability, performance, extensibility, and 
programmatic risk [6]. The first two criteria were considered most important in order to 
achieve a sustainable architecture while not exposing the astronauts to unnecessary risk. 
 The final architecture selection was a “one and a half” launch vehicle solution 
designed with the crew and cargo launching on separate launch vehicles. As shown in the 
lunar concept of operations in Figure 2. The mission mode selected for the lunar 
architecture was to use both a Lunar Orbit Rendezvous (LOR) and an Earth Orbit 
Rendezvous (EOR). In comparison, the Apollo architecture required only a LOR because 
it was capable of delivering all of the architecture elements in a single launch. The 
additional requirements on the current architecture (such as 4 crew, 7 day lunar mission, 
etc.) make use of a single launch vehicle very difficult using near-term technologies. The 
current baseline architecture requires the development of two new shuttle derived launch 
vehicles for delivering crew and cargo to LEO; the development of a two stage lunar 
lander to transfer the crew and cargo from low lunar orbit to the surface of the moon; and 
the development of a re-usable Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) that can provide safe 
transportation of the crew. The CEV is also tasked with the responsibility of transforming 
crew and cargo to the International Space Station. A more detailed description of the 
lunar concept of operations is provided in Chapter 2. 
 
8 
 
Figure 2: ESAS Baseline Lunar Architecture [6] 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Since humans began exploring space in the 1950s, the foundation of almost all 
exploration programs has been the use of high thrust chemical propulsion systems. The 
problem with chemical propulsion systems is that they have a relatively low specific 
impulse (Isp), and therefore require large amounts of propellant to generate the required 
mission maneuvers resulting in vehicles that are up to 70 - 90 percent propellant mass. As 
an example, the ESAS cargo launch vehicle delivers 290,000 lbm of propellant to LEO 
while delivering less than 80,000 lbm of inert mass that includes the EDS, LSAM, and 
the lunar surface payload [6]. The propellant requirements for in-space transportation 
dominate the design of the launch vehicle more than any other aspect of the design and 
can significantly limit the design freedom of the architecture. With an in-space propellant 
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depot, the payload requirements of the launch vehicle are reduced by 70 to 90 percent or 
the payload of the in-space transpiration system can be improved by an order of 
magnitude. The trade is the cost of the developing the propellant depot and delivering the 
propellant to LEO versus building a “very large” launch vehicle or building a smaller 
launch vehicle that requires multiple launches. Developing a reliable and cost-effective 
means of providing propellant to LEO can help both reduce the cost of the overall lunar 
campaign and increase lunar surface and Mars payload capabilities.   
1.2.1 INTRODUCTION OF PROPELLANT RE-FUELING AS A POTENTIAL SOLUTION 
 The concept of propellant refueling revolves around the idea that the performance 
of the architecture can be improved by developing a more efficient means of delivering 
propellant to LEO. In the architecture’s current form, the cargo launch vehicle is 
responsible for delivering the in-space propellant required to complete the mission. It is 
possible that a lower cost commercial operator could be tasked with providing this 
propellant to LEO and charging NASA based on the amount of propellant used. With this 
capability in place, a number of changes can be made to the baseline design that may 
provide an improvement to the exploration architecture.  
 There are a number of potential benefits that can be incorporated into the 
architecture elements when propellant refueling is introduced into the exploration 
architecture. One such improvement is the ability to reduce the payload requirement on 
the launch vehicles that are now being constrained in size because of current vehicle 
assembly and launch facilities. There are two resulting design strategies that can be 
employed when the Earth-to-orbit propellant requirements for in-space transportation are 
reduced. The first is an increase in the mission payload that can be delivered to LEO and 
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to the lunar surface. In this case the mass of the propellant is replaced by additional 
payload. The second design option is to reduce the size of the launch vehicles while 
achieving the same payload capability. A smaller launch vehicle would result in a smaller 
development and production cost. These improvements are both a result of the smaller 
total payload requirement. In addition to increasing the payload capability or decreasing 
the cost of the launch vehicle, propellant refueling can help reduce the concern that 
unexpected mass growth will push the size of the architecture elements beyond the limits 
of the current infrastructure. Any increase in mass can be offset by a corresponding 
decrease in the mass of propellant carried to LEO by the launch vehicles. These potential 
solutions will be evaluated to determine if they provide an increase in value to the 
exploration architecture.  
 Another potential benefit of propellant refueling is the ability to mitigate 
propellant boiloff by providing any lost propellant to the EDS and LSAM at the end of 
the LEO loiter, instead of caring the additional propellant to orbit. With a propellant 
depot, the EDS and LSAM can remain in LEO indefinitely because there is no risk of 
losing the capability to perform the required mission maneuvers. The payload 
requirements on the launch vehicle are reduced because the architecture is no longer 
required to bring additional propellant to LEO to account for boiloff. The exploration 
architecture is also able to achieve a better loss of mission reliability because the 
maximum LEO loiter time is no longer dependent on the launch of the crew launch 
vehicle. The launch of the crew can now be considerably delayed without the risk of 
losing a mission. 
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 The introduction of propellant refueling also allows an increased number of 
concepts of operation to be considered many of which are not possible with the current 
architecture. The availability of additional propellant in LEO allows the EDS to perform 
a greater variety of missions. As an example, the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous maneuver is 
currently performed by the Descent Stage of the LSAM. This scenario requires the lander 
to be sized to carry an additional 50,000 lbm of propellant. Allowing the EDS to perform 
the LOI in addition to the TLI maneuver reduces the size of the lander or greatly 
increases its payload capability because the lander can be sized to carry less propellant. 
This LOI maneuver capability using the EDS was not selected for the ESAS baseline 
design because the launch vehicle could not deliver the required propellant to allow the 
EDS to perform both maneuvers and because of T/W concerns with the EDS performing 
this maneuver. With the addition of propellant refueling, the additional propellant can be 
provided to the EDS once delivered to LEO. This allows the EDS to perform a wide 
range of mission maneuvers without altering the current vehicle configuration.   
 In the previous example, the capability of the EDS was expanded in order to 
accomplish both the TLI and LOI maneuvers. This was possible because sufficient 
propellant was available in LEO and because the EDS itself is a very large propulsive 
stage. The EDS doubles as the second stage of the cargo launch vehicle and is capable of 
holding 488,000 lbm of usable propellant. In the baseline design, this propellant is split 
between the ascent burn and the TLI maneuver, with approximately 225,000 lbm of 
propellant remaining once the EDS is delivered to LEO. A completely full EDS in LEO 
has the capability to deliver 400,000 lbm through TLI and in excess of 300,000 lbm of 
through TMI. The utilization of the EDS could eliminate the need for a new Nuclear 
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Thermal Propulsion (NTP) system and greatly reduce the number of launches needed, 
therefore decreasing the overall cost of large exploration missions. A large amount of 
propellant refueling is required to completely re-fuel the EDS once it reaches LEO and 
would require an efficient low cost propellant delivery method in order to become a 
viable architecture solution.   
 One of the goals established in the Vision for Exploration was to utilize 
commercial partners where possible. This could help improve the adorability and thus 
sustainability of NASA exploration architecture. The need to deliver propellant to LEO 
would allow commercial partners to play a larger role in NASA future exploration 
missions, and could help lower the cost of each mission. The other benefit of utilizing 
commercial launch providers to supply propellant to LEO is that it would increase the 
number of commercial launches completed each year. This would help drive down the 
launch costs to both NASA and to the rest of the commercial launch industry. The 
original low cost predictions for commercial launch vehicles have never been realized 
because the expected demand has never materialized. This demand has remained low 
because of the high cost of launching payload into orbit. This is a problem that cannot be 
solved without the introduction of an outside influence. The introduction of propellant 
refueling could solve this problem by supplying the demand needed to help reduce the 
current launch costs. This could then lead to an increase in demand throughout the rest of 
the launch market as the launch costs could be reduced to a more affordable level. The 
demand for propellant could also lead to the need for a much higher launch rate than can 
currently be provided by the launch industry. This could help pave the way for the 
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development of reusable launch vehicles that would ultimately provide the lowest cost for 
LEO payload delivery.  
 The final benefit of refueling that will be discusses is the ability to help mitigate 
the risk in developing complex systems which have large amounts of initial design 
uncertainty.  During the development of most systems most of the major design decisions 
are made early in the design process where the least amount of knowledge is known 
about the final design. As a result a number of changes are often required during the 
deign process. These changes lead to increases in cost and delays in schedule. Refueling 
can be used to help reduce the number of design changes needed or limit the impact they 
have on the system. This is accomplished by reducing the amount of propellant that is 
delivered to LEO. This provides an insurance policy for program managers to use when 
unexpected design changes occur that may require the addition advanced technologies or 
result in long program delays. Refueling reduces the risk by reducing the number design 
changes required throughout the development process.  
 The above discussion presented a number of potential improvements that could be 
incorporated into the exploration architecture if propellant refueling was available.  There 
are however a number of potential concerns that may limit the value that can be achieved. 
A major concern is that the capability to refuel spacecraft in LEO is not a currently 
available technology. Chapter 2 provides a complete discussion of the current 
development effort for in-space propellant refueling. The second possible concern is the 
ability to provide a long term storage system that eliminates boiloff of the cryogenic 
propellants. A number of potential solutions exist, but again they have not been tested in 
a space environment. A truly zero-boiloff capability is not required but would aid in 
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reducing the price of propellant and the cost of the LEO propellant depot. The final 
concern is the ability to develop a low-cost propellant delivery system that can routinely 
deliver propellant to the storage system. The work in this thesis will look at how the price 
of propellant affects the value that propellant refueling provides the exploration 
architecture.  
   
1.2.2 UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL VALUE OF PROPELLANT RE-FUELING 
 The value of propellant refueling can be classified by understanding how the 
addition of this capability affects the design criteria and how well it address those issues 
facing the development of the architecture. A number of decision making methods can be 
used to look at the overall effects on the Figures of Merit. The tools utilized in this thesis 
will help define the cost and benefits of introducing propellant refueling and help 
establish which refueling strategies results in greatest improvement to the design of the 
architecture.  
 There are a number of ways to evaluate the potential benefits and cost of applying 
propellant refueling to the exploration architecture. The simplest method is to understand 
how the addition of this capability impacts each of the Figures of Merit. This approach 
allows the decision maker to evaluate a number of impacts on the architecture. While this 
method provides a more intuitive means to evaluate propellant refueling, it does not take 
into account the full multi-disciplinary nature of the problem. A Multi-Attributed 
Decision Making (MADM) method [7] is needed in order to evaluate the full impact of 
propellant refueling on the entire architecture. This type of method allows the utilization 
of various FOMs instead of a single decision making criteria and also provides a means 
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to weight the importance of each FOM. This additional information allows the decision 
maker to understand how impacts on each of the decision making criteria affect the 
selection of the final design point. The major concern with the implementation of a 
MADM method is the dependence on the use of weighting criteria to define the relative 
importance of the different figures of merit. An accurate estimation of these weights can 
be difficult, if not impossible, to determine. Therefore, various weighting scenarios are 
often considered to alleviate the uncertainty in these estimations. The result of this 
method is a ranking of the design points based on how well they perform across all of the 
Figures of Merit.  
A Pareto frontier can be used to evaluate the value of various design options when 
more than one Figure of Merit is important to the decision maker. A Pareto frontier is 
also able to establish the solutions which naturally dominant a design space. As an 
example, if two design points are shown to have the same payload mass but design A has 
a lower cost than design B, it is said that design A is dominate because it achieves the 
same capability for a lower cost. Based on these two criteria point, B is always worse 
than point A and can be discarded as a potential solution. Using this logic, a curve of the 
solutions that bounds the decision space can be developed for a set of FOMs. The points 
along this frontier are considered Pareto-efficient, meaning that any improvement in one 
FOM requires a degradation of another. The decision maker can then make trade-offs to 
determine where in the design space the best solution exists. This method is similar to the 
MADM method and allows the decision maker to understand how the design changes as 
various weightings are applied. The benefit of this method is that it quickly reduces the 
size of the design, considering only the dominate solutions, therefore reducing the 
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amount of information that must be considered when making a final selection. The Pareto 
frontier also provides a relationship between the FOMs so that the decision maker can 
understand how the improvement in one FOM impacts another. However, when more 
than two FOMs are considered this concept becomes abstract and difficult to visualize.  
 A payload efficiency factor can also be used to show the potential value of 
introducing propellant refueling into the exploration architecture. This factor is defined 
by dividing the total cost of the lunar campaign by the total amount of payload delivered 
to the lunar surface. In some cases the addition of propellant refueling will increase the 
total cost of the architecture, but if the change in payload capability has a greater 
marginal improvement then the payload efficiency factor will decrease. This factor can 
also be used to help understand which architecture changes have the biggest impact and 
which have little to no impact on the baseline design. This helps to classify how 
propellant refueling can best be applied to the exploration architecture and potentially 
future exploration systems. The payload efficiency factor can not be the only FOM 
because NASA’s yearly budget is constrained; thus a lower payload efficiency factor may 
be offset by an increase in annual cost over several years that must be considered; even 
though the total life cycle is less.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND GOALS 
  The main objective of this research is to understand the effects of propellant 
refueling as it applies to the current NASA exploration architecture. This work will both 
investigate the propellant refueling design space within the current NASA lunar 
architecture and determine the cost and benefit of each point within the design space. 
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These results will then be compared against the ESAS baseline design to see if an 
improvement can be made to the architecture through the implementation of propellant 
refueling. While the results here will focus specifically on a lunar architecture, the overall 
trends should hold to other exploration missions. The following is a description of the 
main goals to be accomplished in this work.  
  
• Goal 1: Develop a lunar architecture model capable of utilizing various 
propellant refueling techniques.  
 
This model will be flexible enough to make trade-offs and measure the impact of various 
propellant refueling capability on NASA lunar architecture. It will also be able to model 
the baseline architecture and replicate the results of the ESAS within a few percentage 
points, providing accuracy and confidence for the model. The individual models must be 
able to calculate quickly so that Monte Carlo analysis can account for uncertainty in the 
model inputs.  
 
• Goal 2: Explore and understand the effects that propellant refueling have on 
NASA’s baseline exploration architecture.  
 
A morphological matrix [8] will be used to characterize the different applications of 
propellant refueling and evaluate the design choices within each of these. This matrix 
encompasses the design space and provides the various inputs to the architecture model. 
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The results from these different combinations will give insight into the mass impacts that 
different applications of propellant refueling have on the architecture.  
 
• Goal 3: Determine the costs and benefits of adding propellant refueling to the 
lunar architecture and determine what approach has the greatest effect on the 
over all design of the architecture.  
 
The final results of this work will provide a guide to selecting the best application of 
propellant refueling as it applies to the lunar architecture. This guide will outline the 
trends observed along the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) and lunar surface payload capability 
Pareto frontier, examine where in the design space the most efficient design points are 
located, and determine how the addition of risk and extensibility considerations affect 
which designs have a greatest benefit to the architecture. The final selection will depend 
on the values of the decision maker, but design points that perform well within each of 
these analyses are likely candidates for the final architecture design. The differences and 
similarities between Scenarios One and Two will also be discussed to illustrate how 
different application of propellant refueling can significantly affect the design of the 
architecture. These two Scenarios will be fully discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
1.4 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
This dissertation will cover the entirety of the work completed during this study in 
an attempt to show the reader the benefits and costs of propellant refueling. This first 
chapter provides the motivation for the research conducted during this study. It provides 
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the reader with a historical view of NASA’s exploration program, including the path 
leading up to the development of new exploration architecture. It then discusses how 
propellant refueling can potentially be used to improve the design of NASA baseline 
architecture. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the major goals to be 
accomplished.  
 The second chapter continues with a background discussion of propellant 
refueling and how it has been conceptually studied for exploration missions in the past. 
The limited work done utilizing this capability has led to the need to develop a more 
complete understanding of its effects on architecture design. A feasibility discussion will 
also be presented to provide the current status on the technology development of a long-
term LEO propellant storage and cryogenic propellant transfer. A look at potential 
propellant suppliers will also be discussed.  
Chapter 3 will outline the design space used in this thesis to explore the effects 
that propellant refueling has on the baseline architecture. A description of the design 
variables will be provided along with the ranges considered during this work. These 
design variables will provide the inputs to the modeling and simulation environment.  
 Chapter 4 will outline the development of the propellant refueling simulation 
environment. This outline will provide the reader with a complete understanding of the 
individual analyses and what interactions exist between each model, along with a 
discussion of the ModelCenter© [9] simulation environment used. The assumptions and 
limitations for each model will be provided. Chapters 3 and 4 should provide the reader 
with a clear understanding of the process for creating the results that will be discussed in 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 
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 Chapters 5 and 6 are very similar in structure and only differ because of the 
scenarios they discuss. Chapter 5 will define Scenario One, where the payload capability 
of the architecture is increased without changing the size of the different elements. 
Chapter 6 will define Scenario Two where the payload capability remains the same as the 
baseline architecture, but the individual elements are allowed to adjust their size. These 
chapters will discuss the results developed from the simulation environment and 
investigate the cost and benefits of each design point. A Pareto frontier will be used to 
establish the dominate design points and show the trade off that can be made between the 
cost and capability of the architecture.  
 The work in Chapter 7 will finalize the value proposition of propellant refueling 
to NASA. A detailed discussion will be presented to show the precise value that the 
introduction of this capability provides the architecture. In particular the effects of 
propellant refueling on each Figure of Merit will be presented.  
 The final chapter will be a concluding discussion outlining specific observations 
made during the study and a guide to the use of propellant refueling in exploration 
missions. A future work section will also be provided to discuss possible improvements, 
as well as additional work that can be made to improve the results provided. 
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 This chapter begins with a detailed discussion of the ESAS architecture which is 
the baseline for comparison in this thesis. Previous in-space propellant refueling design 
studies will be presented to provide the reader with what has been considered to date and 
what information is lacking. The basis for this research is to complete the understating of 
the benefits that propellant refueling can provide to exploration missions. A summary of 
the current technology development will also be included to provide the reader with the 
time frame needed to reach a technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or higher. The 
commercial launch market is also discussed to provide the reader with a basis for the 
propellant deliver price estimations considered in developing the refueling model. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the system engineering methods and practices 
used in this research.  
 
2.1 SUMMARY OF ESAS BASELINE ARCHITECTURE 
 The results of the ESAS completed in 2005 provided the baseline architecture that 
NASA would used to complete the Vision for Space Exploration laid out by President 
George W. Bush. This architecture provided the baseline concept with which to begin 
developing NASA’s new exploration architecture. This concept was not meant to be the 
final design but rather provide the foundation for further studies to build upon. This 
section will outline the baseline design, including all of the major architecture elements. 
CHAPTER 2   
BACKGROUND  
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It will also provide a discussion as to which elements may be affected by the addition of 
propellant refueling to the architecture.  
 
2.1.1 BASELINE LUNAR CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 
 
 As seen in Figure 3, the ESAS architecture utilizes two launch vehicles to deliver 
the crew and cargo to Low Earth Orbit. The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) rendezvous 
with the Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Lunar Surface Access Model (LSAM) prior to 
trans-lunar injection (TLI), which is performed by the Earth Departure Stage. This 
represents the Earth Orbit Rendezvous portion of the architecture alluded to in Chapter 1. 
The EDS is expended once this maneuver is completed and the CEV, Service Module 
(SM), and LSAM continue on to the Moon. The descent stage of the LSAM performs a 
Lunar Orbit Injection maneuver to place the remaining architecture elements into a 
circular lunar orbit, often referred to as low lunar orbit (LLO). The crew then transfers 
from the CEV, which will remain in LLO, to the LSAM habitat; the LSAM then 
separates and descends to the lunar surface using descent stage of the LSAM. The LSAM 
is capable of supporting the four crew members up to seven days on the surface of the 
Moon. At the end of the lunar mission, the LSAM ascent stage separates and returns to 
LLO, leaving the descent stage on the lunar surface. Once in LLO, the ascent stage docks 
with the CEV/SM and the crew transfers back to the CEV. The ascent stage is expended, 
and the SM performs the Trans-Earth Injection (TEI) maneuver to provide the CEV with 
a direct Earth re-entry trajectory. After separation of the SM and re-entry, the CEV makes 
a land-based landing in the western United States.  
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Figure 3: ESAS Baseline Lunar Architecture Concept of Operations 
 
2.1.2 CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY 
 The cargo launch vehicle (CaLV) is designed to provide reliable transportation of 
cargo, in particular the LSAM and EDS, from the Earth’s surface to low earth orbit. The 
ESAS results favor the use of Shuttle-derived launch vehicles for the goals of supporting 
the proposed lunar exploration program. The CaLV (Figure 4) was designed as a space 
shuttle derived launch vehicle. The CaLV uses shuttle heritage components such as the 
reusable solid rocket boosters, though modified to include five segments instead of four, 
the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), and an external diameter equal to the diameter 
of the Space Shuttle External Tank (ET) to both reduce overall development costs as well 
as take advantage of the significant effort already spent on increasing the reliability of the 
Shuttle components. 
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 The CaLV consists of two and a half stages as shown in Figure 4. The core stage 
is a liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) propulsion system powered by five 
SSMEs capable of generating 2,300,000 lbm of vacuum thrust with a vacuum specific 
impulse (Isp) of 452s. Two five segment solid rocket boosters are attached to each side of 
the core stage and are used to provide additional thrust at liftoff. The total vacuum thrust 
of the two SRBs is 7,600,000 lbm with a significantly lower Isp of 265s. The 2nd stage of 
the launch vehicle, which is also utilizes a LOX/LH2 system, is powered by two J-2Ss 
engines. These engines provide a total vacuum trust of 550,000 lbm with a vacuum Isp of 
451s. A summary of these values is provided in Table 1. The diameter of both stages is 
designed to be 27.5 ft to match the diameter of the External Tank of the Space Shuttle. 
The LSAM rests atop the EDS and is enclosed inside a 72 ft payload fairing. The CaLV 
is designed to carry the EDS and LSAM into a 30 X 100 nmi orbit prior to launch of the 
crew.  
Table 1: CaLV Propulsion System Summary 
 Vacuum Thrust [lb] Vacuum Isp[s] Propellant [lb] 
Core Stage 2,300,000 452 2,200,000 
5-Segment SRBs 7,600,000 265 2,800,000 
2nd Stage/ EDS 549,000 451 488,000 
 
  
 The upper stage of the CaLV doubles as the EDS which is responsible for 
performing the trans-lunar injection maneuver. Utilizing the 2nd stage for this maneuver 
instead of adding a third stage decreases the total mass of the vehicle because less 
engines and tanks are required. This stage is therefore designed to hold 488,000 lbm of 
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usable propellant of which only 264,000 lbm is used during 2nd stage ascent. The 
remaining propellant provides a significant in-space propulsive capability, but could be 
greatly increased if the full 488,000 lbm of propellant was available in LEO. The EDS 
tanks could be filled in LEO through propellant refueling. This additional propellant 
would allow the EDS to perform a wider range of missions including performing the 
LOI, originally performed by the LSAM, or proving large payloads to missions beyond 
the Moon.  
 There are a number of other potentially beneficially design changes on the CaLV 
that could be made to take advantage of propellant refueling. As discussed above, the 
EDS is a very large propulsive stage that could be utilized to perform a much wider 
variety of maneuvers than is possible with the baseline design. The immense size of the 
CaLV is partially due to the need to deliver the TLI propellant to LEO. Replacing the TLI 
propellant with propellant from the LEO depot would greatly reduce the size and mass of 
the launch vehicle. Also by not having to carry the TLI propellant to orbit, greater design 
margins could be achieved. It is also possible to increase the propellant burned during the 
2nd stage ascent to provide a greater payload capability to LEO (although limited because 
of gravity losses). Much of the launch vehicle design revolves around the quantity of 
propellant that must be delivered to LEO for in-space maneuvers, with the introduction of 
propellant refueling this burden can be removed increasing the design flexibility of the 
exploration architecture.  
2.1.3 LUNAR SURFACE ACCESS MODULE (LSAM) SUMMARY  
 The Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) provides both access to the lunar 
surface and a habitat for humans during exploration missions. Once in Low Lunar Orbit 
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(LLO), the crew transfers from the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to the LSAM for 
descent and landing on the surface. The crew utilizes the LSAM as a base of operations 
while on the surface. The Ascent Stage is used to return the crew to the CEV in LLO 
(Figure 3). The lander follows a similar design approach used during the Apollo program, 
though the ESAS baseline lander can reach a greater variety of locations on the Moon, 
support up to four crew, and remain on the surface for seven days. All of which are 
significant improvements over the Apollo program; however, more payload capability for 
the entire system architecture is required.   
 The LSAM is a two stage vehicle design (Figure 5). A Descent Stage which is 
responsible for inserting the LSAM, CEV and SM into lunar orbit and transferring the 
lander from orbit to the surface of the Moon. These two maneuvers require 60,000 lbm of 
propellant, which is more than 50 percent of the entire LSAM gross mass. The descent 
stage is powered by a LOX/LH2 propulsion system which is derived from the currently 
available RL-10 engine [ESAS, pp. 166].  The four descent engines generate 60,000 lbm 
of thrust with an Isp of 460s. The descent stage remains on the lunar surface at the 
completion of the missions. The ascent stage is primarily a pressurized living 
environment designed to house the crew during the seven day lunar surface mission. The 
ascent stage has a total pressurized volume of 1,100 cubic feet. This pressurized volume 
also contains a separating bulkhead to allow a section of the habitat to be depressurized to 
allow egress from the vehicle to the lunar surface. The ascent stage also returns the crew 
from the surface of the Moon to lunar orbit at the completion of the mission. This is 
accomplished with a single LOX/Methane engine capable of generating 10,000 lbm of 
thrust. The LOX/Methane engine was selected to provide commonality with future Mars 
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missions, since Methane can be processed from the Mars atmosphere. A number of 
alternative Ascent Stage propellant were considered during the ESAS and remain under 
consideration. This study will allow the ascent stage engine to vary among four possible 
alternatives. These alternatives include the baseline LOX/Methane engine, a storable 
propellant system like Apollo, and both a pressure and pump fed LOX/LH2 system. A 
more detailed description of each engine is discussed in Chapter 3. Once the crew has 
been returned to the CEV, the ascent stage is discarded. The LSAM is 100 percent 
expendable, and new vehicle is required for each mission.  
 The baseline lander is currently designed to perform the LOI maneuver, which 
requires 30,000 lbm of propellant. If the lander was not required to perform this 
maneuver (EDS is filled on orbit to do the LOI) than the gross mass, as calculated by the 
tools used for this study, would be decreased by 48,000 lbm. This is close to 50 percent 
of the current LSAM total gross mass. In addition to resulting in a smaller lander, this 
would reduce the LEO payload requirements of the CaLV, potentially resulting in a 
smaller launch vehicle. Another potential approach to removing the LOI maneuver from 
the lander would be to hold the gross mass of the vehicle constant and allow the payload 
capability to increase. Thus, the reduction in propellant mass could be replaced with 
additional payload capability.  
 
2.1.4 CREW LAUNCH VEHICLE SUMMARY 
 The crew launch vehicle is designed to provide reliable transportation of humans 
and cargo from the Earth’s surface to Low Earth Orbit. The ESAS results favor the use of 
Shuttle-derived launch vehicles for the goals of servicing the International Space Station 
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after the retirement of the STS and supporting the proposed lunar exploration program. 
The CLV is a Space Shuttle-derived launch vehicle. The CLV uses Shuttle heritage 
components such as the reusable solid rocket booster and the Space Shuttle Main Engine 
(SSME) to both reduce overall development cost and schedule as well as take advantage 
of the significant effort already spent on increasing the reliability of the Shuttle 
components. In the baseline architecture, the CLV is responsible for delivering the CEV 
to LEO.  
 The CLV is a 2-stage expendable launch vehicle designed to be the highest 
reliability launch vehicle ever built (Figure 4). The vehicle consists of a four segment 
solid rocket booster first stage, taking heritage from the SRBs used on the Space Shuttle. 
The 2nd stage is a LOX/LH2 propulsion system powered by one SSME. The SSME 
design will be modified to start at altitude. Both the SSME and SRBs have proven to be 
highly reliable launch systems. A key aspect of the CLV’s crew safety is the additional of 
a launch abort tower place at the top of the vehicle. This escape system can be used 
separate the crew of the CLV is case of a catastrophic failure. The CLV is designed to 
carry a payload of approximately 59,900 lbm into a 30 X 100 nmi orbit injected at 60 
nmi. This payload mass was chosen as a result of the ESAS study for the CEV design. 
This orbit will allow the CEV to rendezvous with the pre-launched EDS and LSAM. The 
resulting vehicle is 290 ft tall with a mass of 1.78 million pounds.  
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Figure 4: ESAS Baseline Launch Vehicles 
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Figure 5: ESAS Baseline Lunar Surface Access Module 
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 The work in this thesis will assume a constant CLV configuration and will make 
no design changes throughout the study. While the CLV has potential to take advantage 
of propellant refueling by offloading propellant from the service module or refueling the 
2nd stage in LEO, this will not be considered in this work. This will be considered as 
potential future work.  
 
2.1.5 CREW EXPLORATION VEHICLE (CEV) SUMMARY 
 The CEV consists of a Crew Module (CM) and Service Module (SM) which are 
both launched together aboard the CLV and remain attached until just prior to CM 
reentry (Figure 3). The CEV provides life support systems for the crew while transferring 
between the Earth and Moon and during LEO operations. This includes transportation to 
the International Space Station. The CEV is also responsible for reentry for both lunar 
and ISS missions. The Service Module (SM) is the propulsion system for the CM. This 
vehicle provides the Trans-Earth Injection (TEI) maneuver to return the CEV from lunar 
orbit and provides the capability to transfer the CEV from its insertion orbit to the ISS.  
 The CEV Crew Module (CM), shown in Figure 6, is a scaled up version of the 18 
ft diameter Apollo capsule that is capable of transporting up to four crew members during 
lunar mission and up to six crew for missions to ISS. The CM provides from 425 to 525 
cubic feet of habitable volume during lunar missions depending on the final 
configuration. The CM also utilizes a blunt-body capsule to provide a heritage design 
from previous human and robotic missions. The CM is designed to be completely re-
usable except for the ablative heat shield and landing systems that must be replaced after 
each mission. The CM has no main propulsion system and relies on the service module 
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for all major propulsive maneuvers. The SM was design to utilize a LOX/Methane 
propulsion system in order to obtain commonality with the Ascent Stage of the LSAM. 
Utilizing this system for initial ISS mission helps improve system reliability prior to 
beginning the lunar campaign. A solar array was selected as the primary power system to 
achieve better performance for long duration missions. 
 The configuration of the CM and SM are held constant throughout this study with 
a mass of 44,000 lbm. This mass is used when completing the TLI and LOI maneuvers. 
The SM is highly dependent on the amount of propellant it must carry and could 
potentially be refueled in LEO. Additional work, beyond the scope of this thesis, is 
needed to determine if potential value can be achieved by refueling the service module.   
 
 
Crew Escape SystemCrew Escape System
Crew Module
Service Module
 
Figure 6: ESAS Baseline CEV  
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2.2 PREVIOUS PROPELLANT REFUELING DESIGN STUDIES 
 The concept of in-space propellant refueling has been studied since the 1950’s, 
when the Air Force began investigating how its aircraft refueling techniques could be 
applied to in-space operations. The idea behind propellant refueling is that a vehicle can 
gain better overall performance if it does not need to carry all of its propellant from the 
start of the mission. Aircraft have been using this concept since the 1920’s [10]. Long- 
range cargo aircraft such as the KC-135 are able to re-fuel short-range fighters. This 
greatly increases the range of the fighter aircraft, allowing them to perform a wider range 
of missions. This same concept can be applied to space exploration missions. In this case, 
the propellant required for in-space operations is delivered to LEO and stored in an 
orbiting propellant depot. The propellant can then be transferred to any of the architecture 
elements as needed. Providing this propellant on-orbit can reduce the payload 
requirement for the cargo delivery vehicle by as much as 75% for a lunar mission [11].  
 On-orbit propellant refueling has not yet been put into practice, but much research 
has been done on this subject. On-orbit propellant refueling research can be broken down 
into three general areas of focus. The first is the use of propellant depots in exploration 
missions, the second is utilizing propellant depots to provide increased life and 
performance for commercial satellites, and the third is the design and technological 
development of cryogenic in-space propellant storage and transfer. The following 
sections will summarize the literature that has been written on each of these areas, 
describe how it affects the work being done in this thesis, and how the work here will 
expand upon what has already been studied.  
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2.2.1 PROPELLANT REFUELING IN EXPLORATION MISSIONS 
 A thorough search of the literature was conducted to investigate how propellant 
refueling had been applied to previous exploration mission studies. These studies showed 
that much of the research conducted so far has focused on human missions to the Moon 
and Mars. There was also limited discussion on the possible use of propellant refueling 
for robotic science missions. The bulk of the previous research focuses on a more 
conceptual understanding of propellant refueling and the possible benefits and challenges 
associated with its development. Only a limited amount of work has been done to provide 
analytical results as to the benefits and costs propellant refueling would add to an 
exploration architecture. The following will outline the work done in utilizing propellant 
refueling in exploration missions.   
  The lunar orbital rendezvous concept of operations leading to the Apollo 
architecture, discussed in much of the literature, has similar core components as the 
ESAS architecture discussed above and of that shown in Figure 7. It requires a launch 
vehicles to deliver crew and cargo to LEO, vehicles to transfer the crew and cargo to low-
lunar orbit, vehicles to perform lunar maneuvers, and Earth return vehicles. The main 
differences in these studies are which vehicles are needed to perform each leg of the 
mission and which architecture elements are re-fueled.  
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Figure 7: Typical Lunar Concept of Operations 
 
2.2.2 APOLLO LUNAR ARCHITECTURE 
 
 The first notable study of propellant refueling was during the initial development 
of the Apollo lunar architecture. The original lunar architecture was a Direct approach 
that relied on the use of a very large NOVA [12] class launch vehicle. This vehicle would 
not require an Earth or lunar orbit rendezvous and would deliver all architecture elements 
directly to the lunar surface. A single direct launch vehicle was shown to be technically 
impossible within the time frame of the Apollo program [13]. The Earth Orbit 
Rendezvous (EOR) solution, Figure 8, was proposed to solve the problems with the 
initial Direct approach [14]. The EOR utilized a tanker refueling option in LEO to reduce 
the size of the launch vehicle. While never selected, this option was considered by many 
within NASA, including Wernher Von Braun, to be the best option because of EOR’s 
potential for future exploration systems [14]. The EOR architecture required the launch 
of two Saturn V class launch vehicles. The first launch delivered a refueling tanker and 
the second delivered the crew and in-space transfer elements. The two vehicles would 
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rendezvous and dock in LEO, and the tanker element would transfer liquid oxygen to the 
in-space propulsion vehicles. The EOR would allow a smaller launch vehicle to be 
developed because the in-space propellant would be provided during a separate launch 
thus reducing the payload requirements on the vehicle. The remaining architecture would 
follow the direct lunar mission approach.  
 
 
Figure 8: Apollo EOR Mission Mode [15] 
 
 The drawback of the EOR architecture is that it required the launch of two launch 
vehicles which increased the cost of the architecture and decreased mission reliability, 
because both launch vehicles had to be successful in order to complete the mission. The 
EOR approach would also rely on the use of propellant transfer which had no historical 
reference to draw upon. The EOR option was eventually not selected because the 
refueling technology could not be fully tested within the timeframe of the lunar program 
and it also required two launches per mission.  
 The final Apollo architecture utilized the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous. The primary 
reason LOR was selected over EOR was due to the shorter time frame needed to meet the 
goal of landing a man on the moon [13]. This architecture only required one reasonably 
sized launch vehicle because of the inherent in-space staging strategies. The initial 
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analysis showed that both the LOR and EOR modes where technically feasible and could 
meet the strategic needs of the nation, however the results showed that the LOR option 
offers a 10 – 15% lower cost and higher mission success probability because it relied on a 
single launch vehicle. 
 The Apollo EOR study showed that propellant refueling offers an improvement 
over systems where all elements are launched on a single vehicle. This study also 
demonstrated that launching the in-space propellant separately resulted in a more 
technically feasible architecture solution than a Direct approach because of the reduced 
payload requirements on the launch vehicle. This work will investigate how this concept 
can best be applied to the design of the cargo launch vehicle. The Apollo study also 
alluded to the fact that a low-cost propellant deliver method is required in order to reduce 
the cost of exploration systems.  
 
Result: Propellant refueling can be utilized to reduce the payload requirement on the 
launch vehicle by eliminating the need to carry the in-space propellant. This could 
significantly affect the design of the NASA cargo launch vehicle.  
 
Result: The primary draw back found during the Apollo lunar mode study was the 
additional launch cost of the tanker vehicle.  Utilizing a low-cost existing or proposed 
commercial launch vehicle(s) could alleviate this concern.  
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2.2.3 REFUELING WITH CURRENT SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
 
 The study performed by Cady [11] utilizes the Space Transportation System 
(STS) and the derivative STS-C to deliver crew and cargo to LEO, the International 
Space Station as the refueling node, a re-usable Lunar Transfer Vehicle to transfer the 
architecture elements between Earth and lunar orbit and a re-usable Lunar Excursion 
Vehicle that provides transportation to and from the surface of the moon. This study 
primarily focuses on how the propellant transfer is handled at the refueling node and 
considered four initial options. In option one, the refueling tanks are directly transferred 
to the LTV at the ISS. In option two, the tanker docks with the ISS and provides direct 
propellant transfer to the LTV. In option three, an orbiting depot is developed instead of 
utilizing the ISS and the propellant tanks are transferred to the depot from the tanker. In 
the final concept, an orbiting depot is utilized and the tanker directly transfers propellant 
to the depots storage tanks. The results of the study provided no conclusions as to which 
method provided the best refueling option. The options which utilized the ISS resulted in 
lower cost solutions but provided an increase risk to the space station. The two solutions 
with the new depot offered a better performance because the depot was located at a lower 
orbital inclination, but had a larger development cost.  
 This study had a number of shortcomings and provided little insight into the 
potential benefits of propellant refueling. The most important shortcoming is that the 
study assumed an architecture that utilized propellant refueling and did not trade it 
against a baseline design that accomplished the same mission without the use of 
refueling. Therefore no conclusion could be made as to the potential benefits of adding it 
to the architecture. While the study did attempt to discuss the impact of various 
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propellant transfer strategies, it provided little detail to understand the benefits and cost of 
each option. Much of the study focused on developing which concepts to consider and 
how they should be evaluated. The study also failed to consider more than one potential 
refueling option. The lunar transfer vehicle was the only element of the architecture 
considered for refueling and details on the impact of this decision were not discussed.  
 The results from this study showed that both tank and direct fluid transfer offer 
both positive and negative impacts on the architecture with neither design choice showing 
any distinct advantage over the other. The location of the depot will likely correspond to 
the orbit already being utilized by the architecture to maximize the performance from the 
propellant delivery system. The author does point out that the results of this study are 
preliminary and additional work is required, including an investigation of a series of 
additional trades. To date, no additional work has been published.  
 
2.2.4 REFUELING WITH REUSABLE LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 
 Koelle, in his paper “Lunar Space Transportation System Options,” [16] proposed 
three options where propellant refueling could benefit lunar exploration missions; these 
three concepts are outlined in Figure 9. A fourth option is also provided to represent an 
Apollo lunar orbit rendezvous type solution and serves as a baseline point of reference. In 
concepts 1 – 3 all architecture elements are re-usable. Option one utilizes a three stage 
heavy lift launch vehicle to perform a direct lunar mission, whereby the same vehicle is 
used from the Earths’ surface to lunar orbit.  A re-usable lunar ferry is waiting in orbit to 
transfer the crew and cargo to and from the surface of the moon. The propellant for this 
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ferry is provided through fluid transfer from the 3rd stage of the launch vehicle. Option 
two utilizes three re-usable vehicles: a single stage to orbit launch vehicle (SSTO), a 
lunar transfer vehicle (LTV), and a lunar ferry. The SSTO provides transportation of 
crew, cargo and propellant to and from LEO. The LTV is re-fueled by the SSTO in LEO 
and provides transportation to and from lunar orbit. The LTV provides propellant to the 
lunar ferry which provides transportation of the crew and cargo to and from the lunar 
surface. The third option utilizes a single vehicle to transfer from Earth to the lunar 
surface and back with a stop in LEO to re-fuel at an orbiting depot. All three concepts 
could be designed to utilize propellant refueling in either lunar orbit or on the lunar 
surface. This propellant could potentially be developed directly from lunar resources. The 
author discusses the potential for payload improvement if a reliable and low-cost 
propellant delivery system was available on the Moon.  
 
 
Figure 9: Lunar Transportation System Options [16] 
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 In all three alternative concepts, a new re-usable launch vehicle is required. In the 
first option, a three stage re-usable launch vehicle is developed with the third stage being 
used as the in-space transfer stage. The second and third concepts require the 
development of a SSTO launch vehicle. The author also shows that the propellant 
required to transfer from the Earth’s surface to LEO is similar to the propellant required 
to transfer from LEO to the moon. This would make a node located in LEO the most 
logical option. In this case, the same vehicle could be used for both ascent and lunar 
transfer and is seen in option three. Similar to the study by Cady, only re-usable elements 
are considered in this architecture, making it fundamentally different than the completely 
expendable baseline architecture currently being developed by NASA 
 The author provides all four of these concepts as possible lunar architectures to be 
considered for future development though little detail is provided as to the potential 
benefit of each. He states that a “best” solution can not be determined from the 
information provided and additional work is needed to truly investigate the viability of 
these concepts as lunar mission options. The author fails to make a comparison between 
the four architecture solutions and focuses most of the paper on concept three. The results 
of the author’s analysis shows that a large amount of propellant is needed in order to 
perform the in-space maneuvers and requires a significant number of launches to provide 
all of the propellant to LEO. In some cases 32 launches are needed to provide sufficient 
propellant for the lunar mission. This leads the author to the conclusion that a dedicated 
tanker vehicle would be needed to provide sufficient propellant to the architecture and to 
achieve a launch price that makes this solution economically viable. The author also 
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discusses that this cost can be decreased if lunar resources are used to provide the 
propellant to the architecture. A detailed explanation of this conclusion was not provided.  
 
Result: The Earth Departure Stage can be used to perform a greater portion of the in-
space maneuvers. This would increase the payload mass that can be delivered to the 
lunar surface.  
  
2.2.5 REFUELING IN DESTINATION ORBIT FOR RETURN MANEUVERS 
 
 The work done by Folta [17] considers the concept of propellant refueling by 
placing a depot in the destination orbit to provide the Earth return propellant. This study 
considers placing propellant depots in both lunar and Mars orbit. This approach 
significantly decreases the outbound payload requirements and the size of the in-space 
transfer vehicle. The cost to the architecture is the number of additional launches required 
to preposition the Earth return propellant. This refueling option is only a small part of the 
overall study presented by Folta. Most of the work presented in this paper focused on the 
idea of On-Orbit Staging, and how improved performance can be achieved through 
“basic staging” of the in-space transfer vehicle. The introduction of multiple new 
techniques makes it difficult to single out the potential benefits provided by propellant 
refueling. The author does provide a limited set of data that shows the potential payload 
improvement achieved through the addition of prepositions propellant. A summary of 
these are provided in Figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Lunar Surface Payload using OOS and Return Depots 
 
 In order to discuss the results shown in Figure 10 the reader should ignore the “4-
stage” cases because these refer to the use of On Orbit Staging which does not apply to 
propellant refueling. The “1-stage” and “1-stage with Depot” results show the increase in 
lunar surface payload capability achieved when the architecture makes use of 
propositioned propellant in lunar orbit that is utilized for the return transfer maneuver. 
These results assume a 120 mt LEO payload capability and reusable transfer vehicle 
between Earth orbit and lunar orbit and a reusable lunar lander for transfer to and from 
the surface. These results show a potential improvement in the lunar surface payload of 
95 percent depending on the return delta-V requirements can be achieved. A number of 
assumptions go into these results but they begin to provide insight into the potential 
payload improvement with this implementation of propellant refueling for return mission 
maneuvers.   
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 There are two key concepts from this work. The first is that the introduction of a 
propellant depot in either Mars or Lunar orbit has the potential to increase surface 
payload capability. The second is that the amount of propellant needed for Earth return 
missions, in particular for Mars mission, can be substantial and the ability to decrease the 
propellant delivery price to $1,000/kg can potentially save NASA’s exploration program 
billions of dollars. As was also pointed out in the work done by Koelle, the need for low-
cost propellant delivery is vital to the viability of propellant refueling.  
 
Result: A depot in Lunar or Martian orbit that is capable of providing the Earth return 
propellants can increase the surface payload capability of the architecture.  
 
Result: A low-cost propellant delivery method is required for the continuing development 
of propellant refueling. What price level constitutes a low cost solution? 
 
2.2.6 REFUELING WITH NASA BASELINE ARCHITECTURE 
 
 A number of more recent studies have emerged since the announcement of the 
ESAS baseline architecture. These studies have focused on improving or in some way 
make use of the ESAS architecture elements. A number of concepts have been offer by 
Bienhoff as potential improvements to NASA exploration architecture. In his paper 
“Propellant Depots for Earth Orbit and Lunar Exploration” [18] Bienhoff investigates 
how the lunar surface payload capability can be improved if propellant refueling is 
availiable in LEO. Two potential concepts are proposed. The first is to re-fuel the portion 
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of the EDS propellant used during ascent which could improve the lunar surface payload 
capability by as much as 183% depending on the amount of propellant provided to the 
EDS. This would increase the capability of the EDS, but an additional means of 
providing an increase in payload to LEO would be needed. The second method would be 
to allow the EDS to perform both the TLI and LOI maneuvers. This would allow the 
lander to decrease the amount of propellant needed for its mission maneuvers. No longer 
requiring the LSAM to perform the LOI could potentially increase the surface payload 
capability from 18 mt to 51 mt, assuming the lander could be designed to house such an 
increase in payload capability. In both cases, the addition of propellant refueling in LEO 
can greatly increase the payload capability of the architecture. While this work discusses 
the performance benefits of propellant refueling, it does not investigate the additional 
costs or risks associated with implementing this capability into the current architecture. 
An additional investigation is needed to quantify these effects.  
This study also discusses the cost advantages of incrementally building up the 
propellant depot utilizing the upper stages of commercial launch vehicle. The upper 
stages of both the Delta and Atlas class of launch vehicles utilize LOX/LH2 propellant 
and could be salvaged and utilized as the storage systems for the depot. A number of 
concepts are proposed and qualitatively compared based on the development/assembly 
cost, ease of integration and storage performance among a number of other criteria. 
 
Result: Utilizing propellant refueling in LEO to increase the propellant on the EDS 
allows it to perform a wider variety of missions and increase the lunar surface payload 
capability of the baseline architecture.  
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2.2.7 NASA’S REFUELING STUDIES 
 
 The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has begun some initial work on In-
space cryogenic propellant depots and how they could be applied to exploration 
applications. To date, little has been published on how they would apply a cryogenic 
depot to an exploration mission. A status report of their work was published in November 
2006 [19]. This report outlines their work, which includes some initial propellant depot 
designs and explains how a LEO propellant depot could benefit commercial operators. 
This report suggests that a propellant depot could “offer significant advantages for 
NASA’s space exploration systems”. The details of these advantages are left up to future 
work; this work will include applying the propellant refueling concept to ESAS 
architecture. An outline of the future work to be completed as a part of this study is 
provided below. The first step in their future work aligns well with the work being done 
in this thesis, though little is known of the status of this work and the details being 
investigated. 
 
1. Make in-space cryogenic propellant depots (ISCPD) part of the ESAS architecture 
2. Encourage commercial development of ISCPD  
3. Design cryogenic upper stage capable of propellant transfer with ISCPD 
4. Conduct ground and flight experiments utilizing ISCPD components 
5. Build and test prototype ISCPD module 
6. Study lunar surface ISCPD  
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 The NASA Langley Research Center has also conducted a recent study that 
involves the use of propellant refueling. The Orbital Aggregation and Space 
Infrastructure System (OASIS) [20] study was conducted over several years and involved 
the design of a permanent lunar architecture that could transfer crew and cargo from the 
ISS to the lunar surface. The architecture utilized re-usable in-space architecture elements 
in order to reduce the hardware that had to be launched to LEO for each mission. The 
chemical transfer stage and propellant module would provide transportation for crew and 
cargo between LEO and the first Earth-Moon Lagrange point (L1). A lunar transfer 
vehicle could be placed at L1 to provided transportation too and from the lunar surface. 
The baseline ESAS architecture requires that all architecture elements be delivered for 
each mission, which requires the development of a large heavy lift launch vehicle. 
Utilizing these re-usable stages would allow for a smaller launch vehicle design. In 
addition, a number of refueling flights would be needed to provide the needed in-space 
propellant which could be provided by a low-cost commercial operator. This study 
suggested that propellant would need to be delivered at a rate of less than $1,000/kg. The 
feasibility of this price will be presented at the end of this chapter.  
 
Result: Propellant refueling provides a path for developing re-usable in-space 
architecture elements. These re-usable elements would help reduce the launch vehicle 
payload requirements.  
 
 
47 
2.2.8 SUMMARY OF REFUELING DESIGN STUDIES 
 
 A summary of the different vehicles concepts that have been discussed in this 
chapter are provided in Table 2. While the general architecture for a lunar mission 
remains the same, each concept provided their own solution to accomplish each leg of the 
lunar mission. The most notable difference between these studies and the current lunar 
architecture is the use of re-usable launch elements instead of expendable vehicles. Re-
usable architecture elements rely on the ability to be re-fueled in order to continue to 
provide their mission maneuvers. The work presented in this thesis will focus on the 
current lunar architecture elements and will not investigate the impact on re-usable 
architecture elements.  
 
Table 2: Comparison of Vehicle Concepts Considered 
Design Previous Studies Current Concepts 
Launch Vehicle Saturn V[13], STS-C[11], SSTO[16], RHLV[16] CaLV, CLV 
In-Space Transfer Upper Stage[13] LTV[11,16], SSTO[16] EDS 
Lunar Lander LuBUS[16], SSTO[16], LEV[11] LSAM 
Earth Return SM[13], LTV[11,16],SSTO[16] SM 
Depot Location LEO[13,16], ISS[11,20], LLO[18], Mars[18] -- 
 
 
 
 
48 
 A number of results have been presented in this chapter to summarize the 
important conclusions made during this literature review. Below are four hypotheses that 
will be examined during this thesis that have been developed from the results of the 
previous design studies.   
 
o The concept of propellant refueling is technically feasible and does not result in 
a significant decrease in the architecture’s mission success probability as 
discussed in the Apollo Mission Mode Analysis [13]. 
 
o Utilizing propellant re-fueling in LEO can increase the propellant on the EDS, 
allowing it to perform a wider variety of missions and increase the lunar surface 
payload capability of the baseline architecture. [13, 16, 18].  
 
o A propellant depot in lunar or Martian orbit can improve the extensibility of 
NASA’s exploration architecture by decreasing the amount of propellant that 
the architecture elements must deliver to LEO. [17, 18]  
  
o A low cost propellant delivery price is needed to make re-fueling affordable to 
NASA’s exploration program [13, 16, 17, 20].  
 
 A number of design concepts utilizing propellant refueling have been discussed in 
this chapter. In the previous section, a summary of the conclusions from these studies was 
presented. While these studies provided an initial look at propellant refueling, they failed 
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to provide a comprehensive analysis of the entire propellant refueling design space. This 
thesis will address the inadequacies of these previous studies and explain what must be 
addressed in order to obtain a complete understanding of how propellant refueling can 
impact future exploration missions.  
 The primary piece of information missing from the majority of the previous 
design work is a detailed quantitative analysis. The studies usually focus on describing 
the concept of interest and how it would utilize propellant refueling, while a detailed 
analysis of the overall performance is provided only as an afterthought or is left to future 
work making it difficult to understand the benefits that are achieved. Most of the previous 
work also only considers a single implementation of propellant refueling and does not 
provide a complete investigation of how various methods impact the design of the 
architecture. It is difficult to develop a complete understanding of propellant refueling 
because, depending on the study, each method is evaluated with various vehicles and 
design assumptions. A unified analysis would provide a clearer depiction of the effects of 
propellant refueling. A recurring theme throughout much of the previous work is that 
propellant refueling is required for future exploration missions, but no analysis is 
provided to verify this claim. In order to understand if exploration missions benefit from 
the introduction of propellant refueling, a reference architecture is required that does not 
utilize propellant refueling. In this study, the baseline ESAS lunar architecture is used as 
a point of comparison. By utilizing a set of FOMs, the impacts of propellant refueling can 
be measured. The primary analysis presented in these studies focuses on a single 
evaluation criterion. This is often the change in payload capability, but this metric does 
not consider the full impact of propellant refueling. The effects on life cycle cost, 
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reliability, and development risk, as well as payload capability, must also be evaluated to 
fully understand the total impact. The final shortcoming of these studies is that all but the 
work done by Beinhoff has focused on either out-dated concepts, such as the Space 
Shuttle, or on re-useable architecture elements.  Neither scenario is a part of the next step 
in NASA’s exploration program.   
 The work presented in this thesis will attempt to provide a more complete 
investigation as to the potential benefits and cost that would be associated with in-space 
refueling and examine how it would apply to NASA’s current vision for space 
exploration. The results of this study will answer the following questions:  
 
• What improvement in lunar surface payload can be achieved? 
• Is there an improvement in the overall life cycle cost of the program? 
• Can the mission success and overall reliability be improved? 
• Does this capability provide an easier pathway to other exploration missions?  
• Is low cost propellant delivery realistic at the quantities required for exploration? 
• Is there a transportation architecture that can benefit from in-space refueling? 
 
2.3 CURRENT PROPELLANT REFUELING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT 
 In addition to understanding how propellant refueling could benefit future 
exploration missions, it is also important to understand the feasibility of this new 
technology and the development risk associated with maturing it to the appropriate level. 
There are nine main areas of focus associated with the development of in-space cryogenic 
propellant refueling [21] as shown in Figure 11. The current research has focused on how 
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the fluid could be transferred in a zero-g environment and how propellant boiloff can be 
controlled through both active and passive systems.  
   
 
Figure 11: Cryogenic Fluid Management Key Concepts 
 
 The ability to develop these systems will be essential to the viability of propellant 
re-fuelling as a long-term solution to the growing needs of future exploration missions.  
 
2.3.1 IN-SPACE PROPELLANT TRANSFER TECHNOLOGIES 
 There are several methods that provide the capability to transfer fluids in a zero-g 
environment. The ability to transfer propellant in such an environment is not a new 
technology and is routinely done in today’s space operations. Propellant is transferred 
from tank to engine and, in some cases, from tank to tank. The ability to make and break 
the fluid transfer interface is what makes this so difficult because little has been 
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developed in this area [22]. It should be noted that, while little advancement has been 
made on the side of US space operations, the Russian Space Agency had began using this 
technology in the late 70s to re-fuel the Salyut Space Stations [22]. While this technology 
may not be directly applicable to current fluid transfer operation, it does provide a proof 
of concept that fluid transfer can be obtained in a zero-g environment for storable 
propellants. The most notable fluid transfer test performed to date by NASA is the 
Orbital Refueling System that was tested on STS 41-G [23]. This experiment made six 
successful transfers of 142kg of Hydrazine between two separate tanks. An extra-
vehicular activity (EVA) was also performed to connect a fluid transfer line to a 
simulated satellite valve. There are significant differences between hydrazine and 
cryogenic fluids, but this was a significant initial achievement.  
 The simplest concept for cryogenic fluid transfer is the transferring of propellant 
through either linear or angular acceleration. In this case, the propellant is transferred 
from one tank to another through simple gravitational forces [24]. An example of a linear 
acceleration system is provided in Figure 12. Given a one foot diameter transfer line and 
a 10-4 acceleration environment, the fluid transfer of LH2 would occur at a rate of 8 
lbm/sec [24]. The disadvantage with this type of transfer system is that a propulsion 
system is required that is capable of maintaining the gravitational field for several hours. 
This type of system may not be realistic for large propellant transfer. In that case, a pump 
or pressure system may provide a more effective means of fluid transfer. 
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Figure 12: Linear Acceleration Fluid Transfer Technique [24] 
 
 Boeretz outlines several non-acceleration options that may be more applicable to 
large propellant transfer needs [24]. These options include the use of an inert or boiloff 
gas as the pressurant, a low net positive suction head transfer pump, and a gas generator 
pressurization option. The author points out that the selection of one of these methods 
greatly depends on the quantity of propellant to be transferred, the availiable transfer 
time, and the propellant fluid type. Additional research is required in each of these areas 
to more accurately determine the best option.  
 One of the most promising concepts for cryogenic propellant transfer is “no-vent 
fill”[23]. In this system the propellant is pressurized with its own vapor pressure and then 
liquid sub-cooling is used to return the remaining vapor back to a liquid at a small cost of 
propellant. In this case only minimal venting of propellant is required. Large-scale 
ground testing of a LH2 no-vent fill system has been conducted utilizing near flight ready 
hardware. These tests have shown that a 90 percent transfer of propellant can be 
achieved. To date, no in-space demonstration has been conducted.   
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2.3.2 LONG TERM PROPELLANT BOILOFF MITIGATION TECHNIQUES  
 Propellant boiloff mitigation can be achieved through the use of both active and 
passive systems. Passive techniques such as multi-layer insulation (MLI) and vapor-
cooled shields have a more mature development than active systems, but they can not 
achieve zero boiloff levels. The current state of the art in passive insulation can limit 
propellant loss of liquid hydrogen (LH2) to approximately three percent per month [21], a 
level that would not be insufficient for long-term propellant storage. An active thermal 
management system uses cryo-coolers to keep the propellant below its vaporization 
temperature. A cryo-cooler is a refrigeration system design to maintain cryogenic 
temperature levels. In this case, near zero boiloff levels are achievable over long 
durations. An active system requires additional vehicle dry mass, but studies have shown 
that this additional mass can be offset by the propellant savings within as little as seven 
days [21]. Chato describes the technology readiness level of advanced passive thermal 
management methods to be around five and of active systems to be between three or four 
depending on the propellant selected. These TRL levels could be advanced to six, the 
minimal level NASA will consider, through a limited number of tests in a LEO 
environment.  
 The Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has built a test bed that has been used 
for developing more efficient active and passive insulation systems. The initial work 
done using the test bed focused on a material similar to that used in the Shuttle External 
Tank (Isofoam SS-1171) [25] to protect during ground holds and ascent. The results of 
this study showed that a 41 percent heat leak reduction could be achieved with 25 fewer 
MLI layers than to that of the best previous MLI performance using variable density 
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MLI. Recent work utilizing the hydrogen test bed has focused on the development of 
active zero boiloff systems. The system was able to show that LH2 could be maintained 
at zero boiloff levels for the life of the cryo-coolers at a 25, 50 and 90% fill of the storage 
tank. The system has not been flight qualified nor has it been developed to a flight ready 
level. The test provided evidence that zero boiloff is obtainable. The issue now is 
developing a system that can reach these levels with minimal mass so that active thermal 
management systems provide a more attractive option than current passive systems.     
 Schuster has provided four conceptual-level designs for active propellant cooling. 
These systems use hydrogen boiloff that is passed through vapor-cooled shields to 
regulate the environmental temperature [26]. A schematic for each of these systems is 
provided in Figure 13. Concepts one through three have a minimal amount of boiloff that 
is stored for use in tanking, while the fourth re-liquefies all boiloff propellant reaching 
zero boiloff conditions. An additional pumping system is required for propellant transfer. 
Based on the assumptions of this study, the first concept is preferred from a development 
standpoint because it offers the lowest estimated development and production cost since a 
refrigeration system is not required. It does result in a 0.2% boiloff per month which 
would likely increase the price of propellant because more launches are required.  
 
56 
 
Figure 13: Boiloff Management Concept Schematics [26] 
  
 Platcha conducted a study in 2004 to test zero boiloff capabilities in a thermally 
relevant environment. The experiment used both MLI and cryo-coolers to control the 
internal pressure of the storage system to prevent the need of propellant venting. The use 
of both and active and passive system may provide a more optimal solution. The MLI is 
able to reduce the heat that reaches the cryogenic fluid thus reducing the heat that must be 
removed by the cryo-coolers. The test was performed under a vacuum at 230K with flight 
ready components where applicable; a detailed overview of this test can be obtained in 
reference [27]. 
 A number of recent efforts have been presented to provide the current 
development state of propellant refueling technologies. These efforts have primarily 
focused on fluid transfer and long term propellant storage. The Orbital Express satellite 
demonstrated that automated docking and fluid transfer was possible in LEO. However, 
only storable propellants were tested by this system. Additional research and testing is 
required to verify that a system can be developed to provide cryogenic fluid transfer. 
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Considerable work has also been performed by Platcha and the Marshall Space Flight 
center to advance the development of zero-boiloff technologies. Both development 
projects have show that zero-boiloff of LH2 can be achieved. However, both test beds 
were performed on the ground, and future development is needed to develop a flight 
ready and flight weight system that could be used to verify the technology in LEO. These 
test demonstrations have shown that propellant refueling technologies are obtainable in 
the near future. While the development risk of these technologies is not zero, the current 
development effort has greatly decreased the risk.  
 
2.4 COMMERCIAL LAUNCH INDUSTRY 
 One of the major requirements of propellant refueling is the ability to provide the 
large quantities of propellant to LEO that can then be utilized by the architecture 
elements. This propellant must not only be provided in possibly large quantities on a 
regular schedule, but it must also be delivered at a “low enough” cost that it remains a 
viable option for future exploration missions. This study will not focus on the cost of the 
propellant in LEO nor by whom it is provided, but rather assume a range of cost for 
deliver the propellant needed or each mission. The following section will outline the 
current launch vehicles in both the United States and international commercial launch 
markets. It will also outline the emerging industry of responsive space launch vehicles 
that promise to offer access to space at a much lower cost than is possible today.  
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2.4.1 DELTA FAMILY OF VEHICLES 
 The original Delta class launch vehicle was a derivative of the Air Force’s 
ballistic missile Thor. In 1959, NASA contracted with Douglas Aircraft to build 12 Thor-
Delta rockets that would be used to launch NASA’s first series of scientific and 
exploration payloads [28]. Over the next 50 years, the Delta family of vehicles would be 
the main launch system used for all scientific and communication satellites. Boeing 
Integrated Defense currently operates two classes of Delta launch vehicles: the Delta II 
and Delta IV. The original Delta was made obsolete with the development of the Delta II, 
and the Delta III has been retired due to lack of demand in the commercial 
communication market. The Delta II began service in 1989 and has incurred only a single 
failure in its first 100 flights [28]. The Delta IV began flights in 2002 and has currently 
conducted six successful launches of the Delta IVM (medium payload). The Delta IVH 
(heavy payload) experienced a partial failure during its maiden flight that prevented it 
from reaching its desired orbit. A summary of the capability of these vehicles can be 
found in Table 3. The Delta IVH, which is in the final testing stages, offers to provide a 
much larger payload capability at a lower $/lb.    
 
Table 3: Delta Family Launch Vehicle Summary [29] 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Delta II -7320 6,300 40 6,300 108/110 
Delta II -7925 10,900 52 4,700 108/110 
Delta II -7920 11,300 50 4,400 108/110 
Delta IVM 14,900 70 4,700 6/6 
Delta IVM+ 22,700 100 4,400 6/6 
Delta IVH 45,200 140 3,100 0/1 
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2.4.2 ATLAS FAMILY OF VEHICLES 
 The Atlas launch vehicles can also trace their history back to the early 
development of Inter-Continental Baltic Missiles (ICBM). In 1953, the Atlas rocket 
program was given the Air Force’s highest priority to accelerate it development efforts. 
In 1955, the program was given the highest national development priority due to reports 
on the status of the Russian ICBM program. Then in 1957, the first six Atlas D ICBMs 
were activated, operating out of Cooke Air Force Base. These ICBM would later be 
converted into launch vehicles capable of delivering payload into Earth orbit. The Atlas 
D was first used as a delivery vehicle during the Mercury capsule program. The first 
commercial Atlas rocket was developed after the 1987 crash of the Space Shuttle. The 
program would develop four commercial launch vehicles with progressively increasing 
payload capability. Today, only the Atlas V is still in operation, though there are many 
derivatives of this vehicle with varying payload capabilities and cost as shown in Table 4. 
The Atlas V has conducted nine out of ten successful flights, including the launch of the 
Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter and the New Horizons Pluto Mission [30]. 
 
Table 4: Atlas V Launch Vehicle Summary [29] 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Pric [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Atlas V - 501 9,000 85 9,400 13/14[31] 
Atlas V – 531 15,200 100 6,600 13/14[31] 
Atlas V – 551 18,000 110 6,100 13/14[31] 
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2.4.3 ORBITAL SCIENCES’ FAMILY OF VEHICLES 
 Orbital Sciences’ new class of launch vehicles are designed to offer a lower 
launch cost than current launch providers. These vehicles, however, offer a much smaller 
payload capability than many of the current launch vehicles, as can be seen in Table 5. 
These vehicles are able to achieve a lower launch cost through the use of similar stage 
components. They also utilize decommissioned Peacekeeper and Minuteman missile 
hardware to decrease the production cost. While these vehicles experience a higher $/lb 
for payload delivery, they are able to offer a lower overall launch cost for the smaller 
satellite launch market.  
 
Table 5: Orbital Sciences Launch Vehicle Summary [29] 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Pegasus 980 20 20,000 35/38 
Taurus 2110 3,950 35 8,800 7/8 
Minotaur  1,350 19 14,000 7/7 
 
 
2.5 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAUNCH INDUSTRY 
 In addition to the main US launch providers, there is a large list of international 
launch companies that can offer similar launch capabilities. In some cases, these vehicles 
can offer a lower launch cost, but in general these vehicles offer a similar launch cost to 
that of the United States launch providers. The following sections outline some of the 
major international launch providers.  
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2.5.1 ARIANE LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 The Ariane launch vehicles were originally designed by Arianespace, a 
commercial subsidiary of the French Space Agency Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales. 
Today the European Space Agency (ESA) works closely with Arianespace to coordinate 
all launches of the vehicles. The Ariane 1 was first launched in 1979; since then, there 
has been a total of five Ariane launch vehicles that have completed over 150 missions. 
Today only the Ariane 5 is still in operation.  The Ariane 5 launches from Guiana Space 
Center, which has approximate latitude of zero degrees. This allows the Ariane 5 to 
optimize its geostationary transfer orbit payload as it does not have to waste energy to 
change inclination. The Ariane 5 has almost the same payload capability as the Delta 
IVH and can be offered at a slightly lower launch cost. While the Ariane 5 has 
experienced four failures during its life time, it has not experienced a failure in its last 20 
launches. A summary of the Ariane 4 and 5 is provided in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Ariane Family Launch Vehicle Summary [29]  
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Ariane 4 - 40 4,600 60 13,000 97/100 
Ariane 4 - 44P 7,600 80 10,500 97/100 
Ariane 4 - 44L 10,800 100 9,300 97/100 
Ariane 5 39,600 120 3,000 30/34 
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2.5.2 RUSSIAN  LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 In the addition to the Soyuz rocket, the Russian Space Agency offers a series of 
crew and cargo launch vehicles that are used to launch non-human cargo into Earth orbit. 
The Soyuz’s primary mission is that of humans, but in addition to human missions it has 
performed numerous cargo missions. Two of the most commonly used Russian rockets 
are the Proton and Kosmos 3. The Proton has flown over 300 times and is in the same 
category as the Delta IV H and Ariane 5, delivering in excess of 40,000 lbm to LEO. The 
Kosmos has a payload capability of around 3,000 lbm and has been providing cargo 
launches since the mid 1960’s. Both of these vehicles have better than a 95% success rate 
and offer some of the lowest launch costs. A summary of these vehicles is provided in 
Table 7.  
Table 7: Russian Launch Vehicle Summary [29] 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Proton D1 46,000 85 1,850 288/300 
Kosmos 3M 3,300 12 3,600 420/440 
 
 
2.5.3 ASIAN LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 There have been a number of launch vehicles developed by China, Japan, and 
Korea in the last 20 years. These include the Long March series developed by China, the 
H series by Japan, and the KSLV in South Korea. A sample of these vehicles is provided 
in Table 8. The payload capability of these vehicles is comparative to the other 
international countries discussed, though they have yet to develop a 40,000 lbm class 
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vehicle. Their launch price is somewhere between the Russian launch vehicles and the 
Ariane V.  
Table 8: Asian Launch Vehicle Summary [29] 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Long March  8,500 40 4,700 20/24 
H-11A 202 8,800 100 11,300 12/13 
H-11A 222 20,900 140 6,700 n/a 
 
  
2.5.4 US RESPONSIVE LAUNCH VEHICLES 
 In this work, the classification of a Responsive Space Launch Vehicle will include 
those which are being developed to significantly improve the cost of accessing space. An 
example of these companies includes SpaceX, Rocket Plane Kistler (RpK), and Air 
Launch. These companies have all been founded as new entrepreneurial enterprises that 
claim to be able to achieve a lower development and operational cost than either NASA 
or the larger commercial companies. They claim to be able to do this by streamlining the 
development and operational processes. This could result in launch costs that can be as 
much as 75% less than what is currently available with today’s launch vehicles. The 
drawback with these companies is that they do not have any operational vehicles. SpaceX 
has conducted four test launches with the fourth achieving a successfully orbital 
insertion. SpaceX has completed its testing phase and will begin commercial operation in 
2009 [32]. A summary of SpaceX’s three main launch vehicles is provided in Table 9. 
Once these vehicles begin operation, their goal will be to prove to the industry that they 
can achieve the cost and reliability numbers that are promised.  
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Table 9: Responsive Space Launch Vehicles 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
Falcon I 1,500[33] 7 4,600 1/4* 
Falcon 9 21,800[34] 35 1,600 n/a 
Falcon 9 H 62,600[34] 90 1,500 n/a 
* testing phase, final test scheduled for third quarter of 2008 
 
2.5.5 NASA EXPLORATION ARCHITECTURE ELEMENTS 
 
 In addition to the numerous commercial launch companies that could provide 
propellant to NASA’s exploration architecture, the architecture itself could be used to 
provide propellant to LEO. The cargo launch vehicle has a payload capability of 100,000 
lbm to LEO in addition to the 225,000 lbm of TLI propellant it also delivers to LEO. This 
equates to 325,000 lbm of potential propellant delivery capability which could be used 
for various propellant refueling activities. It is not clear what the propellant needs of the 
architecture will be or what the marginal cost of an additional launch would be, but the 
CaLV could potentially provide the lowest cost propellant delivery option with a 
possibility of achieving a marginal cost of lower than $1,000/lb. Utilizing the CaLV 
would not help NASA promote the commercialization of space and would require the 
architecture to increase its flight rate every few years, but neither of these are potentially 
detrimental to this design option. A range of values is provided in Table 10 because the 
true costs of the CaLV are not publicly available. Case 1 represents an estimate of the 
marginal cost of a CaLV assuming an 80/20 split between the fixed and variable cost. 
Case 2 is an estimate of the Theoretical First Unit (TFU) costs, and Case 3 is the unit cost 
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after the 20th launch assuming a learning curve rate of 90%. A further investigation of the 
cost of the CaLV will be provided in this thesis.  
 
Table 10: Cargo Launch Vehicle Delivery Capability 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Cost [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] 
CaLV (1) 325,000 200* 600 
CaLV (2) 325,000 700* 2,200 
CaLV (3) 325,000 440* 1,350 
 * Estimated launch costs 
 
2.5.6 RANGE OF $/LB CONSIDERED FOR PROPELLANT REFUELING STUDY 
 The results of the previous sections showed that there are a number of potential 
launch providers available that offer a varying range of capability and price. These launch 
vehicle have demonstrated reliabilities that range from 0.83 – 1.0, but most launch 
providers can demonstrate a reliability greater than 0.95 (Figure 15). The results in Figure 
14 and Figure 15 show a summary of the results of the previous sections. These figures 
provide a comparison of capabilities between the United States and the International 
launch Industry. 
 There are a number of factors that that must be considered when selecting a 
propellant refueling launch provider. When a single payload is launched, such as a 
satellite, the most important factors are to select the launch vehicle that has the capability 
to deliver the payload at the lowest possible price while achieving the minimally 
acceptable launch reliability. Because propellant is a more fluid medium, it can be 
delivered over a greater number of launches assuming a storage depot is available in 
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LEO. Therefore, the most important factor to consider is not the launch price or the 
payload capability but rather the cost per pound ($/lb) to NASA. The weight of the 
propellant deliver system will reduce the amount of propellant that can be delivered to 
LEO. This can potentially increase the cost of delivering propellant.  
 The results in Figure 14 demonstrate how the $/lb of payload delivery decreases 
as the capability of the launch vehicle increases. The same trend is seen for both US and 
international launch vehicles. The US launch vehicles generally offer a lower $/lb for the 
small to medium class of launch vehicles while the international launch vehicles offer a 
lower $/lb for vehicles with a payload capability of 40,000 – 50,000 lbm. In either case 
the difference between the two are small, except for two notable exceptions, which are 
marked with blue circles in the figure. These represent the Russian Kosmos and Chinese 
Long March launch vehicles. Both launch vehicle are able to achieve significantly lower 
$/lb than the US launch vehicle of the same payload capability. 
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Figure 14: Summary of $/lb as a Function of Payload Capability 
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 While the international launch vehicles can, in some cases, provide a lower $/lb 
than US launch vehicles, they have not demonstrated the same level of launch reliability. 
In all but two cases, the US launch vehicles provide the highest demonstrated launch 
reliabilities; these results can be seen in Figure 15. The Long March, which offers a low 
$/lb, has a demonstrated reliability of 0.83. This is significantly lower than 0.98 – 1.0 
reliability achieved by most US launch vehicles. While this vehicle can demonstrate a 
lower cost than its US counter part (Delta II), its lower reliability makes it a riskier 
launch provider. Most other international vehicles have a higher reliability than the Long 
March, but all are lower than the US vehicles. There is no reliability probabilities quoted 
for the responsive launch vehicle because these vehicles have not completed their 
development testing phase and have no commercial launch flights to reference. To date, 
Space X has attempted four test flights of the Falcon 1, and will begin operating 
commercially in 2009. These vehicles have potential to offer the lowest $/lb, but there is 
additional risk in depending on their development.  
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Figure 15: Summary of Demonstrated Reliability as a Function of $/lb 
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Table 11: Summary of Potential Launch Vehicles 
 Payload [lbm] Launch Price [$M] Cost/Pound [$/lb] Success Rate 
CaLV (1) 325,000 200 600 n/a 
CaLV (3) 325,000 440 1,350 n/a 
Falcon 9 H 62,600 90 1,500 n/a 
Falcon 9 21,800 35 1,600 n/a 
Proton D1 46,000 85 1,850 288/300 
CaLV (2) 325,000 700 2,200 n/a 
Ariane 5 39,600 120 3,000 30/34 
Delta IVH 45,200 140 3,100 0/1 
Kosmos 3M 3,300 12 3,600 420/440 
Delta II -7920 11,300 50 4,400 108/110 
Delta IVM+ 22,700 100 4,400 6/6 
Falcon I 1,500 7 4,600 n/a 
Delta II -7925 10,900 52 4,700 108/110 
Delta IVM 14,900 70 4,700 6/6 
Long March 3 8,500 40 4,700 20/24 
Atlas V - 551 18,000 110 6,100 13/14 
Delta II -7320 6,300 40 6,300 108/110 
Atlas V - 531 15,200 100 6,600 13/14 
H-11A 222 20,900 140 6,700 n/a 
Taurus 2110 3,950 35 8,800 7/8 
Ariane 4 - 44L 10,800 100 9,300 97/100 
Atlas V - 501 9,000 85 9,400 13/14 
Ariane 4 - 44P 7,600 80 10,500 97/100 
H-11A 202 8,800 100 11,300 12/13 
Ariane 4 - 40 4,600 60 13,000 97/100 
Minotaur  1,350 19 14,000 7/7 
Pegasus 980 20 20,000 35/38 
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 A number of studies, some discussed in this chapter, suggest that achieving a low-
cost propellant delivery system is vital to the success of propellant refueling and future 
exploration architectures. These studies do not go into detail as to what the price of 
propellant would have to be in order to make propellant refueling a beneficial part of 
exploration systems. This work will define the price required to provide an architecture 
improvement to NASA’s exploration architecture. This study will consider a range for 
the price of propellant from $1,500 to $6,000/lb. The $1,500/lb represents the quoted 
potential of the Falcon class of launch vehicles. The $6,000/lb represents the average 
launch price in today’s market (Atlas, Delta) increased by 20 percent to account for 
uncertainty in launch price and final payload capability. This range will be used 
throughout the rest of this work to show the effect that propellant price has on the 
implementation of propellant refueling. It will also be noted again that the introduction of 
propellant refueling could provide the demand required to make reusable launch vehicles  
viable option for future transportation missions. This would ultimately drive down the 
cost of delivering payload to LEO to less than $1,000/lb [35], which would allow 
propellant refueling to become and even more attractive solution.  
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This chapter will discuss the design space investigated in this thesis. The design 
space is defined as the set of all design options considered for comparison. Included in 
this study are both refueling and non refueling design points. A Morphological Matrix 
[36] will be used to provide the inputs for this design space to the simulation environment 
where the FOMs can be evaluated. This design space exploration will provide an 
understanding of how the implementation of propellant refueling can affect the design 
NASA’s baseline exploration architecture. A value proposition for propellant refueling 
can then be developed.  
 
3.1 PROPELLANT REFUELING EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
The methodology employed in this thesis, to develop the value proposition for 
propellant refueling, can be broken down into three areas. A flow chart for this 
methodology is provided in Figure 16. Chapter 1 consisted of a discussion of the current 
exploration architecture and the major performance challenges that have emerged during 
its development. The introduction of propellant refueling was suggested as a means to 
mitigate these challenges. Chapter 2 provided a literature search on propellant refueling 
that summarized the work done to date and provided an initial set of propellant refueling 
concepts to investigate. These two chapters comprise the first section of this methodology 
and set the tone for why propellant refueling is being investigated in this thesis.  
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 The development of the propellant refueling design space and the simulation 
environment used to evaluate the impacts of propellant refueling on the baseline 
architecture comprise the second phase of the methodology. These will be outlined in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 utilizes the information gathered in the first two chapters to 
select the set of design options and variables related to propellant refueling that provide 
the greatest benefit to the design of the architecture. The final set of nine variables is 
discussed in Section 3.2. A morphological matrix is generated from these variables to 
establish the allowable values for each of the design variables. For example, the LSAM 
ascent engine has four choices: Hypergols, LOX/CH4, LOX/LH2 (pressure) and 
LOX/LH2 (pump). The entire morphological matrices for Scenarios One and Two are 
provided in Figure 17 and Figure 18. This matrix encompasses the entirety of the 
propellant refueling design space that will be explored, and results in over 15,000 
possible design combinations between Scenarios One and Two. Chapter 4 discusses the 
simulation environment developed to evaluate the effects that propellant refueling has on 
the baseline architecture. The effect on the baseline architecture is measured by the 
impact on the architecture FOMs presented in Chapter 1.  
The final part of this methodology is to use the results generated from the 
propellant refueling design space simulation to evaluate the potential value added to the 
exploration architecture. This will be presented in the form of Pareto frontiers (Chapters 5 
and 6), an improvement in the cost per pound of payload to the lunar surface (Chapters 5 
and 6) and the value proposition to NASA (Chapter 7).  
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Figure 16: Propellant Refueling Evaluation Methodology 
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3.2 PROPELLANT REFUELING DESIGN SPACE 
 The propellant refueling design space represents the set of trades that will be 
investigated in this work. There are nine inputs variables for Scenario One and ten for 
Scenario Two that create a design space of 15,000 propellant refueling combinations. 
These design options were selected based on the results of the literature search provided 
in Chapter 2. These previous design studies provided an initial foundation for selection 
the refueling option which will be evaluated throughout this dissertation. It is the goal of 
this work to establish which of these potential refueling strategies provides the greatest 
value to future exploration missions. The remaining design options were selected based 
on particular concerns that have emerged during the development of the baseline 
architecture (AS engine selection, mitigation method, and boil-off refueling) A set of 
inputs is created by selecting a value from each row of the morphological matrix. For 
example, the inputs in the second column represent the baseline configuration (Figure 
17). There are a number of designs where no propellant refueling is utilized. This will be 
an important point of comparison in Chapters 5 and 6. These points of reference will 
show the improvements and drawbacks of introducing propellant refueling into the 
baseline architecture.  
 The morphological matrix is used to define the inputs to the simulation 
environment. In addition to the design variables provided in Figure 17 and Figure 18, a 
number of other design variables were initially considered. These include the in-space 
depot location, refueling the Service Module, and utilizing the CLV 2nd stage for the TLI 
maneuver. Refueling the SM and utilizing the CLV as the EDS were removed from this 
study because it is unlikely the development of the propellant refueling technologies 
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could be completed before these vehicles began operation. The benefits of a lunar 
stationed depot depend on the ability to provide propellant from the lunar surface. A 
feasibility study of in-situ resource utilization is beyond the scope of this thesis. These 
three choices were therefore eliminated from consideration. There is potential value in 
these options and they should be considered in future propellant refueling design studies. 
The following sections provide a description of each design variable and the range of 
inputs used in this work.  
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Figure 17: Trade Study Morphological Matrix, Scenario One 
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Figure 18: Trade Study Morphological Matrix, Scenario Two 
 
3.2.1 ADDITIONAL ASCENT PROPELLANT 
 The first design option allows an increase in the amount of propellant burned 
during ascent on the Earth Departure Stage (EDS). In the baseline architecture the EDS is 
initially used as a second stage to deliver the LSAM to LEO. It is subsequently used to 
inject the LSAM, CEV and SM into a lunar approach trajectory or Trans Lunar Injection 
(TLI). A greater payload capability can be obtained if a fraction of the 225,000 lbm of 
TLI propellant is used during the second stage burn of the EDS to inject in to LEO. If this 
propellant is used during ascent, the EDS must be re-fueled in-orbit in order to have the 
propellant required for the TLI burn. The ability to burn additional propellant during 
ascent increases the mission payload that the launch vehicle can deliver to LEO and thus 
to the lunar surface. This work considers burning from 0 to 100,000 lbm of additional 
propellant from the EDS during ascent. A greater amount of propellant could be burned 
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during ascent, but the increase in payload capability is negligible, or in some cases 
reduced because the system thrust-to-mass decreases thus increasing the gravity losses. 
The total payload capability versus the additional propellant burned is discussed in 
Section 4.1.1.  
 
3.2.2 BOILOFF THERMAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 The use of cryogenic propellants in the baseline architecture results in a loss of 
propellant due to boiloff when propellant temperatures go below the heat of vaporization. 
The baseline architecture utilizes a passive insulation system to reduce the amount of 
propellant lost to boiloff. Since the passive system cannot completely eliminate boiloff, 
the architecture must carry additional propellant to LEO in order to have sufficient 
propellant to complete the mission maneuvers once the crew is delivered to LEO.  
 The boiloff thermal management system is used to reduce or eliminate the 
propellant boiloff from the EDS and LSAM. Two thermal management strategies are 
considered in this study. The first is a passive system that utilizes MLI blankets. The MLI 
insulation reduces the heat flux from the external environment to the propellant and thus 
maintaining a lower propellant temperature. This is a relatively simple system that is 
currently used. MLI only limits the boiloff and cannot eliminate it completely. The 
second option is to implement a cryo-cooler with MLI. In this case the cryo-coolers 
actively remove heat from the tanks, keeping the propellant at a constant temperature. A 
small number of MLI blankets are used to reduce the heat that the cryo-coolers must 
remove from the system. It is assumed that the cryo-cooler system results in zero 
propellant boiloff [37]. The simulation has the option to put either thermal management 
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system on the EDS, ascent stage of the LSAM and the descent stage of the LSAM. Since 
each element carries different quantities of propellant and for different mission times, 
each may favor the selection of a different thermal management option. A mass 
comparison between MLI and the cryo-cooler system is provided in Chapter 5, which 
will discuss the tradeoff between adding a more complex cryo-cooler system versus 
utilizing a simple passive system and allowing a set amount of propellant to boiloff.  
 
3.2.3 LSAM STAGE RE-FUELED 
 This design variable is used to trade the benefits of off-loading propellant from 
the LSAM prior to launch. In the baseline architecture, the Descent Stage contains 57,000 
lbm of LOX/LH2 and the Ascent Stage contains 9,100 lbm of LOX/CH4. This design 
variable will help to determine if there is a benefit in removing this propellant prior to 
launch and refueling the LSAM once it reaches LEO. Because the LSAM propellant mass 
fraction is nearly 50%, the lunar surface payload can be increased by decreasing the 
initial propellant delivered to LEO; however, the LSAM inert mass must grow (engines, 
tanks, etc.) to deliver this extra payload to the lunar surface. In addition, the launch 
vehicle shroud must increase in size and mass to accommodate a larger LSAM. The 
increase in fairing mass was calculated by assuming a constant mass per surface area for 
the fairing design. The baseline fairing design was used as the point of reference and a 
value of 1.998 lb/ft2 was determined. Utilizing this value along with the surface area 
provides a means of estimating the mass of the larger fairing design. A sample set of 
masses is provided in Table 12. The size of the lander as a function of payload mass will 
be discussed in Section 3.3.2.  
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Table 12: CaLV Fairing Mass Estimates 
Fairing Diameter Fairing Mass 
27.5 ft 10,552 lbm 
30 ft 11,670 lbm 
33 ft 13,052 lbm 
 
 
 This study considers four options for refueling the LSAM: only the descent stage, 
only the ascent stage, both stages or neither stage. These combinations will allow a 
number of propellant quantities and propellant types to be considered. The more stages 
and propellant types that are involved in the transfer, the greater the cost and risk to the 
architecture, but the greater the possible benefit. The size, complexity and cost of the 
propellant depot is a function of the type of propellant, the number of propellants, and the 
quantity that is required by the architecture. A further discussion of the propellant depot 
will be presented in Section 4.3.3.  If both LSAM stages were re-fueled from the baseline 
LSAM design, the propellant storage system would need to be designed to carry three 
propellant types with three transfer systems. However, if the ascent stage used a 
LOX/LH2 system instead of LOX/CH4, than only two storage systems would be needed. 
Section 3.2.5 will discuss which propulsion systems were investigated for use on the 
LSAM.   
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3.2.4 LANDER PROPELLANT QUANTITY RE-FUELED 
 The baseline architecture delivers both stages of the LSAM to LEO with full 
propellant loads. The previous section discussed the option of offloading the LSAM 
ascent and descent propellant and refueling it in LEO, but this variable only determines 
which stage and not the amount of propellant offloaded. This section will discuss the 
quantity of the LSAM propellant that is offloaded. The design variable has the option to 
refuel either 50 or 100 percent of either stage of the LSAM depending on which options 
are selected for refueling. The baseline utilizes no re-fueling on the LSAM. This case is 
established by the previous design variable when “None” is selected. Therefore a zero 
percent option is not required here and reduced the duplication of results. The greater the 
amount of propellant offloaded the greater the payload improvement but the larger the 
cost to the architecture. By selecting which stage and what percentage of the stage is re-
fueled a large number of refueling combinations can be considered. This will help 
provide a complete picture of the cost of improving the payload capability of the 
architecture through propellant re-offloading.  
3.2.5 LSAM ASCENT ENGINE 
 The LSAM ascent engine is the only propulsion system allowed to change during 
this study. The propulsion systems on the CaLV and descent stage of the LSAM were 
held constant. The propulsion systems on the CaLV and descents stage of the LSAM are 
high performance LOX/LH2 engines and are required to meet the mass goals of the 
architecture. The main draw back of these systems is their higher rate of propellant 
boiloff. The introduction of propellant refueling may eliminate this concern. There is no 
reason to trade this design variable because propellant refueling will only improve what 
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has already been selected as the best option. The ascent engine is allowed to vary because 
it is the one propulsion system still being analyzed for it potential effects on the 
architecture. Further performance, risk and cost analysis is being conducted before the 
final engine design is selected. Allowing this engine to vary will also provide additional 
insight into how propellant refueling can effect the selection of certain engine 
configurations.   
  There are currently four propulsion systems being considered for use on the 
ascent stage of the lander. A summary of these engine parameters is provided in Table 
13. The first is the use of NTO/MMH (Hypergols). These engines have the lowest 
specific impulse of any of the engines considered and would require additional 
development work, but exhibit no significant propellant boiloff. The second engine 
considered is a LOX/CH4 engine. This is the baseline design selected for the ESAS 
baseline architecture. This engine requires the most advanced development work because 
a LOX/CH4 engine has never been flight tested. However, a recent test firing of a 
methane engine has been completed [38]. The LOX/CH4 engine has a higher 
performance than Hypergols engine and a lower boiloff rate then a LOX/LH2 system. 
This engine was originally selected because it was believed to have a greater extensibility 
to future Mars missions. The final two engines are LOX/LH2 systems; both pressure and 
pump fed engines are considered. These two systems are categorized by their method of 
feeding propellant into the thrust chamber. The pressure fed system utilizes an increased 
tank pressure while the pump-fed system utilizes high energy pumps. The trade off 
between these two systems is the additional complexity and mass of the pump-fed system 
versus the increased tank mass of the pressure-fed system [39]. The summary in Table 13 
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illustrates the difference in T/me (lb/lbm) and tank pressure between these two systems. 
The LOX/LH2 propulsion systems offer the greatest performance, but also results in the 
greatest amount of propellant boiloff because hydrogen has the lowest heat of 
vaporization. The analysis in Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss how the payload capability 
and costs of each of these systems affects the overall architecture.  
 
Table 13: Summary of Ascent Engine Assumptions 
Propellant Isp [s] T/me Thrust [lbm] Tank Pressure [psi] O/F 
NTO/MMH  323 30.4 9,300 250 1.65 
LOX/CH4 361 28 9,060 350 3 
LOX/LH2 (pressure) 460 28 9,890 350 6 
LOX/LH2 (pump) 463 38.8 8,970 50 6 
 
3.2.6 LOI MANEUVER 
 The baseline ESAS architecture uses the Descent Stage of the LSAM to insert 
itself, the CEV, and Service Module into a circular low-lunar orbit. This three burn 
maneuver, called the lunar orbital insertion (LOI), provides global access to the lunar 
surface. This architecture design was selected to minimize the required payload mass 
capability of the EDS, for LEO and TLI insertions (Figure 3).   
 When a propellant depot is used, the TLI propellant can be offloaded (as much as 
100,000 lbm) from launch to LEO insertion. This 100,000 lbm constraint was placed on 
the design to limit the total propellant cost to the architecture and the total size of the 
payload delivered to LEO. Chapters 5 and 6 will discuss how offloading this propellant 
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affects the design of the architecture and will show that the Pareto-efficient solutions 
always utilize less than 100,000 lbm of propellant. In LEO, the EDS can be re-fueled to 
perform both the TLI and LOI maneuvers without any changes (except re-fuel 
capability). Using the EDS to perform the LOI maneuver greatly reduces the size and 
mass of the LSAM that must be used to descend to the lunar surface. As will be shown 
later, the elimination of the TLI propellant from the EDS and incorporation of the LOI 
maneuver significantly increases the lunar surface payload capability of the architecture. 
In this study the LOI maneuver can be performed by either the Descent Stage, as on the 
baseline architecture, or by the EDS.  
 
3.2.7 LEO REQUIRED STAY TIME 
 One of the issues with the baseline architecture is that there may be factors that 
delay the planned launch time of the second vehicle [40]. This can lead to substantial 
propellant boiloff or the need for large cryo-cooler systems on the EDS. If the time 
between the launch of the CaLV and CLV exceed the on-orbit design limits of the EDS, 
the mission will be canceled. Thus the EDS and LSAM will be lost because there is no 
planned refueling capability. In the current plan, the risk of losing a mission due to a 
launch delay is mitigated by placing a requirement on the architecture that the EDS and 
LSAM must carry enough additional propellant to cover the boiloff losses for the LEO 
loiter time. In this study both 15 and 95 day loiter times are considered. Because the 
boiloff losses are largely dependent on loiter, a 95 day loiter time requires approximately 
six times the propellant or nine percent of the TLI propellant over the 15 days. The 
propellant boiloff for the EDS and LSAM for both a 15 and 95 day loiter period are 
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provided in Table 14, these values are obtained from the boil-off model used in this 
thesis. .  
 
Table 14: LSAM and EDS Propellant Boiloff Comparison 
 LSAM EDS 
Loiter Time LOX/LH2 LOX/CH4 Hypergols LOX/LH2 
15 Days 1,080 lbm 1,030 lbm 890 lbm 3,785 lbm 
95 Days 6,360 lbm 6,060 lbm 5,370 lbm 23,900 lbm 
 
  
 The analysis done by Cirillo [40] shows that the baseline architecture can obtain a 
mission reliability of 75-80 percent with a 15 day loiter requirement verses a 95 percent 
mission reliability for the 95 day design. The length of the loiter period has a substantial 
effect on the design of the architecture. A longer loiter period increases the amount of 
propellant that must be delivered to LEO, but provides the highest mission success, while 
a shorter loiter period reduces the payload requirements at the expense of a lower mission 
success probability. The introduction of propellant refueling can remove the need to carry 
additional propellant to LEO while also improving the mission success probability. The 
loiter time would become infinite if there were multiple sources for filling the propellant 
depot as defined in the following section.  
 
3.2.8 RE-FUEL BOILOFF 
 A strategy for preventing mission failures associated with excessive LEO loiter is 
to develop cryogenic cooling system technology that can reduce or totally eliminate 
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boiloff. Another strategy is to allow the boiloff to occur and re-fuel this propellant just 
prior to TLI. This second strategy eliminates the need to develop large cryo-cooler 
systems that are discarded every flight and still provide for an extended LEO stay time. 
The boiloff is less than ten percent of the propellant delivered to LEO, but would have 
the potential to save billions of dollars in case of a mission delay. The capability to re-
fuel the boiloff would extend the LEO loiter period for any length of time assuming a 
sufficient supply of propellant to the depot. This would eliminate the need to design the 
architecture around a specific loiter period providing an increase in payload capability, a 
lower LCC and a greater mission reliability.  
 
3.2.9 TLI PROPELLANT OFFLOADED FROM EDS, SCENARIO TWO ONLY  
 The final design variable is only used in Scenario Two and replaces the design 
variable in Scenario One used to increase the amount of propellant used during ascent 
(Section 3.2.1). This design variable allows the TLI propellant to be off-loaded from the 
EDS prior to launch resulting in a decrease in the payload delivered by the CaLV. 
Scenario Two allows the size of the launch vehicle to decrease as the LEO payload is 
decreased. As a result, offloading the TLI propellant will decrease the size and 
development and production cost of the CaLV.  
 A range of 0 to 80,000 lbm of LOX and 0 to 20,000 lbm of LH2 can be offloaded 
from the EDS. An example of how this affects the size of the CaLV is provided in Table 
15. The amount of propellant was limited to these ranges to keep the gross mass of the 
CaLV within 20% of the baseline design. Increasing the amount of propellant offloaded 
beyond these ranges would begin to require configuration changes, because of the overall 
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decrease in size of the CaLV. Since the baseline configuration was held constant in this 
thesis, values outside of these ranges were not considered. This also provided a maximum 
offloading of 100,000 lbm which was the maximum amount of propellant refueling 
considered in Scenario One.  
 
Table 15: Change in CaLV Dimensions as TLI Propellant is Offloaded 
 Gross Mass [lbm] Length [ft] Diameter [ft] 
Baseline 6,390,000 358 13.75 
80,000 lbm (LOX) 5,150,000 315 11.89 
20,000 lbm (LH2) 5,689,000 329 12.61 
80,000/20,000 (LOX/LH2) 4,920,000 301 11.22 
  
 
Offloading LOX allows a greater total mass to be removed from the EDS, but 
offloading the LH2 provides a greater improvement on a per pound basis. An example of 
this is provided in Table 16. The primary cause is the lower density of LH2 as compared 
to the density of LOX. Offloading equal quantities of each propellant will provide a 
greater reduction in the in the size of the LH2 tanks, further reducing the size of the 
vehicle. The EDS holds a maximum of 35,000 lbm of LH2 propellant, thus in order to 
increase the offloaded mass beyond this quantity, LOX must be offloaded as well. The 
results in Chapter 5 and 6 will discuss the trade off between the cost of propellant in LEO 
and the cost saving of decreasing the size of the CaLV.  
 
 
86 
Table 16: Offloading LOX versus LH2 
 Gross Mass [lbm] Length [ft] Diameter [ft] 
20,000 lbm (LOX) 5,802,000 338 12.99 
20,000 lbm (LH2) 5,689,000 329 12.61 
 
 
 This concludes the discussion on the design variables that are considered in this 
study. These variables are input into the simulation environment in order to measure their 
effects on the ESAS baseline architecture. This simulations environment will be 
discussed in great detail in Chapter 4.  
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 This chapter will focus on the development of the propellant refueling simulation 
environment used to evaluate the affects of propellant refueling on the baseline 
architecture. This simulation environment provides an automated process for evaluating 
the design inputs discussed in Chapter 3. This environment models the effects that the 
input variables have on the architecture elements and then evaluates the resulting change 
to the Figures of Merit. The results of this simulation environment can then be used to 
begin developing an understanding of the total value of introducing propellant refueling 
in to NASA exploration architecture. The results from this simulation will be presented in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
4.1 MODELING AND SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT 
 The lunar architecture propellant refueling simulation environment was developed 
using the ModelCenter [41] integration framework developed by Phoenix Integration. 
ModelCenter is a commercially availiable software that provides an architecture for 
passing information between different analysis models. In this case, the models have been 
developed using Microsoft’s Excel©. The ability to automatically pass information 
between the different models greatly reduces the time required to run each simulation. 
After an initial setup, any number of simulations can be run without any human 
CHAPTER 4                                         
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interaction. An illustration of the flow of information within this environment is provided 
in Figure 19, and the variables that are passed between each module are provided in 
Table 17. There are six analysis models and one simulation controller. The six analysis 
models include the cargo launch vehicle, the lunar surface access module, an in-space 
propellant storage system, economic analysis, reliability analysis and a technology 
development risk assessment. These integrated modules (Figure 19) provide the analysis 
needed to investigate the trade options presented in the morphological matrix. 
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Figure 19. Lunar Architecture Simulation Environment 
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Table 17: Summary of Variables Passed Between Analyses 
A CaLV payload capability (only active for Scenario One) 
B Lander gross mass (only active for Scenario Two) 
C Propellant mass re-fueled on CaLV 
D Subsystem masses, mitigation method, # of engines 
E # of tanks, # of engines, propulsion system type, tank material 
F Mitigation method 
G Propellant mass re-fueled on lander 
H Sub system masses, mitigation method, # of engines 
I # of tanks, # of engines, propulsion system type, tank material 
J Engine type, mitigation method 
K Subsystem masses, mitigation method, dimensions 
L Number of propellant transfers 
M Refueling used (Y/N) 
  
  
 The simulation runs from the top left to bottom right and passes information 
between the models signified by a solid line and a black dot. The controller in the top left 
is the link between the design choices and the simulation. This controller translates the 
design trades, developed from the morphological matrix, into a set of inputs for the 
various analyses. An example set of inputs is provided in Table 18. These inputs 
represent the baseline design and include no propellant refueling options.  
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Table 18: Case 1 from the Morphological Matrix 
Additional Ascent  Propellant 0 
EDS Boiloff Mitigation MLI 
Lander Stage Re-fueled None 
Percentage of Lander Propellant 0% 
LSAM Ascent Propellant LOX/CH4 
Lander Boiloff Mitigation MLI 
LOI Burn Element EDS 
LEO Required Stay Time 95 Days 
Re-fuel Boiloff No 
 
  
The diagram in Figure 19 shows the flow of information from the CaLV into the 
LSAM, but this can be flipped depending on the scenario being investigated. In Scenario 
One the payload capability of the CaLV is determined, and this value is passed to the 
LSAM, which calculates its lunar surface payload capability based on the maximum 
allowable lander gross mass. In Scenario Two the lunar surface payload capability is kept 
constant; therefore the lander is sized first, and the total mass is passed to the CaLV to 
determine the launch vehicle size required to deliver this payload capability to LEO. 
Once the design of these vehicles is complete, the amount of propellant refueling required 
is passed to the refueling analysis to size the propellant storage system. Once the first 
three analyses are complete, the design of the architecture is set and the remaining 
models are used to evaluate the remaining FOMs. The economic model takes inputs of 
the vehicle mass from the CaLV, LSAM, and in-space depot and determines the life cycle 
cost of the campaign. The reliability model requires input of the vehicle characteristics 
and number of times propellant is transferred and generates a loss of mission probability 
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estimate for the architecture. The final risk analysis provides a relative risk assessment of 
the design choices made on the CaLV, LSAM and the in-space depot. The following 
sections provide a more detail description of the analysis completed within each of these 
modules.  
 
4.1.1 LAUNCH VEHICLE (CALV) MODEL 
 The cargo launch vehicle model is developed to size the system to meet mission 
and payload requirements and predict the inert and gross mass of the system. A typical 
launch vehicle model is comprised of configuration, aerodynamics, propulsion, trajectory 
and weights and sizing disciplines [42]. The Design Structure Matrix (DSM) for a 
standard launch vehicle model is provided in Figure 20. The “configuration” analysis 
provides design details such as the number of stages, basic shape, and launch 
configuration. These design choices are held constant during this study so the 
configuration analysis is removed. This DSM provides the breakdown of the model 
analyses and where information passes between them. The variables passed between each 
analysis are provided in Table 19. This process requires iteration to converge to a design 
point. Iteration is required when information is passing in both directions between two 
analyses. For example, an iteration loop is required between the Trajectory and the 
Weights and Sizing analyses.  
 Because a computationally intensive Monte Carlo simulation is performed, a fast 
simulation is needed. Therefore, the trajectory, propulsion and aerodynamics model are 
replaced with a meta-model in the form of a single equation. For this present simulation, 
the CaLV shape and thrust were held constant; thus the only variable affecting the CaLV 
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performance, measured by the mass ratio (Minitial /Mfinal), is the mass that the CaLV must 
deliver to the EDS staging point. In Scenario Two the total thrust is allowed to change in 
the form of a reduction in the number of engines, but in Scenario One this remains fixed. 
The following section will discuss the process used and the assumptions made in 
developing this meta-model.  
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Figure 20. General Launch Vehicle Design Structure Matrix 
 
Table 19: Summary of the Variables Passed between Analyses 
A Lift and drag coefficients, function of Mach and Angle of Attack 
B Thrust, Isp, Exit Area 
C O/F, T, Engine T/m, Isp 
D MRrequired 
E Minitial, Minert 
F T/minitial, minitial 
G Vehicle Dimensions (length, diameter) 
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In order to develop the meta-model representing the aerodynamic, propulsion, and 
trajectory disciplines, a number of converged vehicle designs must be obtained with the 
original design tools.  The original design tools used in this analysis include the 
Aerodynamic Preliminary Analysis System (APAS) [43] and the Program to Optimize 
Simulated Trajectories (POST) [44]. The values for the propulsion systems remain 
constant at the baseline values because these engines do not change in this study.  These 
values can be found in Table 21.  The Weights and Sizing discipline utilizes historical 
Mass Estimating Relationships (MERs) within an Excel© spreadsheet [45].  The MERs 
are not replaced with the meta-model, but are needed to converge each vehicle design 
point. 
 The trajectory simulation requires aerodynamic, propulsion, and initial mass data.  
The APAS model provides the aerodynamics data in the form of lift and drag coefficients 
as a function of Mach and angle of attack.  Two sets of coefficients are developed: one 
with the solid rocket boosters attached and one without them attached.  These tables of 
coefficients are then used along with the reference area, which is the cross-sectional area 
for each configuration, to calculate the actual lift and drag. The reference areas are 
provided in Table 20.  It is assumed that these coefficients remain constant to the baseline 
configuration because drag losses are small, accounting for only one percent of the total 
performance.  This assumption has little effect on the design of the launch vehicle, but 
allows the aerodynamics model to be removed from the analysis while its effect can still 
be incorporated into the meta-model. 
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Table 20: CaLV Reference Areas 
With SRBs attached 825 ft2 
Without SRBs attached 593 ft2 
 
 
 The propulsion data parameters (Thrust, Isp, Ae) are held constant at the baseline 
values.  An estimate for the initial mass and stage inert mass is passed into the POST 
model from the Weights and Sizing model.  Given this information, the trajectory can be 
optimized to minimize the mass required to deliver a specified payload into a 30 x 160 
nmi transfer orbit.  The procedure used to close the vehicle design is provided in Figure 
21.  A closed design is defined as a solution where the performance (trajectory and mass) 
analysis is converged to within a given tolerance. This requires an iterative solution 
between the trajectory and the Weights and Sizing models. 
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Figure 21. Procedural Flow Chart for the Trajectory Meta-Model 
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 An initial set of mass estimates (minitial, minert) is passed into the POST model; 
these values initiate the iteration loop.  The trajectory analysis is then performed to 
determine the required mass ratio.  Next, this value is passed to the Weights and Sizing 
model, in which the vehicle is scaled to match the required mass ratio.  The required mass 
of propellant is calculated from the required mass ratio and ideal rocket equation.  This is 
provided in Equation 1.   
 
( )
Required
InitialRequired
propellnat
1
MR
MMR
M
−
=     ( 1 ) 
 
Once the propellant mass is known, the tanks are scaled to hold the required 
propellant and the remaining subsystem inert masses are calculated. Based on the sub-
systems and propellant masses, the initial mass is determined.  If this mass is the same as 
the initial guess, then the vehicle is closed.  If it is not the same as the initial guess, then 
the new initial mass and inert mass are passed back to the POST model and another 
iteration begins.  Once the vehicle design is closed, the MRrequired and the T/minitial are 
recorded.  This process is repeated for a range of payloads in order to change the T/minitial. 
The response surface equation (RSE) for MRrequired verses T/minitial. can then be developed 
using a least squares regression. These curves are provided in Figure 23 and Figure 24 for 
the 1st and 2nd stages, respectively. These meta-models can now be used to replace the 
aerodynamic, propulsion and trajectory disciplines, as shown in the final DSM provided 
in Figure 22.  
 
 
97 
 
 
Weights/
Sizing
RSE
MRrequired
T/mi
 
Figure 22. Final CaLV Design Structure Matrix 
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Figure 23. Trajectory Meta-Model for CaLV 1st Stage 
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Figure 24. Trajectory Meta-Model for the EDS 
 
 This model can now be used to evaluate the impacts of the simulation inputs on 
the CaLV. There are two design scenarios that affect the design of the CaLV. In Scenario 
One the introduction of propellant refueling is used to increase the lunar surface payload 
capability, and in Scenario Two propellant refueling is used to decrease the size of the 
CaLV while maintaining the same lunar mission capability.  
 Under the assumptions in Scenario One, the configuration of the CaLV is not 
affected by the introduction of propellant refueling. This is because any reduction in the 
mass of the in-space propellant delivered to LEO results in a corresponding increase in 
payload capability. This keeps the initial mass of the CaLV constant. There is a special 
case where the initial mass is affected by propellant refueling. When additional EDS 
propellant is burned during ascent, the total payload delivered to LEO (LSAM + TLI 
propellant) also increases, therefore increasing the initial mass of the vehicle. Because the 
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stage thrust is held constant as the initial mass increases, the T/mi decreases. This leads to 
an increase in the required mass ratio.  
 In order to model the simulation in which additional EDS propellant is burned, a 
second meta-model was created using the tools previously discussed. The POST 
optimization was modified to maximize the payload capability for a given amount of 
propellant rather then minimizing the propellant required to deliver a specific payload. 
The amount of propellant used by the 1st stage was set to the baseline value of 2,201,119 
lbm. The amount of propellant used on the EDS was then varied and the total payload 
capability for each design point was determined. The final converged design points are 
provided in Figure 25. The total payload capability increases until an additional 150,000 
lbm of propellant is burned. As additional propellant is used, the total payload begins to 
decrease. This is due to the first stage being held constant, and the staging condition for 
the EDS being reduced. As additional propellant is used, the initial mass of the CaLV 
increases, which decreases the T/mi of the 1st stage. These additional gravity losses 
reduce the staging condition between the 1st and 2nd stages, both velocity and altitude. 
Therefore the 2nd stage must perform a larger portion of the total required mass ratio. 
Eventually the performance benefit of increasing the upper stage ascent propellant is less 
than the additional mass ratio that the 2nd stage must provide to achieve orbit. A velocity 
plot of this trajectory is provided in Figure 26. Data for the baseline design and Scenario 
Two are also included to illustrate the differences in the three trajectories. The reduction 
in EDS staging conditions and the increase in performance required by the upper stage is 
clearly seen in these results.  
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Figure 25. Additional EDS Propellant Meta-Model 
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Figure 26. Trajectory Comparison for Scenarios One and Two 
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 In Scenario Two, as the total LEO payload is decreased, the total propellant 
required to achieve the desired mass ratio also decreases. The reduction in propellant 
mass leads to smaller tanks which lead to an overall smaller CaLV. This results in a 
decrease in the initial and inert mass of the vehicle. The smaller inert mass leads directly 
to a decrease in the development and production cost of the vehicle. This will further be 
discussed in section 4.3.4. The decrease in initial mass allows the number of engines to 
also decrease in order to keep the T/minitial as close to the baseline design as possible, but 
never below. Achieving the exact T/minitial cannot always be achieved because the engine 
thrust is held constant. The total thrust can only be reduced by discrete quantities. This 
results in a range of T/minitial on the 1st stage of 1.5 – 1.8 and a range of 0.86 – 1.44 on the 
2nd stage.  
 A mass comparison of the CaLV created in this model and the baseline design is 
provided in Table 21. A further discussion of the comparison of the baseline CaLV and 
the model developed here is provided at the end of this chapter. An example mass 
breakdown for Scenario Two is provided in Table 22 to illustrate the decrease in vehicle 
size that is achieved by reducing the TLI propellant delivered to LEO by 100,000 lbm.   
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Table 21: Cargo Launch Vehicle Mass Comparison 
 1st Stage EDS Boosters 
 ESAS Model ESAS Model ESAS Model 
Burnout Mass (lb) 215,258 215,474 50,360 50,835 221,234 221,234 
Usable Propellant (lb) 2,215,385 2,201,119 488,370 493,029 2,869,812 2,869,812 
Gross Mass (lb) 6,393,922 6,388,185 -- -- -- -- 
LSAM Mass (lb) 101,441 101,441     
Total Vac. Thrust (lb) 2,347,245 2,347,245 549,000 549,000 7,680,246 7,680,246 
Vac. Specific Impulse (s) 452 452 451 451 265 265 
Diameter (ft) 27.5 27.5 27.5 27.5 176 176 
Length (ft) 210 210 76.4 74 12 12 
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Table 22: Cargo Launch Vehicle Mass Comparison, Scenario 2 
 1st Stage EDS Boosters 
 ESAS Model ESAS Model ESAS Model 
Burnout Mass (lbm) 112,632 215,474 32,940 50,835 221,234 221,234 
Usable Propellant (lb) 1,157,255 2,201,119 218,181 493,029 2,869,812 2,869,812 
Gross Mass (lb) 4,949,949 6,388,185 -- -- -- -- 
LSAM Mass (lb) 101,441 101,441 -- -- -- -- 
Total Vac. Thrust (lb) 938,898 2,347,245 549,000 549,000 7,680,246 7,680,246 
Vac. Specific Impulse (s) 452 452 451 451 265 265 
Diameter (ft) 22.6 27.5 27.5 27.5 12 12 
Length (ft) 171 210 60 74 176 176 
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4.1.2 LUNAR LANDER (LSAM) MODEL 
 The lunar lander model is similar to the CaLV sizing logic with the exception of a 
change to vacuum space flight. It is built using parametric relationships that allow 
changes in the propulsion system, required mission maneuvers, and payload capability to 
be simulated. The LSAM model consists of Propulsion, Trajectory, and Weights and 
Sizing disciplines. The aerodynamics analysis is not required for in-space and lunar 
maneuvers. The design structure matrix and flow of information for the LSAM model is 
illustrated in Figure 27 and Table 23. An additional iteration loop is required in order to 
keep the T/W constant and allow a constant set of delta-Vs to be used for the trajectory 
model. The baseline ESAS configuration is again used, but the size of the vehicle is 
allowed to adjust depending on the inputs to the model.  
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Figure 27. LSAM Design Structure Matrix 
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Table 23: LSAM Propellant Boiloff Comparison 
A Baseline configuration used 
B Isp 
C T, T/Wengine, O/F, # of engines 
D Descent and ascent propellant 
E Component masses 
 
 
 The propulsion model is responsible for providing the thrust, specific impulse, 
oxidizer to fuel ratio (O/F), and T/mengine of descent and ascent engines to the trajectory 
and iteration loop. This model keeps the T/m of each stage constant by adjusting the 
thrust and number of engines used by each propulsion system. This analysis assumes that 
the engines can be designed to minimize the effect that a change in thrust has on specific 
impulse. The design of the RL-10 has shown that a relatively constant specific impulse 
can be achieved over a wide range of thrust [46]. This assumption affects the total lander 
mass or payload capability by less than five percent. A more detailed engine model is 
needed to completely capture the effect that different engine and engine sizes have on the 
LSAM design, but this was not a focus of this work. In the baseline configuration, the 
descent stage utilizes four RL-10 derivative engines to generate 60,000 lbm of thrust with 
a vacuum Isp of 460s. The baseline ascent propulsion system uses a LOX/CH4 engine, 
but due to ongoing trade studies, three other possible ascent engines are considered. A 
summary of these engines is provided in Table 24, where the thrust values represent the 
initial engine data used. The T/W of the descent and ascent stages is maintained at 0.6 
and 0.45 respectively.  
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Table 24. Summary of Ascent Engine Assumptions 
Propellant Isp [s] T/We Thrust [lb] O/F 
NTO/MMH  323 30.4 9,300 1.65 
LOX/CH4 361 28 9,060 3 
LOX/LH2 (pressure) 460 28 9,890 6 
LOX/LH2 (pump) 463 38.8 8,970 6 
 
  
 The trajectory model requires the Isp from the propulsion model and the stage 
inert masses from the sizing model to calculate the amount of propellant required to 
perform each of the mission maneuvers. The descent stage requires two calculations, one 
for the LOI maneuver and the second for the lunar descent maneuver, while the ascent 
stage requires just the ascent maneuver calculation. The mass of propellant required is 
calculated from Equation 1. The delta-V used for each maneuver is provided in Table 25. 
The propellant mass is then passed to the weights and sizing model and will be used in 
sizing the required propellant storage tanks.  
 
Table 25. Lunar Lander Delta-V Table [ESAS, pg. 165] 
Delta-V Maneuver Delta-V [ft/s] 
Ascent Delta-V 6,122 
LOI Delta-V 3,608 
Descent Delta-V 6,233 
AS RCS Delta-V 144 
DS RCS Delta-V 55 
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 A flow chart is provided in Figure 28 to outline the process used to close the 
LSAM design. An initial mass for the LSAM is provided to the model; this is generally 
taken from the previous design point. From the initial mass and delta-V table, an initial 
estimate for the propellant mass is calculated. The propellant mass is then used to size the 
vehicle tanks using an empirical sizing routine that factors in total propellant volume, 
strength of the tank material and internal tank pressure [47]. The engines are then sized to 
maintain their require stage T/m. The remaining subsystems are sized based on historical 
mass estimating relationships. The MERs for the LSAM are provided in Appendix B as a 
reference. A new initial mass can then be calculated and compared against the initial 
guess. If the two values are not equal the new initial mass is returned to the propellant 
sizing step and the entire process is repeated. Once the two values are with the required 
tolerance the vehicle is considered closed for that design point. A summary of the 
baseline LSAM masses are provided in Table 26.  
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Figure 28: LSAM Mass Sizing Flow Chart 
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Table 26: Lunar Surface Access Module Mass Comparison 
 Descent Stage Ascent Stage 
 ESAS (lb) Model (lb) ESAS (lb) Model (lb) 
Dry Mass 13,500 12,770 11,300 11,060 
Total Propellant 55,400 56,100 10,400 9,800 
Lunar Surface Payload 5,057 5,039 -- -- 
Gross Mass 101,411 101,007 -- -- 
 
 
4.1.3 PROPELLANT REFUELING MODEL 
  The results of this thesis will assume that all propellant refueling is done via a 
propellant depot located in LEO. This depot is designed to receive regular propellant 
refueling deliveries from either NASA exploration launch vehicles or a commercial 
launch provider, depending on who can offer the lowest price. The propellant is then 
transferred from the delivery vehicle to storage depot. The depot is able to store the 
propellant until required by NASA for an exploration mission. Tank transfer offers an 
alternative to propellant transfer, but this was not considered (see Scher [48] for an 
analysis of the pros and cons of each method.) The following section provides a 
description of the propellant depot model utilized in this work.  
 The model of the propellant storage systems is designed to determine the mass 
and size of the system needed to accommodate the propellant needs for the NASA lunar 
exploration program. The amount of propellant required is dependent on which propellant 
refueling concept is being considered. The model inputs are the required mass and 
propellant type needed for the exploration mission. The model then calculates the mass of 
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the propellant tanks, cryo-cooler, power system (solar and fuel cells), supporting 
structure, shielding, and maneuvering system. A mass allocation of 1,000 lbm is used for 
the docking and transfer system and 100 lbm for the avionics system [49]. To be 
conservative, the required amount of propellant is always assumed to be twice that 
needed of a single mission. This allows the depot to store enough propellant for two 
missions in case a delay occurs that prevents a sufficient amount of propellant from being 
delivered to the depot. This helps to mitigate the risk of the architecture being delayed 
due to a malfunction with the refueling system.  
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Figure 29. Mass Sizing for LEO Propellant Depot 
 
 The tanks are sized using the same empirical sizing routine performed in the 
CaLV and LSAM models. This requires input of the total required propellant, propellant 
type, and oxidizer to fuel ratio if more than one propellant is used. Up to three separate 
propellant storage tanks can be modeled. The results in the following chapters will show 
that, in most cases, two propellants are preferred. An overall length and diameter 
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constraint is also placed on the size of the tanks to allow it to fit inside the current cargo 
launch vehicle payload fairing. It is also possible that, if the propellant requirements are 
small enough, the depot could be deployed on an existing EELV, which would offer a 
lower cost than the CaLV. A comparison between the Delta IVH and the CALV fairings 
is provided in Figure 30. The EELVs offer sufficient payload capability to deliver the 
depot, but the EELV fairing diameter is 40 percent less than that of the CaLV, limiting 
the total volume of the depot. The depot dimensions provided in Table 27 show that a 
LOX/LH2 depot designed to hold 50,000 lbm of propellant would violate the Delta IVH 
payload volume constraints.  
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Figure 30. Depot Delivery Fairing Comparison 
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Once the sizes of the tanks are established, the propellant thermal management 
system can then be sized. This model assumes that an active cryo-cooler plus passive 
MLI system is used to eliminate all propellant boiloff aboard the depot. MLI alone was 
not considered because it results in a more expensive system since the continuous loss of 
propellant would result in an increase in propellant cost to NASA, leading to an overall 
increase in the life cycle cost. This is the same cryo-cooler that could potentially be used 
on the CaLV and LSAM vehicles. The remaining systems are sized with historical mass 
estimating relationships: supporting structure, power, shielding and RCS. A more 
detailed look at the development of each subsystem can be found in reference [49], 
including a mass break down and an example depot design. The notional depot 
configuration is provided in Figure 31, including the main subsystems included in this 
model. Any number of depot configurations could be considered without significantly 
affecting the results presented in this thesis. The model was developed to provide an 
estimate of the overall dimensions and provide mass estimations to the cost module. A 
number of additional configurations are outlined by Chandler [50]. A summary of the 
depot dry mass and overall dimensions for three propellant combinations is provided in 
Table 27. At these propellant quantities, the tanks are spherical in shape, but they become 
cylindrical as the propellant quantities increase and the diameter constraint is reached.  
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Figure 31. Notional Propellant Refueling Depot 
 
 
Table 27. Summary of Depot Sizes for Various Propellant Mass 
 Dry Mass [lb] Diameter [ft] Length [ft] 
50,000 lbm LOX/LH2 14,000 17.0 40.65 
42,850 lbm LOX 5,950 17.0 17.0 
7,150 lbm LH2 11,500 23.16 23.16 
100,000 lbm LOX/LH2 24,000 21.4 51.2 
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4.1.4 LIFE CYCLE COST MODEL 
 The NASA Systems Engineering Handbook defines the system life cycle in terms 
of phases that includes Phase A (Concept and Technology Development), Phase B 
(Preliminary Design), Phase C (Final Design and Fabrication), Phase D (System 
Assembly, Integration, & Test), Phase E (Operations) and Phase F(Closeout).  Typically, 
Phase A and Phase B are preliminary analyses and designs of the system to determine 
feasibility and initial requirements and are conducted by multiple contractors leading up 
to the selection of the prime contractor for the final design, development, production, and 
operations of the system.  Phase A and Phase B costs are approximately 10 percent of the 
total program costs as demonstrated by programs such as the Hubble Space Telescope, 
the Space Shuttle (costs up to the first flight), Voyager, and Pioneer/Venus.  Because 
these initial Phase A and B costs are fairly constant for NASA programs, these costs were 
not included with the present analysis to compare system architectures. 
The Phase C, D, and E Life Cycle Cost of an architecture accounts for the other 
90 percent that include all costs associated with the campaign from final design to 
completion of the program. Included in these costs are all design, development, 
production, operation and disposal costs [51].  These costs are broken down into three 
categories System Acquisition Cost, Operations and Support Costs, and Disposal Costs, 
as illustrated in Figure 32 [52]. 
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Figure 32: Breakdown of Life Cycle Cost 
 
The System Acquisition Costs are calculated using the NASA Air Force Cost 
Model (NAFCOM) [53].  A summary of the NAFCOM costs breakdown of the System 
Acquisition Cost are shown in Table 30.  
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Table 28. Summary of System Acquisition Costs 
Non-recurring DDT&E  
Engineering Drawings NAFCOM CERs 
Computer Aided Design (CAD) NAFCOM CERs 
Configuration Control NAFCOM CERs 
Specifications and Requirements NAFCOM CERs 
Production of Test Article NAFCOM CERs 
Redesign after Testing NAFCOM CERs 
Integrated Logistics and Support  
System Test Operations NAFCOM Wraps 
Ground Support Equipment NAFCOM Wraps 
Systems Engineering and Integration NAFCOM Wraps 
Program Management NAFCOM Wraps 
Recurring System Procurement  
Theoretical First Unit NAFCOM CERs 
Facilities Startup  
Launch Infrastructure Not included 
Launch and Assembly   
Integration, Assembly and Checkout NAFCOM Wraps 
 
The Non-recurring Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) cost 
element of the System Acquisition Costs includes the “labor, materials, Special Test 
Equipment  and tooling, and other direct and allowable indirect expenses incurred by the 
prime contractor including all subcontracts to the prime required to determine compliance 
with all design requirements documentation and to perform the subsequent analysis, 
design, development, and redesign of test and development hardware” [53].   
The Integrated Logistics and Support costs include the “labor, materials, Special 
Test Equipment and tooling, and other direct and allowable indirect expenses incurred by 
the prime contractor including all subcontracts to the prime required to determine 
compliance with all design requirements documentation and to perform the subsequent 
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analysis, design, development, and redesign of test and development hardware”[54].  The 
System Test Operations element includes “development testing and the test effort and test 
materials required for qualification and physical integration of all test and qualification 
units.  Also included is the design and fabrication of test fixtures.”  The Ground Support 
Equipment includes “the labor and materials required to design, develop, manufacture, 
procure, assemble, test, checkout, and deliver the equipment necessary for system level 
final assembly and checkout.  Specifically, the equipment utilized for integrated and/or 
electrical checkout, handling and protection, transportation, and calibration, and items 
such as component conversion kits, work stands, equipment racks, trailers, staging 
cryogenic equipment, and many other miscellaneous types of equipment are included.” 
The Systems Engineering and Integration element encompasses:  “(1) the system 
engineering effort to transform an operational need into a description of system 
requirements and/or a preferred system configuration; (2) the logistics engineering effort 
to define, optimize, and integrate logistics support considerations to ensure the 
development and production of a supportable and cost effective system; and (3) the 
planning, monitoring, measuring, evaluating, and directing of the overall technical 
program.”  The Program Management (PM) function consists of the “effort and material 
required for the fundamental management direction and decision-making to ensure that a 
product is developed, produced, and delivered.”[54] 
The Recurring System Hardware/Software (HW/SW) Procurement cost is 
discussed at the end of this section because it is highly coupled to the yearly operational 
costs.  
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The Facilities Startup costs are not included in the present analysis because it is 
assumed that the facilities at Cape Kennedy will be sufficient for the architecture.   
The Launch and Assembly cost contains “all labor and material required to 
physically integrate (assemble) the various subsystems into a total system. Final 
assembly, including attachment, and the design and manufacture of installation hardware, 
final factory acceptance operations, packaging/crating, and shipment are included.”[54] 
As shown in Table 28 the NAFCOM model utilizes cost estimating relationships 
(CERs) and percentages of estimated cost, i.e. wraps, to estimate the System Acquisition 
Costs.   A logarithmic regression of the historical data is developed for each vehicle sub-
system to define a Cost Estimating Relationship (CER) between the dry mass and the cost 
of the system. The standard regression equation used for this analysis is provided in 
Equation 2. The a and b values are obtained from the regression of the historical data. 
The Complexity Factor (CF) is a translation of this curve to represent differences 
between the current system and the historical systems used for the regression. Most 
historical systems were built with aluminum, but today’s systems utilize many different 
materials including titanium and composites. These materials weigh less, but should cost 
more, hence the CF accounts for this difference. Other cost complexity factors are used in 
NAFCOM, such as program management skill, funding stability, etc., but were assumed 
to be the same for all the system comparisons and were not changed in this analysis.  
 
CFxaWCost b=                                       ( 2 ) 
 
 To obtain the wrap costs in Table 29, the NAFCOM multiplies the CER based 
costs from Table 12 by simple historical based percentages.  The CER and wrap costs are 
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then summed for each vehicle subsystem.  An additional 20 percent cost margin is used 
to obtain the final System Acquisition Cost.  All architecture vehicles and Propellant 
Depot are costed using this method.  
 
Table 29. Summary and Description of NAFCOM Wraps 
System Wrap Description 
Integration, Assembly, & Checkout All labor and material required to physically integrate the 
various subsystems into a total system.  
System Test Operations Development testing, test effort and materials required for 
qualification and integration. 
Ground Support Equipment All labor and materials required to design, develop, 
manufacture, procure, assemble, test, checkout, and 
deliver the equipment necessary for system level final 
assembly and checkout. 
System Engineering & Integration Specific functions include those for control and direction 
of engineering activities, cost/performance trade-offs, 
engineering change support and planning studies, 
technology utilization, and the engineering required for 
safety, reliability, and quality control and assurance 
Program Management The effort and material required for the Fundamental 
management direction and decision-making to ensure that 
a product is developed, produced, and delivered 
 
 
 A summary of the predicted system acquisition costs (DDT&E) developed in this 
model are provided in Table 30. These values are for the baseline architecture vehicle 
models. The production costs include the cost from the NAFCOM CERs, the additional 
system-level costs, and a 20 percent cost margin. The life cycle analysis assumes that the 
production cost is the total cost required to produce the architecture elements needed of 
each mission. Since all flight elements are expendable, except the CEV, there is no 
additional overhaul done at the end of each mission, so the only costs are the hardware 
and its assembly. The depot cost is included to provide an example of the typical cost of 
the propellant depot. This example is for a depot that is capable of holding 50,000 lbm of 
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LOX/LH2 at an O/F ratio of 5.5. The results for the DDT&E and production are fed into 
the economics model, which calculates the life cycle cost at each design point. The CERs 
used in these calculations are provided in Appendix D.  
 
Table 30. Baseline Architecture Cost Summary 
[FY07] DDT&E ($M) Production ($M) 
CaLV 6,041 643 
LSAM 5,582 730 
CLV 3,778 633 
CEV/SM 4,200 500 
Depot (50,000 lbm, LOX/LH2) 940 190 
 
 
The second element of the Life-Cycle Cost is the Operational and Support costs 
(Figure 1) that include the System Operations, Integrated Logistics Support, and Pre-
Planned Product Improvement elements. In the present analysis, the System Operations is 
broken down into the ground and flight operations because of the way that NAFCOM 
computes cost. 
Because the operation of the architecture is spread over 15 years and because of 
the embedded NAFCOM costs, the Recurring System HW/SW Procurement costs are 
considered as operational costs.  These procurement costs are modeled in NAFCOM as a 
Theoretical First Unit (TFU) cost.  These TFU costs are those incurred by “the prime 
contractor and all subcontracts to the prime include the labor, materials, and other direct 
charges and allowable indirect charges required to produce the flight article”.[13]  
Specifically the TFU cost include the following:[13]  
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• Fabrication and Processing 
• Subassembly and Final Assembly 
• Rework and Modification 
• Experimental Production 
• Installation of Parts and Equipment Including GFE 
• Quality Control Inspection 
• Repair, Rework, Modification, and Replacement of Initial Tooling and STE 
• Sustaining Engineering 
• Production Control 
• Materials Handling 
• Manufacturing Engineering 
• Subcontractor/Supplier Liaison 
• Source Inspection 
 
Thus the NAFCOM computed TFU includes the Operations and Support cost 
elements (Figure 1) of Integrated Logistics Support (e.g. materials handling, 
subcontractor/supplier liaison, etc.) and Pre-Planned Product Improvement (e.g. 
sustaining engineering). 
The remaining Operations and Support Cost is the System Operation cost that is 
broken down into ground and flight operations.  As shown in the breakdown of the TFU 
costs, the fabrication and final assembly costs are included.  Not included in the costs are 
the payload integration and launch pad operations.  However, these costs are considered 
negligible as compared to the unit costs of the flight systems expended after every flight 
as an architecture comparison discriminator.   
Two methods were considered to determine the cost of the expended flight units.  
The first method assumes that the cost of each expended system is the TFU with a 
learning curve applied [53]. The learning curve is a manufacturing term that expresses the 
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amount of knowledge carried over from one unit to the next as a decrease in production 
cost [54]. The learning curve model used in this analysis assumes that the production cost 
is decreased by certain percent every time the number of units produced doubles. This 
learning curve is then applied to the TFU to determine the cost of the Nth unit produced. 
The yearly cost for this method is calculated using Equation 3. The Nth is carried over 
from one year to the next.  
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The second method is a more detailed analysis which breaks the yearly cost into a 
fixed and variable portion. This more detailed analysis may be required to discriminate 
between certain design options.  The fixed portion is all costs that are independent of the 
vehicle flight rate and thus remain constant for any flight rate. Even at a flight rate of zero 
the fixed portion remains. The variable portion is the costs that are dependent on the 
vehicle flight rate, and increases as number of missions completed each year increases. 
At a flight rate of zero, the variable portion is also zero. The yearly cost is calculated 
using Equation 4, the Nth unit is carried over from one year to the next. The total cost is 
derived from the estimate of the TFU.  
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  Both Methods One and Two utilize the TFU for calculating the annual cost of the 
lunar campaign. In the case of Method One all cost are assumed to be variable and the 
total cost depends completely on the yearly flight rate. In the case of Method Two the 
variable cost is decreased and a fix portion is added to account for those cost that are 
independent of flight rate. When the flight rate remains constant either method may be 
used to provide a relative comparison for the LCC between two design options. The 
results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 will utilize Method One and in Chapter 7, where the 
flight rate varies, Method Two will be used to compare the use of refueling to the 
baseline architecture.   
 The final Operations and Support Costs are the Flight Operations or Mission 
Control of the system.  Because all of the different architectures studied include the same 
launch and orbital vehicles, it was assumed that the Flight Operations for these systems 
were constant and were not a discriminator for Life Cycle Cost comparisons.  However, 
the architecture with the Propellant Depot would require additional Flight Operations.  
Since there are no historical data for the operational cost of a propellant depot, the 
operational cost of the Hubble Observatory was used as an analogy. The Hubble data 
processing facility and workforce that analyze the observational data were not included. 
Thus, the flight operational cost of the propellant depot is estimated to be $100M per year 
which assumes to address system heath monitoring, station keeping, and mission 
planning for the refueling events.  
 In order to determine the total Life-Cycle costs of the system architecture, a 
yearly economics model was developed to spread the DDT&E costs over Phase C and D 
and the Operations cost over Phase E (Figure 2).  Phase F (Closeout) or Disposal was not 
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considered in this present analysis because it is not a discriminator for architecture 
comparisons. 
 
Vehicle
Models
DDTE & TFU
(NAFCOM)
Economics
A
B
Campaign Details
$/lb of Propellant
CLV Delay
Life Cycle Cost
Depot Operations Cost
 
Figure 33. Life Cycle Cost Analysis Flow of Information 
 
 The life cycle cost estimate used in this thesis spreads the DDTE out over a 
number of years at the beginning of the program for each architecture element. The CLV, 
CEV, and in-space depot developments are spread out over five years while the CaLV 
and LSAM are spread out over six years based on the complexity of these systems. This 
DDTE is spread as a Beta function over the specified number of years [52]. The 
development of the CEV and CLV begins in 2007 and the CaLV, LSAM, and in-space 
depot begin in 2011. The life cycle analysis will assume a campaign that begins with the 
CEV and CLV operating two flights per year for the five years immediately following 
their development program. The development of the CaLV, LSAM and in-space depot is 
completed during these five years. Once all of the development work is completed the 
architecture begins operation of a 15 year lunar campaign with an assumed flight rate of 
two missions per year. The LCC results presented in Chapters 5 and 6 will utilize Method 
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One with an initial assumption of no learning throughout the campaign. As discussed 
previously various learning rates and the fixed versus variable cost analysis will be 
investigated in Chapter 7 to understand their effect on the implementation of propellant 
refueling. The discounted yearly cash flow [53] analysis is provided in Figure 34. The 
initial peaks and valleys represent the development period of the different architecture 
elements. These development periods could be designed to overlap to eliminate the drop 
off in LCC, but this has no impact on measuring the impact of propellant refueling on the 
architecture. A discount rate of three percent is applied when developing the discounted 
life cycle cost. The results presented throughout this thesis are provided in 2007 dollars 
(FY 2007 $M).  
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Figure 34. Life Cycle Cost Spreading for Baseline Architecture 
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The two development periods between 2007 – 2011 and 2011 – 2016 followed by 
the 15 year lunar campaign starting in 2018 are shown in Figure 34. The spike in cost in 
2017 accounts for the deployment of the in-space depot. The calculation assumes that 
only one depot is required throughout the program. Later in the thesis, the depot costs are 
varied to determine overall LCC impacts. This life cycle cost analysis and lunar 
campaign will be used for all design points in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
4.1.5 RELIABILITY MODEL 
 The reliability model is designed to determine the system-level reliability for the 
entire lunar architecture. The overall system reliability is dependent on the reliability of 
the individual elements and events within the architecture. The model uses a Fault Tree 
Analysis, a technique used during the Apollo program [55], where the reliability of the 
entire architecture is built up from individual events. In this case, the reliability hierarchy 
is broken down into three levels: the overall architecture, the six phases of operation 
(Ascent, LEO Operations, Propellant Refueling, Lunar Transfer, LLO Operations, and 
the Lunar Mission), and the individual underlying events. This structure is outlined in 
Figure 35. The metric of interest is the loss of mission probability. This is the reliability 
most affected by the addition of propellant refueling. The loss of crew reliability is not 
affected because all refueling can occur before the crew is delivered to LEO. The mission 
phases that occur after lunar ascent are not considered, as they are not affected by the 
addition of propellant refueling.  
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Figure 35. Reliability Model Fault Tree Analysis Structure 
 
 The reliability for the overall architecture is calculated using the Fault Tree 
Analysis technique, which builds up the overall system reliability from the reliability of 
the mission events. In this case, the event reliability numbers are taken from historical 
programs, such as the Apollo [55] and Space Shuttle programs [56]. The individual event 
reliabilities are provided in Appendix C. The in-space reliability values were taken from 
the reliability estimations made during the initial Apollo mode comparison. A secondary 
calculation is also made to provide an estimate of how these reliabilities have improved 
since the beginning of the Apollo program. This calculation assumes that a ten-fold 
improvement in each system has been achieved. The reliability calculations for the CaLV 
and LSAM were developed using a dynamically allocating fault tree calculator that is 
able to determine the reliability of each vehicle based on a number of system parameters, 
such as the engine type and required mission maneuvers[57]. The reliability of the launch 
vehicles was not greatly affected by this study because their basic configurations are not 
changed, and the major design changes, such as burn time, do not have a large impact on 
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the vehicle reliability. The lunar lander design space contained a number of different 
engine and propellant combinations, all of which have a substantial impact on the overall 
reliability of the lander. The dynamically allocating fault tree predictor was able to update 
and re-calculate the reliability for both the CaLV and LSAM without having to create a 
new model for each design point.  
 The addition of propellant refueling adds an additional point of failure to the 
architecture, and as a result, the overall reliability is decreased. The Apollo-based 
reliability estimate for the entire propellant refueling operations is 0.9676, resulting in 
less than four failures in 100 refueling trips. This is a higher reliability than the Apollo 
program predicted for the LEO operations (0.916) and lunar transfer (0.762) phases. This 
reliability is further reduced as the number of propellant refuelings is increased, as all 
refueling must occur in order for the mission to continue. This model accounts for the 
total number of refueling events utilized by the architecture.  
 The loss of mission calculation made in this model provides a relative reliability 
comparison for each of the propellant refueling trades considered. While the addition of 
the refueling event decreases the reliability of the architecture, the addition of the 
capability can improve the reliability of other areas of the architecture. It was discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2 that the addition of propellant refueling can de-couple the success of 
each mission from the successful on time launch of both launch vehicles. This trade in 
reliability allocation will be considered further in Chapter 7.  
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4.1.6 TECHNOLOGY RISK MODEL 
 The risk module provides an estimation of the technological development risk 
associated with maturing the technologies that are currently not at TRL 9. A list of the 
technologies that factor into the risk calculation are provided in Table 31 along with the 
TRL number assumed for each. All other technologies are assumed to not influence this 
study and are not considered in this calculation. The risk associated with developing each 
technology is assumed to be an exponentially increasing function of TRL [58]. The lower 
the TRL, the greater the risk encountered to fully mature the technology. This is due to 
the uncertainty in the cost and schedule required to mature the technology and the final 
performance level obtained. The total risk score for each design is a summation of the 
individual risk score for each technology; therefore, the more technologies that must be 
matured, and with lower starting TRL level, the greater the risk to the architecture. It is 
difficult to accurately determine the development risk of any technology because so many 
unknown factors exist. This model utilizes a simple exponential function to equate the 
development risk to the starting TRL; this is provided as Equation 5. The exponent is a 
scaling factor that set the risk score of a technology at TRL nine to ten and a technology 
at TRL one to zero. This is an arbitrary scale used to provide a relative comparison 
between the design points that require additional technology development before they can 
be utilized by the architecture.  
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Table 31. Summary of Development Risk Assessment 
Technology TRL Risk Score 
Ascent Engine   
Storable 7 5.04 
LOX/CH4 5 2.32 
LOX/LH2 (pressure) 8 7.15 
LOX/LH2 (pump) 8 7.15 
   
Propellant Thermal Management   
MLI 8 7.15 
Cryo-cooler + MLI 4 1.46 
   
Refueling 4 1.46 
 
 
4.2 VALIDATION OF BASELINE MODELS 
 The final section of Chapter 4 discusses the validation process that was conducted 
to confirm the results for each of the vehicle models. The goal of the models was to 
match the payload capability and mass of the vehicles developed during the ESAS study. 
The payload capability is one of the key measures for each vehicle and the dry mass leads 
directly to the overall cost of the vehicle. These vehicles were designed and calibrated to 
match the ESAS results so that these models could provide a direct comparison when the 
propellant re-supply elements are added to the architecture. The vehicle mass, propellant 
requirements, and payload delivered were all within a few percent of the ESAS results. 
These results are provided in the following sections. A detailed discussion as to the 
development of these results can be found in reference [59].  
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4.2.1 CARGO LAUNCH VEHICLE 
 The cargo launch vehicle (CaLV) is designed to deliver large non-human cargo 
elements to LEO for lunar exploration missions. This includes in excess of 320,000 lbm 
of payload comprised of the LSAM and TLI propellant. A detailed description of the 
cargo launch vehicle is provided in Chapter 2. A mass comparison of the ESAS results 
for the cargo launch vehicle and the one developed during this study were provided in 
Table 21. These results showed that the dry mass of the two vehicle differed by less than 
one percent. This was achieved because the MERs used for the sub-system mass were 
calibrated to match the results outlined in the ESAS report [pg. 428]. This allowed the 
basis of the launch vehicle models to be to the same so that the trajectory and cost 
analysis would provide a better comparison. 
 The ESAS report [pg. 433] provided a set of trajectory plots for the ascent phase 
of the CaLV which provide another means of comparison between the two models, 
Figure 36 and Figure 37. These results are taken directly from the output of the POST 
optimized trajectory. The main difference between the two trajectories is that the 
optimized path of the model pulls up out of the densest part of the atmosphere later than 
the ESAS CaLV exposing it to a higher thermal load. This additional load last for 
approximately 10 seconds. The dynamic pressure peak remains the same at around 550 
psf. The other aspects of the trajectory, (altitude, velocity, and acceleration) match up 
well with the published ESAS results. A comparison of the trajectory profiles are 
provided in Figure 36 and Figure 37. The fact that the final trajectories are nearly 
identical suggests that this model will predict the behavior of the CaLV well.  
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Figure 36: CaLV Altitude and Velocity Profile Comparison 
 
 
Figure 37: CaLV Acceleration and Dynamic Pressure Profile Comparison
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 A summary of the key trajectory results are provided in Table 32. The main 
differences seen here is the timing of the vehicle separations. The stage separation events 
of the model are around eight to sixteen second off from the ESAS trajectory data. This is 
primarily due to an increase in the burn time of the solid rocket boosters. The overall 
propellant requirements and mass ratio were shown to provide an accurate estimate of the 
ESAS results.  
 
Table 32. Summary of Trajectory Analysis 
 ESAS Model 
Mass Ratio 4.84 4.83 
Max Dynamic pressure (psf) 523 558 
SRB Separation (s) 117 125 
1st Stage Separation (s) 405 418 
2nd Stage MECO (s) 627 643 
Max g’s  2.8 2.94 
Final Velocity (ft/s)  25,900 25,700 
 
 
4.2.2 LUNAR SURFACE ACCESS MODULE 
 The Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) provides both access to the lunar 
surface and a habitat for humans during exploration missions. Once in Low Lunar Orbit 
(LLO), the crew transfers to the LSAM for descent to the surface. The crew utilizes the 
LSAM as a base of operations while on the surface. At the end of the mission the LSAM 
separates and a smaller ascent stage is used to return the crew to the CEV in LLO (Figure 
5). Chapter 2 provides further details on the LSAM design and function.   
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 The LSAM model again provides a close match to the results presented in the 
ESAS reports, as shown in Table 26. The largest difference between the two models is 
seen is in the dry mass of the descent stage. While there is a 5.5% error between the 
model and the ESAS results, this is only a mass difference of 350 lbm. This is primarily 
due to differences in the structural mass of the vehicle. It is difficult to model the sub-
systems mass of the lunar lander because there is little historical mass information to base 
the analysis. The remaining vehicle parameters, specifically the lunar surface payload 
capability and total lander mass, match up well with the published results for the ESAS 
lunar lander.  
 The results from these validation cases provide enough evidence to conclude that 
the development of these models resulted in an accurate representation of the baseline 
ESAS architecture elements for reference comparison. A cost and reliability validation 
was not possible, as the ESAS results were not made public. The models and tools 
discussed in this chapter are used to evaluate the propellant re-refueling design space. 
These simulation results will be discussed in Chapter 5 – 7.  
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CHAPTER 5                                                             
A PARETO FRONTIER FOR LUNAR SURFACE 
PAYLOAD CAPABILITY AND LIFE CYCLE COST: 
SCENARIO ONE  
 
The term non-dominated solution refers to the locus of points within a design 
space where no additional improvements in the responses can be made without violating 
constraints. These points define the design space boundary and represent the best 
achievable solutions. This boundary is referred to as the Pareto frontier. Any solution not 
along the frontier is considered dominated and can be improved by moving to a solution 
on the frontier. A point along this frontier can then be selected based upon the 
preferences of the decision maker to one response or another. This helps the decision 
maker understand how his or her preferences and the uncertainty of these preferences 
affect the final architecture selection.   
This chapter will discuss the Pareto frontier for the lunar surface payload versus 
life cycle cost metrics and categorize the non-dominated design points which bound this 
design space. The results will demonstrate that, in general, in order to increase the lunar 
surface payload capability, the life cycle cost of the architecture must increase. There are, 
however, a number of design points that can improve the lunar surface payload capability 
while also achieving a lower life cycle cost than the baseline. As will be shown, all points 
along the frontier include the use of propellant refueling. The ESAS baseline design 
point, described in Chapter 2, is not on the Pareto frontier, suggesting that an 
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improvement in the architecture can be achieved through the addition of propellant 
refueling. These two FOMs were selected to provide a screening for the best refueling 
strategies. The other FOM were not selected because for a given refueling options there is 
little difference in the risk, extensibility and reliability of the architecture. Therefore, 
these do not act as good discriminators for the screening process.  The impact on these 
three FOM will be further examined in Chapter 7.  
 
5.1 THE IDENTIFICATIONS OF NON DOMINATED SOLUTIONS 
  The procedure described in this section is intended to define a Pareto frontier 
using the propellant refueling trade space simulation discussed in Chapter 3. This chapter 
will focus on the results for Scenario One; the design philosophy for this Scenario is to 
utilize propellant refueling to improve both the lunar surface and LEO payload capability 
of the architecture. Given any two Figures of Merit, such as life cycle cost and lunar 
surface payload, the steps in Figure 39 can be used to develop the set of non-dominated 
solutions. The trade space morphological matrix is shown in Figure 38. Where the nine 
propellant design variables used in this study are listed in the first column, and the 
remaining columns represent the design choices for each input variable.  
 
5.1.1 DEVELOPING THE PARETO FRONTIER 
A logic flow diagram of the steps used to generate the Pareto frontier is provided 
in Figure 39. The first step in developing the Pareto frontier is to eliminate any 
extraneous design points that do not make practical sense. These cases were only 
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included to simplify the automation of generating the entire trade space. For example, all 
cases that include both cryo-coolers and Hypergols on the LSAM ascent stage are 
removed since no propellant boiloff will occur in these cases.  
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Figure 38: Trade Study Morphological Matrix 
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Figure 39: Pareto Frontier Creation Flow Chart 
 
 
The next step is to place a limit on the payload capability of the architecture, 
where the addition of propellant refueling can increase payload capabilities that increase 
the size of the LSAM beyond the limits imposed by the fairing of the CaLV. The black 
design points in Figure 40 represent the designs that were removed from consideration 
due to this fairing constraint. The red points represent an 8.5m diameter constraint, and 
the blue points represent a 9.5m diameter constraint. The results discussed in this chapter 
will assume an 8.5m diameter constraint as it used in the baseline configuration. In all 
cases, a 10m maximum height constraint is also applied to the payload section of the 
lander (Figure 41). As will be discussed later in this chapter, the points that offer the 
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lowest cost per pound of payload to the lunar surface are well below this height 
constraint.   
 
 
Figure 40: All Design Point with Fairing Constraint Applied 
 
  Constraining the fairing diameter to 8.5m and a height of 10m restricts the 
payload to 100,000 lbm as is shown in Figure 41. This assumes the same packing density 
for the baseline LSAM design. The fairing diameter constraint has no effect on the design 
points that fall on the Pareto frontier. As shown in Figure 40, the design points that would 
be added if the fairing constraint was increased to 9.5m lie within the Pareto frontier. 
Therefore, this constraint is not active for the points along the frontier. The active 
constraint along the frontier is the maximum allowable payload height. Placing this 
constraint at 9m would remove all points with a payload capability greater than 90,000 
lbm, and increasing this constraint to 12m would increase the maximum payload 
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capability to 125,000 lbm assuming the packing density of the payload remains the same 
as the current LSAM configuration. A larger payload would raise the landing CG, which 
may require a more sophisticated landing control system. This effect is not considered in 
this analysis.   
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Figure 41: LSAM Volume Constraint Dimensions 
 
 Once the infeasible trade set and geometry constrained data has been eliminated, 
the non-dominated solutions in the design space can be determined (Figure 39). The 
remaining designs are sorted in ascending order by lunar surface payload capability. The 
design with the lowest payload is selected, and a search is performed for designs with a 
lower life cycle cost. If such a design is found, the current one is discarded, as it is not 
Pareto optimal. This process is repeated for the design with the next higher lunar surface 
payload capability and is continued until all design points have been examined. The 
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design points that remain represent the Pareto frontier. In this case, the Pareto frontier is 
comprised of 27 design points, which have the lowest LCC that can be achieved for a 
given payload capability. The Pareto frontier generated from this analysis is shown in 
Figure 42. These are broken down into two sets. The pink points, near the baseline, 
represent the design points where no propellant refueling was considered, and the blue 
points represent where propellant refueling was utilized.  
 
Baseline
 
Figure 42: Path for Establishing the Set of Non-Dominated Solutions, Scenario One 
 
5.2 BASELINE IMPROVEMENTS FOR NON PROPELLANT REFUELING OPTIONS 
 
 Figure 43 shows ten circled design points that do not require propellant refueling 
have a better solution than the baseline design. These points are summarized in Table 33. 
These solutions either have a lower LCC and provide the same payload capability, or 
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they have a higher payload capability without increasing the LCC of the baseline 
architecture. There are a number of solutions that show an improvement in both the LCC 
and the payload capability of the architecture. Examining the region around the baseline 
design point reveals ten designs (circled data points) that offer a greater payload 
capability without increasing the LCC of the architecture and do not require propellant 
refueling. 
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Figure 43: Improvements in Baseline Architecture 
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 Table 33: Improvements in Baseline Design without Propellant of Refueling 
Case # Ascent Stage 
Propellant 
Ascent Stage 
Thermal 
Descent Stage 
Thermal 
EDS   
Thermal 
LEO Stay LCC 
($M) 
Payload 
(lbm) 
1 (B)    LOX/CH4 MLI MLI MLI 95 71,710 3,619 
2 Hypergols MLI MLI MLI 95 71,467 3,704 
3 LOX/CH4 Cryo-cooler MLI MLI 95 71,664 4,518 
4 LOX/LH2 (pump) MLI MLI MLI 95 71,793 6,198 
5 LOX/CH4 MLI Cryo-cooler MLI 95 71,642 6,827 
6 LOX/LH2 (pump) Cryo-cooler MLI MLI 95 71,818 7,038 
7 Hypergols MLI Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler 15 68,957 7,211 
8 LOX/CH4 Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler 15 69,147 8,018 
9 LOX/LH2 (press) Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler 15 69,630 8,970 
10 LOX/LH2 (pump) MLI Cryo-cooler MLI 95 71,725 9,406 
11 LOX/LH2 (pump) Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler Cryo-cooler 15 69,225 10,709 
 
 
 There are two distinct groups of designs: those that can increase the baseline 
payload capability for the same life cycle cost (Group 1) and those that can both increase 
the payload capability and decrease the life cycle cost of the baseline architecture (Group 
2). The only differences between the two groups is the propellant boiloff thermal 
management system utilized by the EDS and the required LEO loiter time. In Group 1, 
the EDS and LSAM utilize a passive MLI thermal management system to minimize the 
boiloff propellant during a 95-day loiter period. The points in Group 2 utilize an active 
cryo-cooler plus MLI system to eliminate all propellant boiloff and are designed for a 
shorter 15-day loiter period.  
The benefit of utilizing a cryo-cooler to eliminate propellant boiloff is due to an 
increase in the lunar surface payload and a decrease in the LCC as shown in Figure 43. 
The payload increases because the cryo-cooler system has a lower total mass than the 
MLI only system plus the propellant lost to boiloff, as is shown in Figure 44. Eliminating 
the need to carry additional propellant directly leads to an increase in architecture 
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payload. Examining Case #4 and Case #11 in Table 33 shows that a 5,200 lb increase in 
payload is achieved when transitioning from an all MLI system to a cryo-cooler plus MLI 
system.  A more detailed model of the thermal managements system is needed to 
determine if refueling the LEO boiloff is a better solution than utilizing a cryo-coolers to 
eliminate this loss of propellant.  
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Figure 44: Total Mass of the Potential Thermal Management Systems 
 
The LCC is also less for the points in Group 2 than in Group 1 because the 
elimination of propellant boiloff allows the CLV to be delayed without resulting in a loss 
of the LSAM and EDS. In the design points where only MLI is used, once the designed 
loiter period is exceeded, the EDS and LSAM no longer have sufficient propellant to 
complete the remaining mission maneuvers. These elements must then be replaced before 
the mission can be completed. The probability that this will occur is dependent on the 
designed LEO loiter period. This change in probability is illustrated in Figure 45 along 
with the increase in LCC to account for the replacement missions. The shorter the design 
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loiter period, the higher the probability that a mission will be lost and the greater the cost 
to the architecture. The benefit of a short loiter is that less propellant must be carried to 
LEO resulting in a greater payload. A decrease in LCC of $2.5B can be achieved by 
switching from an MLI system (case #4) to a cryo-cooler system (Case #11) on all 
architecture elements. These results and all of the results that follow in this chapter and in 
Chapter 6 assume that once the designed loiter period is exceeded than the mission is lost 
and must be replaced. In actuality this may not always be the case, because the 
architecture is designed to perform the worse case mission during the worse Earth-Moon 
alignment. Since these conditions are rarely both active the architecture may be able to 
remain in LEO for a longer period of time. This work will require that that architecture 
always be ready to perform the worse case mission, but this may be an optimistic 
assumption and should be considered when evaluating the results of this study.  
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Figure 45: Loss of Mission effect on LCC 
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 There is a secondary trend relating to the engine selection on the LSAM ascent 
stage that can be observed within each of these groups as shown by the circles and the 
data points in Figure 43. In both groups, the LCC varies only slightly while the payload 
capability can vary by as much as 200%. The Hypergol engine (green points) has the 
lowest payload capability while the pump-fed LOX/LH2 engine (dark blue circles) has 
the highest. This is due to the increase in performance of each engine (Isp and T/WE, 
Figure 40), which directly affects the payload of the vehicle. The engine performance 
values along with the corresponding payload are provided in Figure 46. This figure shows 
that, as the Isp and T/WE, increase, the lunar payload also increases. The LOX/LH2 
pump-fed engine offers the greater payload because it has the highest Isp (460) and T/WE 
(38). A greater Isp and T/WE reduce the amount of propellant required to complete the 
mission maneuver, and since the total mass of the LSAM is held constant, a reduction in 
the required propellant results in an increase in payload. A more detailed cost analysis is 
needed than provided here in order to account for all of the differences between the 
various engine options. An engine with a greater performance has a higher engine cost, 
but lower inert mass which results in a lower vehicle cost. A more detailed cost analysis 
would help provide a better discriminator for the AS selection, but this is not a primary 
result of this work. The work in this chapter shows that the engine selection is not greatly 
effected by the addition of propellant refueling and that the engine selection has a smaller 
overall effect in the architecture than the introduction of propellant refueling.  
 
147 
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
LOX/LH2 (pump) LOX/CH4 Hypergols
Isp = 460
T/WE = 38
Isp = 360
T/WE = 28
Isp = 323
T/WE = 30
 
Figure 46: Engine Performance Values and Payload Capability 
 
As an example, a configuration that utilizes a passive thermal control system on 
all architecture elements with a LOX/LH2 ascent engine (Case #4) can provide 2,500 lbm 
more payload capability than utilizing a Hypergol engine (Case #2). The LOX/LH2 
engine increases the cost of the LSAM Ascent Stage because of its greater complexity 
[Humble]. The complexity factors used for estimating the DDT&E and TFU for the 
ascent engine are provided in Table 34 [60]. The Hypergol engine is the simplest design 
considered and results in the lowest development and production cost. The LOX/LH2 
pump-fed engine option is the most complex, and therefore results in the highest cost to 
the architecture. The LCC is increased by $325M when a LOX/LH2 pump-fed engine 
(Case #4) is used instead of a Hypergol engine (Case #2). The cost of the ascent engine is 
a small component of the overall LCC of the architecture. Thus it has less of an impact 
than an increase in the payload capability.  
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Table 34: LSAM Ascent Stage Engine Complexity Factors 
Engine Type DDT&E CF TFU CF 
LOX/LH2 (pump) 3 2.28 
LOX/LH2 (pressure) 2.2 1.88 
LOX/CH4 2.6 1.97 
Hypergol 1.0 1.0 
 
  
 The results of this study demonstrate that an improvement in the lunar surface 
payload can be achieved by utilizing a higher performing engine on the LSAM ascent 
stage and by utilizing cryo-coolers on each of the architecture elements.  The change in 
Ascent Stage engine has a small effect on the LLC, while the switch to cryo-coolers 
shows a larger decrease because it is able to improve the LOM of the architecture. It is 
also evident that the elimination of propellant boiloff concerns with an advanced 
technology can greatly affect both the payload capability and the cost of the exploration 
architecture. This is why non-refueling designs show the best payload and cost when their 
propellant storage systems utilize an active boiloff thermal control system. In the case 
when hydrogen is used on the ascent stage it is assumed that zero-boiloff is achieved. In 
the case of a long term outpost mission this zero-boiloff level may be difficult to achieve. 
A further study of this is needed in order to fully address the limitation of propellant boil-
off when the hydrogen engine is selected for the ascents stage. The Hydrogen engine may 
also results in a lower reliability because of the increase in engine complexity.   
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5.3 DESIGN TRENDS IN NON-DOMINATED SOLUTIONS 
 
The previous section discussed how the baseline design could be improved 
without the implementation of propellant refueling technologies. While the previous 
section discussed a number of designs that can improve upon the baseline design, none of 
these designs fall on the Pareto frontier. This section will describe the Pareto-optimal 
designs and discuss how they differ from the non refueling cases and the baseline design. 
The solutions that lie on the Pareto frontier (red line) can be organized into five groups as 
shown in Figure 47. The Pareto frontier is comprised of design points that all utilize 
propellant refueling. The blue points in this figure represent the designs that utilize 
propellant refueling, while the pink points represent those that do not. The points on the 
Pareto frontier offer an increase in lunar surface payload capability, but generally result 
in a greater life cycle cost. The following section will discuss the points along the frontier 
and characterize how the introduction of propellant refueling affects the payload 
capability and the life cycle cost of the architecture.  
 The LCC results presented in this chapter and again in Chapter 6 will utilize the 
analysis outlined in Section 4.1.4. The components of the LCC include the development 
cost of the architecture elements, including the cost of developing a propellant depot for 
the refueling cases. The acquisition cost for the architecture element are also included, 
plus the cost of building and launching the propellant depot to LEO. The final component 
of the LCC is used for the refueling cases which must purchase propellant before 
completing each mission. This propellant is purchased at a set price and will be 
represented by a $/lb.  
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Figure 47: Propellant Refueling Pareto Frontier Groups
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The initial results will utilize a price of $2,000/lb and then sensitivity analysis will be 
conducted to see how the results change as the price of propellant is increased.  
Before determining the best strategy for moving the baseline architecture onto the 
Pareto frontier, it is important to understand the makeup of the design points that fall 
along this frontier. There are five design variables that remain constant at every point 
along the frontier. These variables are the Descent Stage, Ascent Stage and EDS boiloff 
thermal control systems, the ability to re-fuel the LEO propellant boiloff, and requiring a 
15 day LEO loiter. The ability to re-fuel the propellant lost to boiloff is the primary driver 
for the LEO loiter period and the thermal control system selected for the EDS and 
LSAM. The baseline architecture requires the EDS and LSAM to carry additional 
propellant to LEO to account for the propellant boiloff lost during the loiter period. 
Because the boiloff propellant can be re-fueled with a depot in LEO, the additional 
propellant required for boiloff with the baseline architecture can be replaced with payload 
(5,000 lbm or 140 %). This design choice allows the EDS and LSAM to be re-fueled 
prior to the trans-lunar injection maneuver and eliminates the need to carry additional 
propellant to LEO. As a result, the cargo launch vehicle can deliver a larger lunar surface 
payload capability. A second benefit of refueling the boiloff is that the CLV can 
experience a delay without resulting in a loss of mission and pre-deployed hardware 
(EDS and LSAM) because the boiloff propellant can be re-fueled at any time. As a result, 
a designated loiter period is not required. This drives the section of the 15 day LEO loiter 
which is the shortest period considered. Theoretically this should be driven to zero but 
this was not considered during the design space exploration. A lower life cycle cost is 
therefore achieved because these elements do not have to be re-launched as in the 
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baseline architecture which required 1 – 2 missions to be replaced during the lunar 
campaign based in a reliability of 0.947 (Figure 58).  
Since the propellant boiloff is re-fueled and no longer an architecture concern, 
MLI becomes the best solution for the thermal management system on the EDS and 
LSAM. The results in Figure 48 illustrate that the use of a cryo-cooler plus MLI results in 
a lower total mass than MLI plus the mass of propellant lost to boiloff. However, if the 
propellant lost to boiloff is replaced then the total mass of the two systems is similar, 
especially for the 15 day loiter period. The cost of utilizing MLI is less than the 
development of a cryo-cooler system, and since the two system offer a similar total mass, 
the use of MLI becomes the best architecture design choice when the boiloff propellant is 
re-fueled. Since propellant boiloff is not a concern, cryo-coolers do not provide a benefit 
to the architecture. A passive system is still needed in order to reduce the total amount of 
boiloff and the amount of propellant that must be delivered.  
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Figure 48: Total Thermal Management System Mass
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Table 35: Scenario One, Non-Dominated Solution Description, Points 1 - 14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case # Group # Ascent   
Propellant 
Lander        
Refueling 
LEO Stay 
Time 
Re-fuel LEO 
Boiloff 
LOI 
Maneuver 
Additional Burn 
(lbm) 
DS %      
Re-fueled 
LCC 
($M) 
Payload 
(lbm) 
$/lb 
1 1 Hypergols None 15 Yes DS 0 n/a 68,939 7,840 293,107 
2 1 LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes DS 0 n/a 69,109 8,701 264,745 
3 1 LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes DS 0 n/a 69,154 11,765 195,933 
4 1 LOX/LH2 (pump) Ascent Stage 15 Yes DS 0 100 69,774 16,169 143,840 
5 -- Hypergols None 15 Yes DS 25,000 n/a 71,076 19,539 121,257 
6 2 Hypergols None 15 Yes EDS 0 n/a 71,110 31,942 74,207 
7 2 LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes EDS 0 n/a 71,280 32,803 72,432 
8 2 LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes EDS 0 n/a 71,322 35,867 66,285 
9 2 LOX/LH2 (pump) Ascent Stage 15 Yes EDS 0 100 71,742 41,213 58,026 
10 3 Hypergols None 15 Yes EDS 25,000 n/a 72,999 48,045 50,647 
11 3 LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes EDS 25,000 n/a 73,169 48,906 49,871 
12 3 LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes EDS 25,000 n/a 73,212 51,969 46,958 
13 3 Hypergols Ascent Stage 15 Yes EDS 25,000 50 73,615 55,924 43,878 
14 3 LOX/LH2 (pump) Ascent Stage 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 73,620 57,599 42,605 
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Table 36: Scenario One, Non-Dominated Solution Description, Points 15- 27 
 
 
Case # Group # Ascent   
Propellant 
Lander        
Refueling 
LEO Stay 
Time 
Re-fuel LEO 
Boiloff 
LOI 
Maneuver 
Additional Burn 
(lbm) 
DS %      
Re-fueled 
LCC 
($M) 
Payload 
(lbm) 
$/lb 
15 4 Hypergols Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 0 100 63,339 74,104 38,999 
16 4 LOX/CH4 Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 0 100 64,200 74,275 38,564 
17 4 LOX/LH2 (pump) Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 0 100 67,263 74,317 36,829 
18 4 LOX/LH2 (pump) Both 15 Yes EDS 0 100 73,116 74,854 34,126 
19 -- LOX/LH2 (pump) Ascent Stage 15 Yes EDS 50,000 100 73,989 75,438 33,986 
20 -- Hypergols None 15 Yes EDS 75,000 100 80,265 76,611 31,816 
21 5 Hypergols Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 87,794 76,668 29,109 
22 5 LOX/CH4 Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 88,655 76,838 28,890 
23 5 LOX/LH2 (pump) Descent Stage 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 91,719 76,880 27,941 
24 5 LOX/CH4 Both 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 97,544 77,414 26,454 
25 -- LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes EDS 100,000 100 100,231 78,613 26,144 
26 -- Hypergols Ascent Stage 95 No EDS 100,000 100 103,927 79,343 25,448 
27 -- LOX/CH4 Ascent Stage 95 No EDS 100,000 100 104,055 79,462 25,455 
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There are five remaining design variables which do not remain constant along the 
Pareto frontier: the Ascent Stage engine, which element performs the LOI maneuver, how 
much additional propellant is burned during ascent, which LSAM stage is re-fueled and 
how much propellant is re-fueled. These design variables can be grouped into five 
categories that make up the design points along the frontier. The five groups are shown in 
Figure 47, and the details of each are depicted in Table 35 and Table 36. The thermal 
management design variables are removed from these tables because they remain 
constant along the frontier.  
 The four groups can be distinguished by their implementation of propellant 
refueling and their values for the remaining design variables. For example, the only 
change between Group One and Group Two is that the LOI maneuver is performed by 
the descent stage in Group One and by the EDS in Group Two; the remaining design 
variables are the same. The makeup of the five groups along the frontier can be 
differentiated by the vehicle that performs the LOI maneuver, the amount of additional 
propellant burned during ascent, and the lander stages that are re-fueled. The Ascent 
Stage engine selection does not affect the makeup of the groups along the frontier, but 
rather forms a repeating pattern within each group. The following section will describe 
how the remaining design variables define the points along the Pareto frontier.   
The choices of ascent engine and LSAM refueling scenario create a repeating 
pattern within each of the five groups. This pattern can been seen by examining how the 
ascent stage engine selection and LSAM refueling strategy change for Cases 10 – 14. The 
ascent stage engine follows the following pattern while moving from low to high payload 
capability within each group: Hypergols, LOX/CH4, LOX/LH2 (pump), Hypergols, 
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LOX/LH2 (pump). This pattern is illustrated in Figure 49. The second Hypergol case is 
italicized because it only occurs in some of the groups while the other four points are 
always present. As an example of this trend, consider the points in Groups Three (Cases 
10 – 14). The first three points include no lander refueling while the final two points re-
fuel the ascent stage. This example is illustrated in Figure 49, where the ascent engine 
selection and LSAM refueling strategy are noted.  
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Figure 49: Ascent Engine and Lander Refueling Pattern 
 
This pattern is a result of the engine performance factors (Isp and T/WE) and the 
amount of propellant offloaded from the LSAM. The five cases in Group Three can be 
used to outline this pattern. Cases 10 – 12 utilize no propellant off-loading from the 
LSAM while Cases 13 and 14 off-load all of the propellant from the ascent stage. As a 
result Cases 10 – 12 have a lower payload capability and LCC than Cases 13 and 14. This 
is because, when propellant is offloaded from the LSAM, it is replaced with additional 
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payload (constant gross mass); the more propellant offloaded from the LSAM the greater 
the payload. This increase in payload results in an increase in LCC because additional 
propellant must be purchased as more propellant is offloaded. As an example, Case #13 
provides an increase of 7,819 lbm of payload over case #10 and an increase in LCC of 
$616M. The only difference between these two design points is the amount of propellant 
offloaded from the LSAM.  
 This pattern also shows how the selection of the ascent stage engine affects the 
lunar surface payload and the LCC of the architecture. Figure 50 illustrates the change in 
payload for Cases 1 – 3 as the ascent engine changes. The LOX/LH2 engine (Case #3) 
has the highest Isp and T/WE which results in the greater payload. The LOX/CH4 (Case 
#2) and Hypergol (Case #1) have a comparable payload because they have similar 
performance factors with Case 1 providing a lower Isp and a slightly higher T/WE. The 
performance factors affect the mass of propellant required to complete the mission 
maneuvers, a greater T/WE and Isp results in less propellant. The total mass of the LSAM 
is held constant during this scenario, thus a decrease in required propellant leads to an 
increase in the payload that can be delivered to the lunar surface. This resulting change in 
payload is seen in all five groups along the Pareto frontier. The relative close vicinity of 
these points suggests that the engine type, and how the lander is re-fueled, have less of an 
impact on the life cycle cost of the architecture than the other design variables. The other 
design variables contribute to larger jumps in both the LCC and payload capability. 
 
 
158 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
LOX/LH2 (pump) LOX/CH4 Hypergols
Pa
yl
ao
d 
(lb
s
)
Isp = 460
T/WE = 38
Isp = 360
T/WE = 28
Isp = 323
T/WE = 30
 
Figure 50: Change in Payload for Difference Engine Performance Parameters 
 
 The distribution of the five groups, shown in Figure 47, can be explained by the 
final two design variables: the stage that performs the LOI maneuver and the additional 
propellant burned during ascent. These two design variables have the largest impact on 
the payload capability and require the most propellant refueling. The refueling of the 
LSAM also provides a significant increase in the lunar surface payload when the Descent 
Stage is re-fueled in addition to the Ascent Stage.  
 As mentioned earlier, the only difference between Group One (Case #s 1 – 4) and 
Group Two (Case #s 6 – 9) is that, in Group One, the descent stage performs the LOI 
maneuver, while the EDS performs this maneuver in Group Two. Figure 51 illustrates 
how the LSAM payload can be increased when the LOI maneuver is performed by the 
EDS instead of the descent stage. The improvement between the baseline and Case #7 is 
noted in this figure. This change to the architecture increases the payload capability to the 
lunar surface of the baseline architecture by more than a factor of eight (3,619 lbm to 
32,803 lbm) while only increasing the total LCC by 3.5%. An additional example that 
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occurs between two points along the Pareto frontier is the increase in payload and LCC 
between Case #2 and Case #7. The only change between these two design points is that 
the EDS is utilized for the LOI maneuver in Case #7. This results in a 24,100 lb increase 
in payload (277%) and a $2.2B increase in LCC (3.1%). This payload improvement is 
possible because removing the LOI maneuver from the LSAM’s manifest decreases the 
propellant requirement by 40% (22,000 lbm). There are two potential possibilities for the 
impact of this trade on the design of the architecture. The first is that the overall size of 
the LSAM can be reduced; a result that will be investigated more in Chapter 6. The 
second option is that the LSAM can maintain the baseline gross mass and increase the 
payload capability of the vehicle by replacing the LOI propellant with additional payload. 
Both of these options can be seen in Figure 51. Since the gross mass of the LSAM is 
shifted down when it is not required to perform the LOI maneuver, it is able to achieve a 
greater payload while maintaining the original gross mass. In the ESAS study the EDS 
was not used for the LOI because the CaLV did not have the payload capability to deliver 
the propellant required for the EDS to complete both the TLI and LOI maneuvers. In this 
case, the LOI propellant is delivered to LEO separately and therefore does not increase 
the payload requirement on the CaLV.  
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Figure 51: LSAM Gross Mass as a Function of Lunar Surface Payload 
 
 The change in design inputs from Group Two (Case #s 6 – 9) to Group Three 
(Case #s 10 – 14) increases the amount of propellant burned on the second stage of the 
CaLV during ascent. The LOI maneuver is completed by the EDS as in Group Two As 
the second stage is also the EDS, there is a large amount of propellant left in the stage 
when the baseline vehicle reaches LEO. This propellant is then used for the trans-lunar 
injection maneuver. Increasing the propellant burned during the ascent phase of launch 
increases the payload that can be delivered to LEO, but the EDS would have insufficient 
propellant to complete the remaining mission maneuvers. The EDS then becomes 
dependent on the propellant depot to provide the propellant required to complete the 
lunar mission. Increasing the amount of propellant burned during ascent does not 
drastically improve the total payload capability to LEO, but rather increases the mission 
payload by replacing the unburned propellant delivered to LEO with mission payload. 
The total payload is the unburned EDS propellant plus the LEO mission payload. This 
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trade of TLI propellant for mission payload is shown in Figure 52. The four columns 
represent the amount of additional propellant burned during ascent. The total payload 
improvement is approximately 25,000 lbm when all of the EDS propellant is used, but the 
mission payload is increased by 250,000 lbm. The improvement in mission payload is 
more dramatic and directly leads to an overall improvement in lunar surface payload 
capability.  
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Figure 52: Change in Payload Capability as the Ascent Propellant is Increased 
 
 The design space investigation included an increase in the amount of propellant 
burned on the upper stage of the CaLV between 0 and 100,000 lbm. The designs in 
Group Three utilize a 25,000 lb increase in the upper stage burn, which leads to a 
corresponding increase in lunar surface payload capability of 16,100 lbm between Case 
#7 and Case #11. This increase in payload is in addition to the improvement already 
provided by utilizing the EDS for the LOI maneuver and refueling the propellant lost to 
boiloff.  
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 The remaining two groups (Groups Four and Five) utilize a similar refueling 
strategy to that employed in Group Three. The payload is increased by decreasing the 
amount of propellant that is delivered to LEO. In Group Three this was accomplished by 
increasing the EDS propellant that is used during ascent, and in Groups Four and Five 
this is done by further increasing the propellant used during ascent and by offloading 
additional propellant from the LSAM. Since burning additional propellant does not 
significantly increase the total payload, offloading propellant accomplished almost the 
same result.  
 The design points in Group Four (Case #s 15 – 18) are more closely related to 
Group Two than they are to Group Three. In this group, the EDS performs the LOI 
maneuver as in Groups Two and Three. The EDS upper stage burn is unchanged from the 
baseline design and propellant refueling is used to remove the LSAM propellant prior to 
launch. The distinguishing characteristic in Group Four is that the Descent Stage 
propellant is now offloaded for all points, whereas only the ascent propellant had been 
offloaded previously. All other design variables remain the same between Groups Two 
and Four. The increase in propellant refueling increases the mission payload capability, 
but it also results in a greater life cycle cost because of the cost of providing propellant to 
LEO. Examining Case #7 and Case #16 shows that the payload can be increased by 
31,400 lbm (95%) when the descent stage propellant is offloaded. This also results in an 
increase in LCC of $2.99B (4.2%). The descent maneuver requires approximately 57,000 
lbm of propellant which can be offloaded prior to launch. With the LSAM propellant 
removed, prior to launch, the CaLV is able to launch more mission payload to LEO 
because additional payload capability can replace the off-loaded propellant. The increase 
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is not one-to-one, however, because any increase in payload also increases the descent 
propellant needed.  
 The final group (Case #s 21 – 24) is a combination of Groups Three and Four. 
This group utilizes propellant refueling to offload the Descent Stage propellant and 
increases the amount of propellant that is burned on the EDS during ascent. This is in 
addition to refueling the propellant lost to boiloff and utilizing the EDS for the LOI 
maneuver. Including these two implementations of propellant refueling increases the 
lunar surface payload capability to 88,000 lbm (Case #22), but increases the discounted 
life cycle cost of the architecture by $5B (7.2%). 
 The overall trend in the points along the frontier shows that as more propellant 
refueling is added to the architecture, a greater payload can be delivered to the lunar 
surface. This increase in refueling results in an increase in the life cycle cost of the 
architecture. This trend would likely continue along the Pareto frontier, but it is 
ultimately constrained by the physical limitations of the launch vehicle as discussed 
earlier. A summary of the major driving design changes between each of the five groups 
is provided in Table 37.  
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Table 37: Description of the Changes between the Five Groups 
Initial 
Group 
End 
Group 
Major Driving Design Change Average 
LCC 
Average    
Payload 
-- Group 1 Change from Baseline $69.2 B 11,100 lbm 
Group 1 Group 2 LOI maneuver changed from DS to EDS $71.3 B 35,300 lbm 
Group 2 Group 3 Burn an additional 25,000 lbm $73.3 B 52,500 lbm 
Group 2 Group 4 Increase lander refueling $74.4 B 67,000 lbm 
Group 4 Group 5 Burn an additional 25,000 lbm $76.9 B 91,400 lbm 
  
In summary, the points along the Pareto frontier show that an improvement in the 
baseline architecture can be achieved. The previous section discussed how an 
improvement to the baseline architecture could be accomplished without introducing 
propellant refueling. This section showed how further improvements could be made with 
various implementations of propellant refueling. There are three methods for improving 
the baseline architecture. The first is to eliminate the dependence of the architecture on 
the rate of propellant boiloff. This solution increases the payload capability and reduces 
the life cycle cost, and is the only strategy that can improve both Figures of Merit. The 
second is to allow the EDS to provide both the TLI and LOI maneuvers. This trade 
provides a large increase in payload capability while only slightly increasing the LCC. 
The additional cost of propellant is balanced by a reduction in the cost of the LSAM. The 
final method is to reduce the amount of propellant that the architecture must deliver to 
LEO, either by burning additional fuel during ascent, or by offloading the propellant 
before launch. In either case, the payload capability is increased as propellant is traded 
for additional mission payload.  
 The amount of propellant refueling that should be adopted depends on the demand 
for lunar surface payload capability and the increase in LCC that NASA can absorb 
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within its current budget. If an increase is not possible, then there are propellant refueling 
scenarios that exist that would not violate the current budget profile while still achieving 
an improvement over the baseline architecture (Group One). Additional scenarios will be 
investigated in Chapter 7 to show that an increase in the lunar surface payload can also 
lead to a lower campaign cost. This occurs by altering how payload is delivered to the 
lunar surface for the lunar campaign. The following section will expand upon the results 
in this section and discuss the efficiency of the different propellant refueling methods at 
delivering propellant to the lunar surface as compared to the baseline architecture.  
 
5.4 COST PER POUND OF DELIVERING PAYLOAD TO THE LUNAR SURFACE 
 The previous section discussed the points along the Pareto frontier, but did not 
detail which points along the frontier would provide the most benefit to the exploration 
architecture. By definition, the points along the frontier are Pareto efficient and cannot be 
distinguished without input from the decision maker. This frontier says nothing about 
which design should be selected only that it should be one of these points if these where 
the only decision criteria. Additional information is needed about the preferences of the 
decision maker in order to select the final design.  
 In addition to considering the Pareto frontier, another way to look at the results is 
to compare the cost of delivering payload to the lunar surface. In this section, the cost of 
delivering a pound of payload ($/lb) to the lunar surface will be calculated. This includes 
all development, operational, and refueling costs associated with the lunar architecture. A 
large amount of resources are required to develop the infrastructure and hardware needed 
to deliver the initial payload to the lunar surface. Once this has been established, 
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additional payload can be delivered at a much lower cost. This work has investigated how 
various propellant refueling techniques can be applied to the baseline architecture to 
improve the payload capability. This cost per pound of payload delivered to the lunar 
surface for the points along the Pareto frontier is shown in Figure 53. Because each point 
along the frontier increases the payload capability of the baseline architecture, the $/lb for 
these points will be less than that of the baseline. The degree of improvement in this 
metric will depend on the cost of each propellant refueling case relative to the 
improvement it provides the architecture.  
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Figure 53: Effect of Propellant Refueling on Payload Capability, LCC and $/lb 
 
 The ESAS baseline architecture has a lunar surface payload estimated delivery 
cost of approximately $660,000/lb using the methodology in this dissertation. This result 
is high because the architecture is designed to deliver a relatively small payload to the 
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lunar surface, but requires an expensive infrastructure. When the entire LSAM mass is 
considered payload, this value decreases to $35,000/lb. The results in Figure 53 do not 
include the mass of the LSAM, only the payload carried to the surface. This can be 
considered all payload (no crew) or an Ascent Stage and an assumed payload for crewed 
missions.  
 It is evident in these results that the use of propellant refueling can drastically 
reduce the $/lb of delivering payload to the lunar surface. The $/lb can be reduced to 
almost one twentieth of the baseline value when all aspects of propellant refueling are 
applied to the architecture. However, this results in a large increase in the life cycle cost 
of the architecture. It is still possible to reduce the baseline $/lb by 90 percent without 
increasing the LCC of the architecture. This is accomplished by implementing Case #9 
from Table 35. This design point includes both the utilization of refueling to eliminate 
propellant boiloff and the switch of the LOI maneuver from the LSAM to the EDS. The 
combination of these improvements greatly enhances the efficiency of delivering payload 
to the lunar surface.  
 The $/lb curve presented in Figure 53 can be broken into two regions of interest. 
These regions include an initial area where a large improvement in the $/lb is experienced 
and a region where there is little to no improvement. The separation of these regions is 
noted in Figure 54. The first region has the steepest decrease in $/lb and represents the 
points where the life cycle cost of the baseline architecture is not increased by the 
additional of propellant refueling. Since these designs improve both the LCC and the 
lunar surface payload the $/lb experiences the greatest decrease from the baseline.  
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 The remaining designs build upon the refueling cases in Region One and thus do 
not experience as large a drop in $/lb. As additional propellant refueling is added there is 
a diminishing return on the improvement in the $/lb of payload to the lunar surface. This 
diminishing return is evident by the decrease in the slope of the curve as more propellant 
refueling is added to the architecture. While these designs continue to provide greater 
payload capability, they also required a greater LCC. The two competing FOMs result in 
a smaller improvement in the $/lb. This region contains the design points that increase the 
payload capability by decreasing the amount of propellant that the architecture is required 
to deliver to orbit and replacing it with additional mission payload. The results in Figure 
54 show the separation of these two regions. The improvement in $/lb in the second 
region is significantly less than in the first.   
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Figure 54: Regions of Different Rate of Change in the $/lb 
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 The results discussed in the previous section outlined the improvement in the cost 
of delivering payload to the lunar surface. In the previous example the “payload” was 
equal to the mission payload and did not include ascent stage of the LSAM. It is also 
important to understand what the $/lb of delivering the “total payload” delivered to the 
lunar surface. The “total payload in this case refers to the mass that is delivered to the 
lunar surface by the descents stage of the LSAM and includes the ascents stage or an 
additional cargo element. This is a useful calculation when comparing the refueling ass to 
a cargo only mission. In this example the improvement in the $/lb of payload delivered to 
the lunar surface is not as large because the improvement in payload between the baseline 
and the refueling cases is not as large as when the assent stag is not included. Since the 
improvement in $/lb is not as large it may be possible to achieve the same improvement 
as the seen in the refueling cases by increasing the number of cargo mission conducted 
during the lunar campaign. A more detailed comparison of these two cases will be 
investigated in Chapter 7. The marginal cost of launching an additional cargo mission 
will be compared against the cost of refueling the architecture elements.  
 The results for the $/lb for the “total payload” are provided in Figure 55. In these 
results the baseline $/lb is $92,000/lb, where as, it was $600,000/lb when the ascent stage 
was not included in the calculation. It is still possible to decrease the $/lb by 50 percent 
without increasing the LCC beyond that of the baseline. This is achieved because of the 
savings offered by eliminating the dependence of the architecture on the propellant lost to 
boiloff. It was noted previously that this assumptions my over predict the actual results 
and would effect these results.  
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Figure 55: Effect of Propellant Refueling on Total Payload Capability 
 
 It is useful to examine the $/lb as a relative change from the baseline architecture. 
This way, only the cost and benefits of refueling are considered and the comparative cost 
of delivering the baseline payload is removed from the calculation. This is known as the 
marginal cost per pound. The marginal cost per pound is calculated using the results of 
Equation 6. As a result of this formulation, when plotted, the results are separated into 
positive and negative values depending on the impact to the exploration life cycle cost. 
 
Baseline
Baseline
lb PayloadPayload
CostCostinalM
−
−
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$arg       (6) 
 
 The results of this calculation for the designs along the Pareto frontier are 
provided in Figure 56. These results are plotted against the lunar surface payload 
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capability instead of the LCC to provide the maximum payload capability that can be 
achieved without surpassing the LCC of the baseline architecture.  The first two groups 
still show a decrease in the LCC, which is indicated by the negative values for the 
marginal $/lb. The designs in Groups Three through Five show that the additional cost to 
increase the lunar surface payload capability beyond 40,000 lbm is less than $5,000/lb, 
significantly less than the cost of delivering the original payload. This result is expected 
because the additional cost of adding propellant refueling to the architecture is small 
compared to the cost of the initial infrastructure.  
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Figure 56: Marginal Cost of Increasing the Lunar Surface Payload  
 
 These results do not indicate which design is best, but rather provide additional 
information about the points along the Pareto frontier. The discussion in the previous 
section established that the architecture should operate at one of the points along the 
frontier in order to maximize the improvement in the baseline architecture. Since the 
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other FOM do not significantly vary along the frontier this should enable the best 
refueling strategies to be identified. It may be that considering the remaining FOM could 
results in different strategies. An additional study would help validate or invalidate this 
assumption. The Pareto frontier provides the decision maker with the capability to trade 
the life cycle cost and payload capability of the architecture. These results illustrate how 
propellant refueling methods can be used to deliver a greater payload to the lunar surface, 
and the cost associated with it. These tools help the decision maker evaluate the use of 
propellant refueling and select the propellant refueling methods that should be adopted by 
the project management.  
 
5.5 ASSUMPTIONS AFFECTING THE DESIGN POINTS ALONG THE FRONTIER 
 The Pareto frontier discussed in the previous section is built around specific 
assumptions about the nature of the architecture and the ability to provide propellant to 
the various architecture elements. These assumptions include the cost of delivering 
propellant to the architecture, the maximum payload volume that can be carried by the 
CaLV and LSAM, the efficiency and cost of the thermal management systems, the effects 
of the two launch solution, and a number of other assumptions that, if changed, could 
affect the look of the frontier. The following section will discuss a number of these 
assumptions and how variations in these assumptions affect the points along this frontier. 
The results here will show that the points discussed previously are robust and continue to 
hold true even as the underlining assumptions change.   
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5.5.1 THE EFFECT OF AN UNCERTAIN PROPELLANT PRICE ON THE PARETO FRONTIER 
 The propellant delivery price is a difficult parameter to estimate and has a 
significant impact on the LCC of the architecture. It will be important to the decision 
maker to understand how the Pareto frontier changes as the price of propellant changes. 
A propellant price of $2,000/lb was assumed for the results already presented in this 
chapter, but as was discussed in Chapter 2 this is at the lower bound of the potential cost 
of propellant in LEO. The Pareto frontier for a propellant delivery cost of $3,000/lb and 
$4,000/lb is provided in Figure 57. These two frontiers show a similar pattern to the 
Pareto frontier discussed previously in this Chapter.  
 There are only a few designs that differ between the three frontiers. The 
differences are circles in Figure 57 and summarized in Table 38. There is only one point 
that appears on the original frontier that does not appear on the higher propellant cost 
curves (Case #D1). This case, from the original Group Three, is the additional Hypergol 
ascent engine point that does not appear in the ascent engine pattern of the other groups. 
Section 5.3 discussed the ascent engine pattern and noted that this point was not present 
in the other groups along the frontier. Hypergolic propellants do not lose propellant to 
boiloff, so as the price of propellant increases, these designs become relatively lower cost 
solutions because they require less propellant to be provided to LEO. In Groups A and B 
two new design points emerge that were not on the frontier at a propellant price of 
$2,000/lb. A third design point also emerges in Group C that only appears on the frontier 
at a propellant price of $4,000/lb. These points (A2, A3, B2, B3 and C3) form a new 
group between original Group One and Two. This new group is similar to the original 
Group One, but includes an additional 25,000 lbm of propellant burned on the EDS 
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during ascent. These points exist in the higher propellant price cases because these 
designs utilize less propellant than the points in the original Group Two. At a propellant 
price of $2,000/lb, this new group is dominated by the original Group Two because of its 
lower payload capability. As the price of propellant increases, the points in the original 
Group Two show a larger increase in LCC than the new group because the amount of 
refueling required, and eventually these new points are no longer dominated solutions. 
The remaining points along the frontiers are the same across all propellant delivery costs, 
suggesting that they are robust against a change in the price of propellant.  
 The points in Group 1 have been shown to offer a lower LCC than the baseline 
architecture, but as the price of propellant increases this savings is reduced. At a 
propellant price of $8,600/lb there are no refueling solutions that offer a lower LCC than 
the baseline design. However, propellant refueling still offers potential value because of it 
ability to increase the lunar surface payload.  
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Figure 57: Changes to the Pareto Frontier with Increases in Propellant Cost
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Table 38: Summary of Pareto Frontier Changes as Propellant Price Increases 
 
Case # Ascent   
Propellant 
Lander        
Refueling 
LEO Stay 
Time 
Re-fuel LEO 
Boiloff 
LOI 
Maneuver 
Additional Burn 
(lbm) 
DS %      
Re-fueled 
LCC 
($M) 
Payload 
(lbm) 
$/lb 
A1 
($2,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
A2 
($3,000/lb) 
LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes DS 25,000 100 71,695 20,400 117,151 
A3 
($4,000/lb) 
LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes DS 25,000 100 72,144 20,400 117,884 
B1 
($2,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
B2 
($3,000/lb) 
LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes DS 25,000 100 71,739 23,464 101,917 
B3 
($4,000/lb) 
LOX/LH2 (pump) None 15 Yes DS 25,000 100 72,189 23,463 102,556 
C1 
($2,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
C2 
($3,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
C3 
($4,000/lb) 
LOX/CH4 Ascent Stage 15 Yes DS 25,000 100 72,910 28,113 86,448 
D1 
($2,000/lb) 
LOX/CH4 None 15 Yes EDS 25,000 100 73,615 55,924 43,878 
D2 
($3,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
D3 
($4,000/lb) 
-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
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5.5.2 THE EFFECT OF LAUNCH UNCERTAINTY ON THE PARETO FRONTIER 
 Another important sensitivity to investigate is the separation time between the 
launch of the CaLV and CLV. The separation time is different from the designed loiter 
period discussed previously in this chapter. The separation time represents the expected 
time between the launch of the cargo and crew, while the design loiter period represents 
the additional margin built into the architecture to account for a delay in the launch of the 
crew. The results presented in this chapter assume that the separation time is seven days, 
but it can be shown that decreasing this separation time could greatly increase the 
probability of launching the CLV within the designed loiter period. Increasing this 
probability reduces the potential number of missions that are lost during the lunar 
campaign, which decreases the LCC of the architecture, as shown in Figure 58.  
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Figure 58: Effect of a Lower Launch Separation on Mission Success 
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Propellant refueling eliminates the dependence of the architecture on the launch 
timing of the CaLV and CLV by replacing the lost propellant once all of the architecture 
elements have been delivered to LEO. This allowed the EDS and LSAM to remain in 
LEO for longer periods without decreasing the payload capability of the architecture. 
Another potential means of reducing the impact that a one and a half launch solution has 
on the architecture is to launch both vehicles as close together as possible. This will 
increase the likelihood that the second launch vehicle, the CLV in this case, will be 
launched within the original window. This is because there is less uncertainty in the 
launch countdown within a 90-min period than over a 7-day period, because outside 
factors such as weather are more predictable. With a higher probability of launching the 
CLV, the architecture can be designed for a shorter loiter period without greatly 
decreasing the reliability of each mission. A shorter separation time will decrease the 
impact that propellant refueling has on the architecture. NASA has also considered 
switching the order of launching the Ares I and Ares V. In this scenario the crew would 
be launched before the cargo. Since the Service Module relies on storable propellant it 
dos not experience the same level of propellant boiloff than is experienced on the EDS 
and LSAM. The crew can then remain in LEO until the EDS and LSAM are delivered 
without the potential of losing a mission. The draw back of this scenario is that the crew 
must wait in LEO until the Ares V is launched; increasing the risk they are exposed to 
during the mission. This could also lead to a situation where the crew are forced to return 
to Earth without completing a mission if the Ares V is delayed beyond a specified time.  
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Figure 59: Sensitivity to Assumptions in LEO Boiloff Refueling 
 
 The results of this sensitivity study are provided in Figure 59. The Pareto frontier 
is again provided assuming of propellant refueling price of $2,000/lb. Three groups have 
been noted in this chart to illustrate how the designed loiter period, and launch separation 
time impact the architecture and how these solutions compare to the refueling case where 
the propellant is replaced in LEO. The designs in Groups One and Two do not re-fuel the 
propellant lost to boiloff as in the baseline design. The designs in Group One are for a 95-
day loiter period and the designs in Group Two are for a 15-day loiter. These points show 
the same results presented previously in this Chapter. The shorter the loiter period the 
greater the payload capability (less boiloff), but the higher the life cycle cost because of 
the degradation in the mission success probability (Figure 58). The new information 
shown in Figure 59 is that when the launch separation time is reduced from 7-days to 90-
min the LCC of the architecture is reduced. These results do not include any additional 
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cost to account for the operational cost of two launch count downs occurring in close 
proximity. The shorter separation time reduces the number of missions that would be lost 
over the life of the lunar campaign which leads to a reduction in LCC. This trend is seen 
in both Groups One and Two. A larger decrease in LCC is seen for the shorter loiter 
period as it has the higher probability of losing a mission so the reduction in separation 
time has a greater impact on the launch success. This change in LCC between these two 
groups for the different launch separation times and design loiter periods is provided in 
Table 39.  
 
Table 39: Change in LCC with a Change in Launch Separation 
 P(7-days) LCC(7-days) P(90-min) LCC(90-min) 
Group 1 0.947 $72B 0.998 $69.5B 
Group 2 0.804 $75B 0.969 $71B 
 
 
The reduction in separation time improves the design points, but it does not bring 
them onto the Pareto frontier. The designs in Group Three utilize refueling to replace the 
propellant lost to boiloff. In this case, decreasing the separation time has little impact on 
these designs. Since the architecture elements are able to remain in LEO for any period of 
time, reducing the launch separation time only slightly increases the amount of propellant 
that must be delivered to LEO, and has no impact on the payload capability. The designs 
in Group Three also include the points along the Pareto frontier (Cases 1 – 4, Table 35). 
The frontier does not include the non-refueling cases, even when the launch separation is 
assumed to be as low as 90 minutes. The designs with the shorter separation time are 
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moved closer to the frontier than those with the original seven day assumption, but still 
result in a greater LCC and a smaller payload capability. However, decreasing the launch 
separation time lowers the LCC below that of the refueling cases that utilized the EDS for 
the LOI maneuver (Cases 6 – 9, Table 35). The LCC for these cases are noted in Figure 
59. It is clearly shown that the LCC for the designs in Groups One and Two are moved 
below this line when the launch separation in shorted from 7-days to 90-min. The 90-min 
separation cases are still dominated by the frontier, but they are no longer dominated by 
the refueling cases that utilize the EDS for the LOI maneuver because these points offer a 
lower LCC. The decision maker must now consider the impact to the LCC when 
considering the EDS for the LOI maneuver. The launch separation time does have a 
significant effect on the LCC of the architecture, but the ability to replace the propellant 
lost to boiloff while in LEO is still shown to offer a better architecture solution at a 
propellant price of $2,000/lb.     
 
5.6 SUMMARY OF NON-DOMINATED SOLUTIONS 
In summary, the results illustrate that the baseline architecture can be improved in 
terms of payload capability and LCC with the addition of propellant refueling. It was also 
shown that there are design alternatives that can improve the baseline design, without the 
use of propellant refueling, by altering the engines used on the LSAM ascent stage. A 
Pareto frontier was identified to define the set of Pareto-optimal solutions that bound the 
design space. These solutions show that there are design variables that are consistent 
among all points along the frontier. In fact, the difference between each group is 
primarily due to a single design variable that increases the amount of propellant refueling 
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in the architecture. The robustness of these designs has also been discussed in comparison 
to the cost of delivering propellant to the architecture. It was shown that the frontier was 
not significantly altered despite a propellant price increase from $2,000/lb to $4,000/lb. 
The final conclusion from this section is that the utilization of propellant refueling can 
greatly improve the capability of the architecture without a large increase in the LCC, and 
is robust against changes in the propellant delivery cost. There are, however, only a 
limited number of cases that can achieve a lower LCC with the addition of propellant 
refueling. Chapter 6 will discuss how propellant refueling can be used to specifically 
reduce the LCC of the exploration program.  
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CHAPTER 6                                                             
A PARETO FRONTIER FOR LEO PAYLOAD 
CAPABILITY AND LIFE CYCLE COST:                   
SCENARIO TWO  
 
The Pareto frontier discussed in Chapter 5 was for Scenario One, which used 
propellant refueling to increase the payload capability of the architecture. This generally 
required an increase in life cycle cost because of the additional propellant costs. The goal 
of Scenario Two is to reduce the life cycle cost of the architecture while maintaining the 
same lunar surface payload capability. The introduction of propellant refueling reduces 
the size of the architecture elements because only the dry mass of the in-space stages 
need to be delivered to LEO instead of the total gross mass that includes propellant. The 
pros and cons of Scenario Two will be discussed in this chapter. This chapter will also 
include a discussion of the LEO payload capability versus life cycle cost Pareto frontier. 
These results will be similar to those presented in Chapter 5 and will identify the design 
points that provide the most benefit to the architecture. A comparison will be made 
between the results for Scenarios One and Two, to understand the overall effect that 
propellant refueling can have on the exploration architecture.  
The results presented in Chapter 5 showed how propellant refueling could be used 
to increase the payload capability of the lunar exploration architecture. It is possible; 
however, that increasing the payload capability does not provide additional value to 
NASA. The development of Scenario Two attempts to address this point by utilizing 
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propellant refueling to lower the life cycle cost of the architecture while maintaining the 
same lunar surface payload capability. This is achieved by reducing the size and mass of 
the architecture elements as the performance requirements of the vehicles are reduced 
through the introduction of propellant refueling. The methods for architecture elements 
sizing discussed in Chapter 4 were utilized in the analysis presented in this chapter. 
 
6.1 DEVELOPMENT OF A PARETO FRONTIER FOR SCENARIO TWO 
Scenario Two’s design space is similar to that of Scenario One, though one design 
variable is changed. Rather than increasing the amount of EDS propellant used during 
ascent to increase the payload capability, some TLI propellant is offloaded to reduce the 
LEO payload requirement on the CaLV. The morphological matrix for Scenario Two is 
provided in Figure 60. In Scenario Two, the lunar surface payload capability could not be 
used as one of the metrics for the design comparison, as this quantity remained constant 
among all design points. Therefore the total LEO payload capability is used. The total 
LEO payload is a summation of the mission payload (LSAM) and the in-space propellant 
(TLI) delivered aboard the EDS. This metric was selected because it represents one of the 
major drawbacks of this design philosophy: An architecture which is less extensible to 
future missions. As more propellant refueling is utilized, the CaLV becomes smaller, 
which decreases total payload capability that the launch vehicle can deliver to LEO. The 
use of propellant refueling can reduce both the mission payload (smaller LSAM) and the 
in-space propellant (offloading TLI) while maintaining the same lunar mission capability.  
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Figure 60: Design Space Morphological Matrix, Scenario Two 
 
 The method for determining the points along the Pareto frontier developed in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.1) was again applied to the designs in Scenario Two. This method 
determines which points within the design space are Pareto optimal. The Pareto frontier 
and the dominated solutions are provided in Figure 61. Section 5.2 will discuss the 
designs along this frontier, and Section 5.3 will discuss how this frontier changes as the 
price of propellant changes.  
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Figure 61: Pareto Frontier and Design Points for Scenario Two 
 
There are two general trends that can be seen in the results of the trade space 
exploration shown in Figure 61. The first is that the introduction of propellant refueling 
can provide a lower cost solution than the current baseline design. A reduction of seven 
percent in the total life cycle cost can be achieved. The second trend is that, as discussed 
earlier, the introduction of propellant refueling decreases the LEO payload required to 
meet the lunar mission requirements and thus the size, mass, and cost of the architecture 
elements as shown in Figure 61. The following sections will discuss the points that 
dominate the design space (Pareto frontier) and provide a breakdown of the design 
variables throughout this design space.  
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6.2 DESIGN TRENDS IN THE NON DOMINATED SOLUTIONS 
 The points along the Pareto frontier can be broken down into three distinct groups 
that share a number of commonalities among their designs. These three groups are noted 
for the Pareto frontier shown in Figure 62, which depicts the same frontier that is shown 
in Figure 61, but with the dominated solutions removed. A summary of the design points 
along the frontier are also provided in Tables 41 and 42. There are three design variables 
that do not appear along the frontier: off-loading hydrogen from the CaLV, off-loading 
oxygen from the CaLV, and off-loading propellant from the LSAM, and there inputs are 
set to the baseline value of zero. These design variables lead to a decrease in the payload 
capability delivered to LEO by the CaLV and results in a decrease in the LCC of the 
architecture. Utilizing these methods to offload propellant from the EDS and LSAM does 
provide a lower cost solution than the baseline, but these points do not appear on the 
frontier because there are other propellant refueling techniques that offer a lower LCC. 
This will be explained further in Section 6.4. Therefore, while offloading the in-space 
propellant can improve the baseline architecture, this technique is dominated by other 
propellant refueling strategies. The designs along this frontier assume a propellant price 
of $2,000/lb. It will be discussed in Section 5.3 that, at a propellant price of $1,500/lb, 
that a limited number of solutions appear along the frontier that offload in-space 
propellant. The remaining design variables vary along the frontier and are discussed in 
the following sections.  
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Figure 62: Scenario Two Pareto frontier Groups 
 
6.2.1 DESIGN POINTS IN GROUP THREE 
 The designs in Groups One (Case #s 14 – 21) and Group Two (Case #s 1 – 10) 
utilize propellant refueling in some respect while the designs in Group Three (Case #s 11 
– 13) do not. The appearance of non refueling design points on the frontier is different 
than was seen in Scenario One, where all non refueling cases were dominated by 
propellant refueling designs. The three points in Group Three offer the greatest payload 
capability because the CaLV remains at or near its original size, and its payload 
capability is not reduced through the use of propellant refueling. These three designs 
must also account for propellant lost due to boiloff and therefore have a chance of losing 
a mission when a significant delay occurs between launching the crew and cargo, thus 
resulting in an architecture design with a higher life cycle cost than those that utilize 
propellant refueling. The baseline design also appears along this frontier, offering the 
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highest LEO payload capability, but also the highest LCC. The designs in Group Three 
differ only by the LSAM ascent engine and the thermal management system employed on 
the Descent Stage as shown in Table 41. All other design options remain the same as the 
baseline design. These differences have little impact on the payload capability and LCC 
of the baseline design, improving the LCC by less than one percent and decreasing the 
payload capability by less than four percent. 
 
6.2.2 DESIGN POINTS IN GROUP TWO 
 The remaining points along the frontier utilize propellant refueling and are 
referred to as Group One and Group Two in Figure 62. These two groups include two 
significant implementations of propellant refueling. In Group Two, the only use of 
propellant refueling is the ability to replace any propellant lost to boiloff while the EDS 
and LSAM loiter in LEO, except that the AS is refueling in cases 1 and 2. This reduces 
the amount of propellant that must be carried to LEO by the CaLV, resulting in a smaller 
launch vehicle. Refueling the propellant lost to boiloff also reduces the probability that a 
mission will be lost because the EDS and LSAM can remain in LEO for an extended 
period of time before the crew are launched, preventing the loss of hardware (EDS and 
LSAM) and the need to re-launch it (CaLV). A more detailed description of the 
architecture benefits of eliminating propellant boiloff was presented in Chapter 5.  
 In general the design points in Group Two only utilize propellant refueling to 
replace the propellant lost to boiloff, with the exception of Case 1 and 2 (Table 41). 
These two cases also include offloading a small amount of propellant from the LSAM in 
addition to refueling the propellant boiloff in order to further reduce the payload the 
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architecture must deliver to LEO. These two points are inferior to the rest of the points 
within Group Two because they experience a large decrease in capability for only a slight 
decrease in LCC. Table 40 illustrates the reduction in LCC and LEO payload capability 
when the Ascent Stage of the LSAM is re-fueled. A 0.5 percent reduction in LCC is 
achieved while the payload capability is reduced by 19 percent. This demonstrates that 
offloading the in-space propellant provides little benefit to the architecture because the 
LCC savings is small as compared to the reduction in payload.  
 
Table 40: Relative Improvement in Groups 2 Design Points 
 Payload % from Baseline LCC % from Baseline 
Case #1 5.2% 19% 
Case #6 4.7% 9.9% 
 
   
The initial introduction of propellant refueling to replace the propellant boiloff 
offers benefit to the architecture as it is capable of reducing the LCC by 4.7 percent with 
only a 10 percent reduction in the payload that can be delivered to LEO. It is up to the 
decision maker to determine if the tradeoff of payload for LCC is an overall benefit to the 
architecture.
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Table 41: Summary of Pareto Frontier, Groups Two and Three 
 
Case # AS 
Propellant 
AS 
Thermal 
DS 
Thermal 
Lander    
Refueling 
EDS 
Thermal 
Re-fuel LEO 
Boiloff 
LEO Stay 
Time 
LOI 
Maneuver 
Additional 
Burn 
(lbm) 
DS %      
Re-fueled 
LCC 
($M) 
Payload 
(lbm) 
1 LOX/LH2 MLI MLI Ascent Stage Cryo-cooler Yes 15 DS 0 0 67,946 287,077 
2 LOX/LH2 MLI MLI Ascent Stage MLI Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,191 287,557 
3 LOX/LH2 MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,235 298,688 
4 LOX/LH2 Cryo-cooler MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,285 300,510 
5 LOX/LH2 MLI Cryo-cooler None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,309 301,927 
6 Hypergol MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,309 319,636 
7 Hypergol MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 95 DS 0 0 68,509 321,396 
8 Hypergol MLI MLI None MLI Yes 95 DS 0 0 69,239 324,740 
9 Hypergol MLI Cryo-cooler None MLI Yes 15 DS 0 0 68,756 323,528 
10 Hypergol MLI Cryo-cooler None MLI Yes 95 DS 0 0 69,276 328,136 
11 Hypergol MLI Cryo-cooler None MLI No 95 DS 0 0 71,195 345,337 
12 Hypergol MLI MLI None MLI No 95 DS 0 0 71,433 354,188 
13 LOX/CH4 MLI MLI None MLI No 95 DS 0 0 71,710 354,684 
191 
 The thermal management system for the EDS is typically an active system, while 
the LSAM is typically passive on both stages. Cases 1 and 3 provide an example of this 
result. This difference is due to the total amount of boiloff that occurs between the two 
vehicles. The EDS experiences a larger total boiloff than the LSAM because of the larger 
volume of propellant that it carries. The addition of a cryo-cooler reduces the amount of 
propellant that must be delivered to LEO to provide sufficient propellant to re-fuel the 
architecture elements. The trade off for utilizing a cryo-cooler depends on the cost of the 
system verses the cost of providing propellant to LEO. Chapter 7 will further address this 
issue and discuss which of these options is preferred depending on their relative costs. 
The use of passive systems is always favored on the LSAM because the total boiloff is 
small. The primary improvement to Group Two is the introduction of propellant refueling 
to replace the propellant lost to EDS boiloff, allowing the architecture to remain in LEO 
for an extended period of time.  
 
6.2.3 DESIGN POINTS IN GROUP ONE 
 The designs in Group One introduce the refueling strategy to allow the EDS to 
perform the LOI maneuver rather than the Descent Stage of the LSAM. The design points 
in Group One are summarized in Table 42. In this case the LSAM LOI propellant is 
removed (30,000 lbm), which allows the size and mass of the LSAM to be reduced. 
Section 5.3 provided a summary of how the size of the LSAM is affected by removing 
the LOI maneuver from its mission requirements. The reduced LSAM mass decreases the 
payload requirement on the CaLV, which leads to a smaller launch vehicle design. Group 
One offers the lowest cost solution because the smaller LSAM results in a lower cost 
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solution for both the LSAM and the CaLV. Case #14 from Group One provides a 2.2 
percent reduction in the LCC as compared to Case #3 from Group Two. The only design 
change between these two cases is which stage performs the LOI maneuver. This is a 
small reduction in LCC compared to the 28 percent reduction in LEO payload that is a 
result of removing the LOI propellant from the design of the LSAM and providing it to 
the EDS once delivered to LEO. The design points in Group One follow the same trends 
seen in Group Two with respect to the thermal management system and LEO loiter 
period. The design points favor the use of a cryo-cooler on the EDS and MLI and the 
LSAM and, because the propellant boiloff is re-fueled, the designs also favor the use of a 
15-day loiter period.  
No other uses of propellant refueling are active along the frontier; this indicates 
that allowing the EDS to perform the LOI maneuver offers the lowest cost solution to the 
architecture because it has the largest impact on the most architecture elements. The 
disadvantage of this solution is that the lower LCC comes at the expense of a 
significantly lower LEO payload capability. A seven percent decrease in LCC is obtained 
between case # 11 (baseline) and case # 14 at the cost of a forty percent decrease in LEO 
payload capability. While this does not impact the current plans for the lunar campaign it 
will make it more difficult to expand the architecture to other missions, especially if large 
payloads are required. 
 The Pareto frontier is primarily defined by the two propellant refueling strategies 
presented in Groups One and Two. The remaining design variables either do not change 
from their baseline values or have a small effect on the LCC and the LEO payload 
capability. This result was also seen in Scenario One, where the introduction of 
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propellant refueling provided the largest impact on the architecture, and the remaining 
designs variables (ascents stage engine and the thermal management system) resulted in 
small changes around the main refueling strategies. This Pareto frontier illustrates that the 
selection of a propellant refueling strategy has a much higher impact on the architecture 
figures of merit than the other design variables being traded including: the selection of 
the LSAM ascent engine, the boiloff thermal management system, or the length of the 
LEO loiter.  
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Table 42: Summary of Pareto Frontier, Group One 
 
Case # AS Propellant AS Thermal DS Thermal Lander 
Refueling 
EDS 
Thermal 
Re-fuel LEO 
Boiloff 
LEO Stay 
Time 
LOI 
Maneuver 
Additional 
Burn (lbm) 
DS %      Re-
fueled 
LCC ($M) Payload 
(lbm) 
14 LOX/LH2 MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 EDS 0 0 66,710 214,171 
15 LOX/LH2 Cryo-cooler MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 EDS 0 0 66,769 215,522 
16 LOX/LH2 MLI Cryo-cooler None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 EDS 0 0 66,780 215,808 
17 Hypergol MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 15 EDS 0 0 66,861 229,702 
18 Hypergol MLI MLI None Cryo-cooler Yes 95 EDS 0 0 67,012 231,108 
19 Hypergol MLI MLI None MLI Yes 95 EDS 0 0 67,461 233,450 
20 Hypergol MLI Cryo-cooler None MLI Yes 15 EDS 0 0 67,105 231,715 
21 Hypergol MLI Cryo-cooler None MLI Yes 95 EDS 0 0 67,508 235,188 
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6.3 EFFECT OF PROPELLANT PRICE ON THE PARETO FRONTIER 
One of the largest uncertainties when introducing propellant refueling into the 
lunar exploration architecture is the cost of providing propellant to LEO. In the results of 
Section 6.2, a propellant price of $2,000/lb was assumed. As the price of propellant 
increases, the designs which rely heavily on propellant refueling become increasing less 
attractive because of their increase in LCC. At a propellant price greater than $3,000/lb, 
the designs in Group One become dominated by Group Two because they now have a 
higher LCC with the already lower payload capability. The designs in Group Two utilize 
less propellant and are therefore not as affected by an increase in price as are the design 
in Group One. This section will discuss how the points along the Pareto frontier change 
as the assumed price of propellant changes. A number of Pareto frontiers are provided in 
Figure 63 with varying assumed propellant process. This figure includes the Pareto 
frontier discussed in the previous section along with two additional curves that assume a 
price of $3,000/lb and $1,500/lb. These illustrate how the frontier changes as a function 
of propellant price.  
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Figure 63: The Effect of a Change in Propellant Price on the Pareto frontier 
 
 The design points in Group One (Case #s 14 - 21) have the largest dependency on 
the price of propellant because they require propellant refueling of any of the design 
points considered in Scenario Two. Therefore, this group has the largest fluctuations as 
the price of propellant changes. There are two trends to consider when evaluating the 
effect of a change in propellant price. The first is how one group changes relative to the 
rest of the Pareto frontier, and second is how the points within each group change relative 
to each other.  
When the price of propellant decreases from $2,000/lb to $1,500/lb as shown in 
Figure 63, the design points in Group One shift down relative to the rest of the designs 
along the frontier. This is because a larger amount of propellant is required for the 
designs in Group One as compared to the rest of the frontier. As the price of propellant 
decreases, the general shape of the frontier remains intact with Group One, becoming a 
relatively more attractive solution. When the price of propellant increases, the frontier 
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begins to take on a different shape. Figure 64 shows how the shape of the frontier 
changes as the price of propellant increases. At a propellant price of $3,000/lb, the LCC 
for the points in Group One are only slightly less than the design in Group Two, while 
offering a significantly lower LEO payload. As the price of propellant increases from 
$3,000/lb to $4,000/lb, the design points in Group One completely disappear from the 
frontier. This is because the LCC of Group One becomes greater than Group Two, and 
since Group One offers a lower LEO payload, they become completely dominated by 
Group Two. At a propellant price of $4,000/lb, the value of utilizing the EDS for the LOI 
maneuver is eliminated as it is no longer capable of offering a lower cost solution.  
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Figure 64: Propellant Price for the Elimination of Group One from the Frontier 
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 Examining the points in Group One closer, as shown in Figure 65, it is evident 
that there are changes to the points that appear within this group as the propellant price 
increases or decreases. As the price of propellant decreases from the initially assumed 
$2,000/lb, there are three additional points that appear on the new frontier. These are 
noted by the red circles in Figure 65. Point B introduces a new design that does not utilize 
a cryo-cooler on the EDS, but instead uses a passive MLI system. This case still 
implements propellant refueling to replace the propellant lost to boiloff so that the EDS 
and LSAM can remain in LEO as long as needed. With the EDS now utilizing MLI, 
instead of a cryo-cooler, a greater amount of propellant is required; however, at the lower 
propellant price, MLI becomes a better solution than adding the cryo-cooler to the design 
of the EDS.  
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Figure 65: The Effect on Group One of a Change in Propellant Price 
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 The points in Group C offer a new propellant refueling strategy that is not seen at 
a propellant price greater than $1,500/lb. These two points offload some TLI propellant 
from the EDS. This reduces the payload requirements on the launch vehicle greatly 
reducing it size and cost. This design point is not seen on the frontier at a propellant price 
of $2,000/lb or greater because the cost of propellant is more than the savings generated 
from the smaller architecture elements. In these two cases, 50,000 lbm of LOX is 
removed from the launch vehicle and provided after the EDS is delivered to LEO; this is 
equal to 15 percent of the total LEO payload. While this new design doesn’t offer as low 
a cost solution as utilizing the EDS for the LOI, it does provide an in-between point that 
trades the cost and benefits between Groups One and Two. A lower LCC is achieved than 
in Group Two with sacrificing as much LEO payload as in Group One.  
 As the price of propellant increases, the number of designs in Group One 
decrease. The designs that require a greater amount of propellant begin to disappear first, 
and this trend continues until all points are gone at a propellant price of $4,000/lb, as 
discussed previously in this section. The first three points that disappear are those that 
utilize a passive thermal management system on the EDS, noted as Group A in Figure 65. 
These three MLI cases require a greater amount of propellant refueling and thus become 
dominated as the price of propellant increases. This change shows that a cryo-cooler is 
the best option for the EDS thermal management system at a propellant price of 
$2,000/lb. If a price of $1,500/lb can be achieved, than the cost of providing propellant 
becomes less than placing a cryo-cooler on the EDS, and a passive thermal management 
system becomes the superior architecture choice.  
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 The design points in Group Two (Case # 1 – 10, Table 41) are not greatly affected 
by a change in propellant price, and in most cases, no notable change is seen. These 
points utilize propellant refueling to replace the propellant lost to boiloff. The boiloff for 
the LSAM can range from 500 to 5,000 lbm depending on the LEO stay time and the 
ascent engine selection. In the cases where the EDS utilizes a cryo-cooler, this is the total 
amount of propellant that must be delivered to the architecture, resulting in a very small 
change in LCC as the price of propellant changes. When the EDS does not utilize a cryo-
cooler, the quantity of propellant required can increase by more then 400 percent as the 
EDS is a much larger propellant storage system than the LSAM. In these cases, there is a 
larger dependency on the price of the propellant. Both of these cases are noted in Figure 
66; the relative change can be seen for the various propellant prices.  
 The initial two points, noted as Group A (Cases # 1 and 2), also have a larger 
amount of refueling, because in these two designs, the Ascent Stage of the LSAM is 
empty during launch to LEO, after which it is re-fueled. This equates to an additional 
10,000 lbm of additional propellant that must be provided to the architecture. Case #1 
disappears from the frontier at a propellant price of $3,000/lb, while Case #2 remains. 
This is because Case #2 utilizes a passive thermal management system on the EDS and 
requires a greater amount of propellant during refueling than Case #2 which utilizes a 
cryo-cooler on the EDS. In general all designs in Group Two have a smaller dependence 
on the price of propellant than those in Group One because they use less propellant 
refueling. These results also illustrate that, even at a high propellant price, the 
introduction of propellant refueling would provide for a lower cost solution than the 
current baseline design. This is because the cost of the propellant is a small portion of the 
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total LCC (less than 1%) and, even with a significant increase in the price of the 
propellant, the LCC is only slightly increased.   
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Figure 66: The Effect on Group Two of a Change in Propellant Price 
 
6.4 EXPLORATION OF THE DESIGN SPACE WITHIN THE FRONTIER 
 In addition to understanding the designs that fall on the Pareto frontier, it is 
important to understand the designs that fall just off this frontier. With the uncertainty 
that is associated with developing the propellant refueling technology, it is important to 
understand how much variation can be handled along the frontier before the non refueling 
cases begin to dominate. The results of Figures 67, 68, and 69 will demonstrate how the 
design space, within the frontier breaks down for a number of the design variables: which 
stage performs the LOI maneuver, whether propellant refueling is used for propellant 
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boiloff, and whether propellant should be removed from the design of the EDS. The 
greater the distance between the frontier and the non refueling design points, the less 
concern there is about the uncertainty in developing this capability. If the non refueling 
cases are right along the border of the frontier, propellant refueling becomes a 
considerably more risky venture, as any variation from the baseline assumptions degrades 
the value of this choice.  
 Figure 67 illustrates which design points utilize the EDS and which use the 
LSAM for the LOI maneuver. The Pareto frontier was split into two refueling groups: the 
first utilized the EDS and provided the greatest decrease in LCC, and the second group 
continued to use the Descent Stage and provided less of a decrease in LCC, but also a 
better LEO payload capability than Group One. The design space in the vicinity of each 
of these groups shows the same results as seen in the frontier. In fact there is a distinct 
trend that shows the use of the EDS in the lower half of the design space and Decent 
Stage in the upper half. There is a middle set of data that shows a lot of overlap between 
the two choices, but this is due to the influence of other design variables that are not 
considered here. The distinct split shows that utilizing the EDS for the LOI maneuver 
instead of the LSAM forces the decision maker to trade improvements in one FOM 
(LCC) for a reduction in the other (LEO payload). This is not the case for utilizing 
propellant refueling to replace the LEO boiloff, as this option is always active along the 
frontier where propellant refueling is considered.  
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Figure 67: Lunar Orbit Injection Maneuver Breakdown 
 
 The results in Figure 68 depict the use of propellant refueling to replace any 
propellant lost due to propellant boiloff, whether on the EDS or LSAM. The results here 
show a similar split as seen in Figure 67, but the design space is split horizontally instead 
of vertically. This horizontal split shows that the introduction of propellant refueling in 
this manner is a benefit to the architecture in spite of the selection of the remaining 
design variables. There is also a large gap between the frontier and those points that do 
not utilize this option for propellant refueling, except near the baseline where no 
propellant refueling is considered. This would allow a significant increase in the cost of 
propellant refueling to be absorbed before this strategy would become a higher cost 
solution. These are both promising traits that help lower the risk of implementing this 
capability into the lunar exploration architecture.   
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Figure 68: LEO Propellant Boiloff Refueling Breakdown 
 
 The final figure, Figure 69, depicts the impact of removing the TLI propellant 
from the design of the EDS and providing it in LEO. The blue points in this figure 
represent all design in which some quantity of propellant was removed from the design of 
the EDS. This includes just one of the propellants (LOX or LH2) or both and in the 
various quantities outlined in the Morphological Matrix. In general, the trend in these 
results shows that the cost of removing this propellant has little effect on the overall 
design of the architecture, assuming a propellant price of $2,000/lb. At this price, the cost 
of propellant is slightly more than the savings achieved by reducing the size of the CaLV. 
The reason this option is not active on the frontier is that it offers the same cost, but 
results in a lower the payload capability. There is, however, less of a separation between 
the frontier and these design points; it was shown in Section 6.3 that lowering the price of 
propellant to $1,500/lb would bring some of these points onto the frontier. A similar 
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result is also seen if larger cost savings could be achieved by reducing the size of the 
launch vehicle. This becomes a possibility if a new technology development programs 
are required to help mitigate unexpected mass growth on the CaLV or LSAM.   
 
 
Figure 69: Breakdown of EDS Propellant Removal 
 
 The results of Figures 67 - 69 help to show the robustness of propellant refueling 
strategies against changes in the assumptions of the analysis. If small changes in 
assumptions can negate the benefits of introducing this capability into the architecture, 
the risks of implementation become too great. The results in Figure 67 and Figure 68 
provided limited evidence that the introduction of propellant refueling to mitigate 
propellant boiloff and to allow the EDS to perform the LOI maneuver is relatively 
insensitive to changes in propellant refueling assumptions.  
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6.5 COST PER POUND OF DELIVERING PAYLOAD TO LEO 
 An important metric discussed in Chapter 5 was the cost of delivering a pound of 
payload to the lunar surface as shown in Figure 53. This was useful when discussing 
Scenario One because the introduction of propellant refueling changes both the payload 
capability and the LCC. This cost per pound metric was then used to track the relative 
change in both values. In Scenario Two, the lunar surface payload remains constant, so 
this metric would track the change in the LCC only, which was discussed along with the 
Pareto frontier presented previously in this chapter. It may, however, be useful to look at 
how the cost of delivering payload to LEO changes with the introduction of various 
propellant refueling strategies. This metric is calculated by dividing the LCC by the total 
payload delivered to LEO during the lunar campaign. This metric is plotted in Figure 70 
as a function of the LCC and propellant price.   
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Figure 70: Effect of Propellant Refueling on Payload Capability, LCC and $/lb 
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 This metric, “cost per pound of payload to LEO,” illustrates that the introduction 
of propellant refueling increases the cost of delivering payload to LEO. This is because 
the LEO payload capability is reduced by up to 40 percent, while the LCC is at most 
reduced by seven percent. Since the LCC is decreased by a smaller amount, the cost per 
pound to LEO increases. The cost per pound for Group One increases by nearly $4,000/lb 
from the baseline value. The difference between the baseline and Group Two is smaller 
because there is a smaller decrease in payload capability while achieving nearly the same 
improvement in LCC as Group One. The difference in cost per pound between the 
baseline and Group Two is $500/lb, an order of magnitude smaller increase than seen for 
Group One.  
 The focus of Scenario Two is to decrease the cost of the lunar campaign without 
reducing the lunar surface payload capability of each mission. The introduction of 
propellant refueling accomplished this goal because it is able to lower the LCC while 
holding the lunar surface payload capability constant. As shown in Chapter 5, the cost per 
pound to the lunar surface could be greatly reduced through the introduction of propellant 
refueling, which greatly increases the payload capability for a small additional cost to the 
architecture. In Scenario Two, the cost per pound to the lunar surface is reduced, but 
because the payload capability was held constant, the effect is smaller than experienced 
in Scenario One. A summary of the cost per pound to the lunar surface for both Scenarios 
One and Two is provided in Table 43. The designs in Scenario Two provide at most a 
seven percent reduction where as the designs in Scenario One can provide between a 50 
and 92 percent reduction in this metric. This is primarily because of the significant 
increase in payload capability achieved for the designs in Scenario One.  
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Table 43: Description of Changes between Groups 
 $/lb to the Lunar Surface 
Baseline 660,000 
Group 1 (Scenario Two) 620,000 
Group 2 (Scenario Two) 635,000 
Scenario One 50,000 – 300,000 
 
 
6.6 SUMMARY OF SCENARIO TWO RESULTS 
 The introduction of Scenario Two was used to develop an alternative to Scenario 
One where the LCC was decreased by reducing the size of the architecture elements. The 
results provided in this chapter showed that this could be accomplished and the best 
refueling strategies for this scenario were identified. These strategies included refueling 
the propellant lost to boiloff and utilizing the EDS for the LOI maneuver. These are the 
same solutions identified for Scenario One. The impact of these solutions on the 
architecture is a maximum reduction in LCC of seven percent. This is a greater reduction 
in LCC than is achieved in Scenario One, but the reduction in the cost per pound of lunar 
surface payload is much less (7 percent vs. 90 percent). The main drawback of Scenario 
Two is that any reduction in LCC results in a corresponding reduction in the LEO 
payload capability. This decrease in LEO payload capability reduces the ability of the 
architecture to be extensible to missions beyond the Moon. The total LEO payload 
capability is reduced by as much as 40 percent, whereas in Scenario One it remained 
constant. This reduction in extensibility may make Scenario Two a less attractive option 
because the total decrease in LCC is small and can also be accomplished with Scenario 
One without reducing the ability to perform exploration missions to Mars and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 7                                                                          
VALUE PROPOSITION FOR PROPELLANT REFUELING 
 
 Chapter 7 describes the value proposition of propellant refueling to NASA’s 
exploration program. A value proposition is defined as: “A business or marketing 
statement that summarizes why a consumer should buy a product or use a service. This 
statement should convince a potential consumer that one particular product or service will 
add more value or better solve a problem than other similar offerings” [61]. In this 
problem, the service is the addition of propellant refueling to NASA’s exploration 
architecture, and the value is the ability to provide improvement to each of the 
architecture’s figures of merits. The value proposition will be described in order to 
provide evidence that the implementation of this service will provide greater value to 
NASA than the current baseline.  
 
7.1 NASA’S PROPELLANT REFUELING VALUE PROPOSITION 
 In order to develop NASA’s value proposition, the concept of what is value to 
NASA must be clearly defined. During the Exploration Systems Architecture Study five 
Figures of Merit (FOMs) were established to provide a set of metrics to evaluate the 
various concepts that were considered during this study; these were outlined in Chapter 1. 
These criteria establish the value added to the exploration architecture. An improvement 
in one or more of these criteria without degrading another would provide a more valuable 
design in the eyes of the decision maker. Therefore, the value of a design change, such as 
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including propellant refueling, is measured by how well it improves each of these FOMs. 
The five FOMs are: safety and mission success, affordability, performance, extensibility, 
and programmatic risk; the first two FOMs were considered the most important. In this 
study, the third metric, performance, is considered a constraint in the system sizing, thus 
all design changes meet the performance requirements. The implementation of propellant 
refueling can have a positive impact on each of these criteria depending on the selected 
configuration. The following sections will discuss how the introduction of propellant 
refueling affects each of these criteria. The value proposition will then be presented to 
establish which implementation of propellant refueling provides the best alternative to the 
baseline design and if this selection is affected by the weighting of the selection criteria.  
 
7.1.1 IMPROVEMENT IN ARCHITECTURE CAPABILITY 
 The ability of propellant refueling to provide value to the exploration architecture 
stems from its ability to increase the payload capability per unit of LCC of the 
architecture, to increase mission and design flexibility, and to improve the mission 
success probability. These improvements provide design freedom to the architecture, 
allowing it to achieve a greater performance without significantly altering the design of 
the baseline vehicles. This section will discuss how the improved payload capability 
affects the architecture life cycle cost, the operational and development risk, and the 
overall extensibility of the program to future missions.  
 The screening process presented in chapter 5 showed that there are three refueling 
strategies that can effectively increase the payload capability of the architecture: reducing 
the performance requirements on the LSAM by allowing the EDS to perform the LOI 
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maneuver, providing the ability to re-fuel the propellant lost to boiloff while the EDS and 
LSAM are in LEO, and increasing the LEO payload by burning additional propellant on 
the second stage during ascent. The design points along the Pareto frontier were 
combinations of these three primary refueling strategies. In order to understand the 
potential benefits that each of these strategies offer they will be investigated 
independently throughout this chapter. These options are not the same as those on the 
Pareto front discussed in Chapter 5 because they do not combine multiple strategies. 
They are all identical to the baseline concept, except that they introduce a single refueling 
strategy.  
The lunar surface payload capability for these three options is provided in Table 
44. The “w/ Crew” case has a smaller payload because it must also deliver the crew and 
the Ascent Stage to the lunar surface. The “w/o Crew” case is a purely cargo mission. 
The cargo version of the LSAM replaces the Ascent Stage and crew with additional 
payload and a cargo delivery platform. Replacing the Ascent Stage of the LSAM with the 
cargo carrier increases the payload capability by 23,000 lbs [62]. The following section 
will provide a more detailed discussion of how these three cases can improve the lunar 
surface payload capability than was presented in Chapter 5 and 6.  
 
Table 44: Lunar Surface Payload Capability 
 w/ Crew w/o Crew 
Baseline 3,619 lbm 26,800 lbm 
EDS Performs LOI 28,800 lbm 51,900 lbm 
Re-fuel LEO Boiloff 8,600 lbm 31,800 lbm 
Burn Additional 25,000 lbm 14,700 lbm 37,800 lbm 
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Utilize the EDS for the LOI Maneuver 
 
 The most significant increase in payload capability comes from the case where the 
LOI maneuver is performed by the EDS instead of the lunar lander. The baseline lander 
design includes approximately 32,500 lbm of propellant just for the LOI maneuver. If the 
LSAM LOI propellant is removed, then the payload capability of the lander can increase 
assuming the total LEO payload capability remains the same. The payload capability 
does not improve on a one to one scale because both the descent propellant and support 
structure must increase. A six fold increase in payload is possible with the crewed version 
of the lander and the payload of the cargo only lander can be nearly doubled.
 Utilizing the EDS for more than the TLI maneuver provides the ability to deliver 
greater payloads to the lunar surface if additional propellant is available in LEO because 
the EDS is less than 50 percent full in LEO. The results shown in Figure 71 provide the 
lunar surface payload capability as a function of the amount of propellant that is 
transferred to the EDS in LEO. This additional propellant is used to increase the delta-V 
capability of the TLI maneuver or allow the EDS to perform the LOI as well. The initial 
point along the blue line represents the capability of the baseline design where no 
refueling occurs. The red curve represents the situation where the EDS is used for the 
LOI maneuver. Case #7 is noted; at this point the total gross mass of the LSAM is the 
same as the baseline configuration. The points along this curve with a greater lunar 
surface payload than Case #7 require the CaLV to deliver a greater LEO payload than in 
the baseline design. The points below Case #7 are able to achieve a greater lunar surface 
payload than the baseline while decreasing the total payload that the CaLV has to deliver 
to LEO. These points represent a hybrid solution between Scenarios One and Two. These 
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curves show the increase in payload capability that is possible by adding propellant 
refueling to the baseline. The EDS-LOI red curve can provide both a greater maximum 
increase in payload capability and a greater improvement in the payload capability per 
pound of propellant re-fueled. The EDS-LOI blue curve has a lower slope because the 
size of the lander must grow at a faster rate to account for the increase in LOI propellant 
needed for greater payload designs.  
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Figure 71: Lunar Surface Payload Capability as a function of EDS Propellant 
 
 The results in Figure 71 show the theoretical increase in payload capability but do 
not consider the practically of placing the payload in the current vehicle fairing 
configuration. The larger the payload requirement, the larger the vehicle needed to 
complete the mission. The results in Figure 72 show how the maximum diameter of the 
lander increases as the payload requirement increases. The red line again represents the 
case where the EDS performs the LOI maneuver. The dotted lined represents the current 
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maximum allowable lander diameter based on the current fairing configuration. In order 
to handle an increase in payload capability either the payload fairing must be redesigned 
or the size of the baseline lander must be reduced so that the vehicle does not violate the 
fairing constraint when additional payload is added. In the latter case, eliminating the 
LOI maneuver from the lander can reduce the vehicle size by 37% enabling the vehicle to 
handle up to 60,000 lbm of payload before violating the fairing constraint.  
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Figure 72: Lander Size Comparison as a function of Payload Capability 
 
Refueling the LEO Boiloff on the EDS and LSAM 
 
 The payload capability of the architecture can also be improved by eliminating the 
need to carry additional propellant to account for boiloff that occurs while the EDS and 
lander are in LEO. The addition of MLI can reduce the amount of boiloff that occurs, but 
without the addition of a zero boil-off cryo-cooler system, there will always be some 
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boiloff that must be accounted for with additional propellant that must be carried to LEO. 
A range of anywhere from four to ninety five days has been considered for NASA’s 
baseline architecture. There are two main factors that influence the selection of this stay 
time. The first is that, the longer the designed stay time, the more propellant that must be 
stored on the vehicles, and thus a lower payload capability or a greater vehicle size. The 
change in payload capability as function of the designed stay time can be seen in Figure 
73. This chart was developed by linking the propellant boiloff model discussed in 
Chapter 3 with the CaLV model and varying the number of days the EDS was required to 
remain in LEO. As the number of days increased, a greater quantity of propellant was 
required to maintain the minimal propellant levels needed to complete the required 
mission. The launch vehicle is physically constrained; therefore, any increase in 
propellant directly decreased the payload capability of the vehicle. The decrease in 
payload capability is greater than the additional propellant required due to the additional 
hardware needed to store the propellant aboard the vehicle. A 15 day stay time was used 
at the zero point of reference. These results show that there is a 15,000 lb difference in 
payload capability or design margin between the 4 and 95 day cases.  
 The second factor is that, in the design of a multi-launch architecture, the mission 
is dependent on the successful launch of both vehicles. If the delay in launching the 
second vehicle is longer than the designed stay time, then the vehicles (EDS and LSAM) 
no longer have the propellant capability to complete the mission. As discussed in Chapter 
5 and 6 depending on the difficulty of the mission the EDS and LSAM may have the 
ability to remain in LEO for longer than the designed period. The results presented here 
assume that once the designed limit is exceeded the mission is lost. The probability of 
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losing a mission and the associated cost to the architecture are provided in Figure 74. The 
details behind the creation of this chart are provided in Chapter 4. The chart shows the 
trends for the two separate launch separations times considered. The separation is the 
time between launching the cargo launch vehicle and the crew launch vehicle. The 
shorter the time between these two launches the less likely there will be an outside 
influence that affects the timing of the launch. As an example, it would be much easier to 
predict the weather patterns within a 90 minute window then over a 7 day window. The 
concern with launching both vehicles within a relatively short time period is that the 
operational complexity of coordinating the countdown of two independent launches is 
higher than a single launch. There is however a significant increase in the mission 
success if both vehicles can be launched within this small window. These two competing 
factors make it difficult to select an optimal stay time, either the architecture has a low 
payload capability and high success rate or it has a low success rate and a high payload 
capability. The introduction of propellant refueling introduces the possibility of a high 
payload capability without compromising the success of each mission. Propellant 
refueling eliminates the need to carry additional propellant to LEO to account for 
possible propellant boiloff. Any propellant that is lost while the vehicles are in LEO is re-
fueled once all mission related hardware has been delivered to LEO. This eliminates the 
chance that a mission will be lost due to a delay in launching the second launch vehicle. 
A comparison of this improvement in reliability due to propellant refueling is offered in 
Section 7.1.4.  
 The lunar surface payload capability for the 7 day separation and 95 day LEO stay 
time can be increased by approximately 12,000 lbm when propellant refueling is 
217 
implemented to provide the boiloff propellant. While this is less of an increase than can 
be obtained from reconfiguring the LOI maneuver, it comes at a much lower cost to the 
architecture. Depending on the price of propellant, this solution may provide a lower cost 
solution than the baseline design while achieving a greater payload capability. This was 
shown in Chapter 5.  
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Figure 73: Change in Payload Capability as a function of Boiloff 
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Figure 74: Effects of LEO Stay Time on Overall Campaign Cost and Mission Success 
 
Decrease In-space Propellant Delivered to LEO  
The final method that can be utilized for improving the payload capability of the 
architecture is to increase the amount of propellant that is used during ascent. Since the 
upper stage of the cargo launch vehicle is also the EDS, there is additional propellant 
available that, in the baseline architecture, is reserved for the TLI maneuver. The 
utilization of this propellant during the ascent phase allows the launch vehicle to insert a 
larger payload into LEO. In this trade study the launch vehicle configuration remained 
fixed and the only change made to the design was the quantity of propellant used during 
ascent. The total propellant at liftoff remained the same as in the baseline design. The 
results provided in Figure 75 show the relationship between the propellant burned and the 
payload capability of the vehicle. The increase in total payload capability is dependent on 
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how much additional propellant is used, but an increase of approximately 10 percent can 
be obtained if all of the EDS propellant is used.  
  The total LEO payload capability in defined by two main terms. The first is the 
mission payload that includes the lunar lander and its corresponding payload. In the 
baseline design the mission payload is approximately 101,000 lbm. The second term is 
the propellant payload that includes the in-space propellant aboard the EDS once it 
reaches LEO. This was approximately 225,000 lbm in the baseline configuration. As the 
ascent propellant utilized increases, the mission payload increases, and the propellant 
payload decreases. This trend can be seen in Figure 75; note that the total EDS LEO 
payload increase is small, whereas the in-space mission payload increases dramatically. 
There are two reasons why there is only a small increase in the total payload. The first is 
that the gross lift off mass of the vehicle increases by 175,000 lbm to account for the 
additional mission payload while still carrying the same propellant load. This 
significantly decreases the capability of the core stage, reducing its separation velocity by 
nearly 4,000 ft/s, assuming there is no change in the design of the first stage. The second 
factor is that the T/W of the upper stage is decreased from 0.84 to 0.61 requiring a longer 
burn time to reach the same final conditions. Both are a T/W and gravity loss problem. 
Section 4.1.1 further discussed why the total payload is improved only slightly when the 
total propelled burned is increased. Additional engines could be used to improve the 
performance providing a greater capability per pound of propellant burned, but would 
increase the design dry mass, and cost of the vehicle.   
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Figure 75. Change in Payload Capability and the Ascent Propellant is increased 
 
 The ability of the launch vehicle to deliver a greater payload to LEO leads directly 
to a greater lunar surface capability. However, as the LEO payload mass increases, so 
does the required TLI propellant. In the final case shown above, where the EDS is 
delivered to LEO empty, the required TLI propellant is increased from 225,000 lbm to 
473,000 lbm, more than doubling the baseline propellant.  The lunar surface payload 
capability and the required TLI propellant are provided in Table 45. The 100,000 lb case 
requires that 205,000 lbm of propellant be delivered to LEO for propellant refueling in 
order to meet the new propellant requirements for the greater payload capability.   
 
Table 45: Lunar Surface Payload Capability for an Increase in the Ascent Burn 
 w/ Crew w/o Crew TLI Propellant 
Baseline 3,619 lbm 26,800 lbm 225,000 lbm 
Burn Additional 25,000 lbm 14,700 lbm 37,800 lbm 245,900 lbm 
Burn Additional 100,000 lbm 47,900 lbm 71,100 lbm 331,200 lbm 
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 The main concern with increasing the payload capability of the CaLV/EDS is that 
the lander would quickly violate the fairing constraint for any increase in payload 
capability without a reduction in lander requirements (see Figure 72). The 25,000lb 
additional propellant case will be used to evaluate this method as it is the closest to the 
current fairing constraint. In order to consider greater payload capabilities this method 
would have to be coupled with other changes to the lunar architecture that reduce the 
requirements on the lander. There is however potential use for this method outside of a 
lunar mission as it provides the greatest LEO payload capability.  
 
7.1.2 REDUCTION IN ARCHITECTURE CAMPAIGN COSTS 
 The additional of propellant refueling offers two direct methods for reducing the 
life cycle cost of exploration missions. The first is through an increase in payload 
capability where the architecture has the capability of reducing the required number of 
years needed to complete the lunar campaign. The second is by designing the launch 
vehicle to only be responsible for delivering the mission payload to the LEO while 
providing the in-space propellant once the architecture elements are delivered to LEO. 
Removing the in-space propellant can reduce the payload requirement on the launch 
vehicle by more than 70 percent, thus greatly reducing the size of the vehicle needed to 
complete the mission. Smaller vehicles results in lower development and production 
costs. As the results in Chapter 6 discussed reducing the size of the architecture elements 
results in an overall poor architecture solution, therefore only the refueling strategies 
develop in Chapter 5 will be considered.  
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 The NASA reference lunar campaign [63] will be used to provide a more detailed 
estimate of cost for the lunar exploration missions than was used for the architecture 
screening in Chapters 5 and 6. In order to remain within the proposed budget this 
campaign has been changed from that proposed during ESAS, which was designed to 
conduct two missions per year. The lunar campaign includes two phases: the first phase is 
the deployment of the lunar outpost which has an approximate total mass of 135,000 lbm, 
and the second phase is the completion of 10 years of extended stay missions at the lunar 
outpost, consisting of one 180 day human mission per year. The 135,000 lbs is an 
estimate based on the number of required cargo missions, assuming the maximum 
payload is delivered during each mission. The delivery of the outpost in the baseline 
architecture is deployed over nine missions with five being exclusively cargo missions 
and four crew and cargo missions. The details for the outpost deployment and extended 
stay phases of the campaign are provided in Figure 76. The deployment of the outpost is 
limited by the number of missions that can be conducted in a given year and the payload 
capability of each mission. The extended stay missions consist of two separate missions; 
the first is the launch of the Pressurized Logistics Module (PLM) containing mission 
consumables which must be deployed to the outpost prior to the arrival of the crew, and 
the second is the delivery of the crew to the lunar outpost to begin their 180 day stay. 
These two missions rotate with one complete 180 day stay being completed each year. 
The LSAM baseline payload of 3,600 lbm is used as the reference cargo delivery 
capability for the combined crew and cargo lander; the cargo only lander has a reference 
payload capability of 26,800 lbm. This cargo payload was determined by replacing the 
ascent stage with a cargo platform and assuming the remaining mass difference to be 
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additional payload capability [63]. Figure 76 outlines the details of the campaign 
including how the outpost is delivered to the lunar surface, when the outpost is 
completed, and the number of days the crew is on the lunar surface. The number of 
surface days increases as the outpost is assembled and eventually leads to a 180 day stay 
at the completion of the outpost.  
 
 
Figure 76: Baseline lunar Campaign Mission Summary [64] 
  
 The lunar exploration extended stay missions may extend beyond a 10 year time-
frame but these costs will not be considered in the propellant refueling value assessment. 
In addition, any International Space Station and robotic precursor mission will also not be 
included as these costs will not be affected by the implementation of refueling. Using the 
NASA cost model (NAFCOM), the baseline Design Development Test and Evaluation 
(DDT&E) and Theoretical First Unit (TFU) costs for each of these vehicles is provided in 
Table 46. 
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Table 46: Cost Values for Baseline Exploration Architecture 
 CEV CLV LSAM Cargo LSAM Crew CaLV 
DDTE 4,200 3,778 -- 5,582 6,041 
TFU 500 633 547 730 643 
 
  
 Increasing the payload capability can affect both phases of the lunar campaign. 
During the outpost deployment phase, the increase in payload allows a greater amount of 
cargo to be delivered during each mission. This decrease the total number of mission 
required to deploy the permanent outpost hardware. During the extended stay phase of 
the campaign the greater payload capability can be used to pre-deploy the resources 
needed for each mission. Therefore each cargo mission can deploy enough payload to 
provide for two crewed missions. In the baseline campaign the cargo missions only have 
the capability to provide enough payload for a single crew mission. Decreasing the 
number of mission required to achieve the goals of the campaign allows it to be 
completed in a fewer number of years. Since the campaign is completed sooner the fixed 
cost required to operate the campaign can be transferred to other programs reducing the 
total cost of the lunar campaign. These recourses can then be transferred to other 
exploration missions.  
 In order to maintain a fair comparison between the refueling case and the baseline 
architecture three constraints must be maintained. The first is that the total payload 
delivered to the lunar surface during the lunar campaign must remain constant between 
the baseline and the various refueling cases. This constraint is primarily used to verify 
that the total mass of the lunar outpost has been deployed, since the refueling case has a 
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lager payload capability it can accomplish this task in a shorter period of time than the 
baseline. The time required to deploy the mass of the outpost in provided in Figure 77. In 
this example it is clear that the refueling architecture can deploy the outpost in less time 
than the baseline. In fact it is able to reduce the total length from 4.5 years to two years.  
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Figure 77: Improvement in the Lunar Surface Payload Capability 
 
The second constraint is that the same amount of science must be conducted 
during the lunar campaign. A useful metric to evaluate this is to use the total days spent 
on the lunar surface. The baseline campaign discussed in Figure 76 resulted in 2,000 days 
on the lunar surface and therefore all architecture comparison will maintain this total 
surface stay. The number of surface days achieved versus the length of the campaign is 
provided in  Figure 78. In both cases the total number of days on the lunar surface is 
2,000. The refueling case is able to achieve this requirement in a shorter period of time 
than the baseline as it is able to reduce the number of required missions.  
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 Figure 78: Improvement in the Lunar Surface Payload Capability  
 
 The final constraint is that the annual budget must remain within the budget of the 
baseline campaign. This is illustrated in Figure 79 at a propellant delivery price of 
$2,000/lb. Since the refueling case has a higher development cost and a higher cost per 
mission than the baseline campaign, the operation must be altered in order to remain 
within the total yearly budget of the baseline. The refueling campaign will be altered in 
order to minimize the total length while remaining with in these three constraints.  
 The three options for increasing the payload capability that were discussed in the 
previous section will be considered here to help characterize how the cost of the 
campaign can be reduced through an increase in the lunar surface payload capability. The 
results in Table 44 provide the payload capability for each of these cases. The effect of 
increasing the payload capability has two direct effects on the campaign. The first is a 
decrease in the number of missions needed to deploy the lunar outpost because a greater 
amount of payload can be delivered during each mission. The second is, with a greater 
payload capability available during the extended stay missions, there is potential to 
increase the science performed during each mission, increase the lunar surface stay time, 
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or to combine the crew and cargo missions reducing the number of missions needed for 
the extended phase. 
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Figure 79: Budget Matching for the Propellant Refueling Option 
  
 The results presented in this section will detail how the introduction of propellant 
refueling affects the design of the baseline lunar campaign. The refueling case where the 
EDS performs the LOI maneuver will be used for the initial comparison. The campaign 
will be altered to remain with in the yearly budget of the baseline campaign while still 
obtaining the mission requirements discussed previously. These results are presented in 
Figure 80 and Figure 81. These two figure describe how the three phases of the campaign 
(development, outpost deployment, and extended stay) are affected by the introduction of 
propellant refueling. It is important to understand if the length of the campaign can be 
shortened through the introduction of propellant refueling. The architecture is able to 
save $5.2B for every year that is cutoff from the end of the. This accounts for the yearly 
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cost of operating the baseline architecture which can be transfer to other missions once 
the objectives for the lunar campaign are achieved.  
 The results in Figure 80 show the number of years required to complete the lunar 
campaign for a fixed to variable ratio of 80/20. These results also include three propellant 
delivery prices ($2,000/lb, $4,000/lb, $6,000/lb). These results show that it is possible to 
shorten the length of the lunar campaign by as much as 2.5 years, including a six month 
delay in the start of the campaign to account for the increase in development cost. Even at 
the highest propellant delivery price the campaign can still be shortened by six months. 
This reduction in the length of the campaign results in a savings between $2.6B and $13B 
to account for the yearly cost of operating the baseline campaign that is no longer 
required.  
 In order to account for the higher cost of operating the refueling architecture a 
number of breaks are placed into the campaign. During these breaks no lunar missions 
are conducted, but the architecture must pay the fixed cost associated with the program. 
These breaks can clearly be seen in Figure 80. In the case of a propellant delivery price of 
$2,000/lb there are three required breaks during the campaign. At a propellant delivery 
price of $6,000/lb the number of requires breaks increases to nine in order to stay within 
the budget of the baseline program. At this price the length of the campaign is almost as 
long as the baseline, even though the number of mission required is less. The number of 
breaks is dependent on the cost of propellant and the fixed cost of operating the 
exploration architecture.  
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Figure 80: Decrease in Length of Lunar Campaign, F/V: 80/20 
 
 The results in Figure 81 are similar to those illustrated in Figure 80 except that 
they assume a ratio of fixed to variable cost of 60:40 instead of 80:20. This new ratio 
results in a lower fixed cost than the previous case and a further reduction in the length of 
the lunar campaign when refueling is added. This additional reduction in the length of the 
campaign is due to the smaller penalty the refueling architecture must pay when no 
missions are being conducted. As the assumption for the percentage of fixed costs 
decreases, these breaks have a smaller impact on the LCC of the campaign. This 
decreases the number of breaks required to remain within the yearly budget of the 
baseline architecture. At a propellant price of $2,000/lb the length of the campaign is 
further reduced by six months and at a propellant price of $6,000/lb the length of the 
campaign is further reduced by 1.5 years. At the higher propellant delivery costs a greater 
number of breaks in the campaign are required, as shown in Figure 80; therefore a lower 
fixed cost will have a greater impact on the designs that have the highest cost of 
propellant. The fixed to variable assumption has a dramatic impact on the design of the 
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campaign, but in both cases discussed the length of the campaign can be reduced and a 
significant reduction in the LCC of the architecture can be achieved.  
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Figure 81: Decrease in Length of Lunar Campaign, F/V: 60/40 
 
 These two figures show how the introduction of propellant refueling, which 
increases the payload that is delivered to the lunar surface during each mission, can effect 
the different phases of the lunar campaign. Even though the refueling cases cost more per 
mission to operate they are able to reduce the overall LCC of the architecture by reducing 
the total length of the campaign. This reduces the total fixed cost that must be paid to 
operate the lunar missions. The greater the cost of providing propellant to the architecture 
the smaller the impact that propellant refueling has on the operation of the lunar 
campaign because more breaks in the operation of the campaign are required to remain 
within the baseline budget. The ratio of fixed to variable costs are an important 
parameters to understand as a lower fixed cost tends to favor the refueling cases more 
than the baseline design as they are more dependent on the fixed cost than the non-
refueling architectures. The overall results of these two figures are that the length of the 
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lunar campaign can be reduced through the introduction of propellant refueling which 
results in a decrease in the LCC of $2.5B and $15.6B depending on the cost of propellant 
and the final ratio of fixed to variable costs.  
 
7.1.3 REDUCTION IN ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATIONAL RISK 
 There are two areas of risk that are important to the exploration program. The first 
and maybe the most important factor concerning the architecture design is the risk 
associated with loss of crew (LOC) or loss of mission (LOM). The loss of mission is a 
probability that an event will occur that will keep the mission from being completed, 
however the crew are able to return safely. The Apollo 13 mission would be an example 
of a loss of mission, but not a loss of crew. The loss of crew probability is the chance a 
failure will result in the loss of human life. The second area of risk is that associated with 
the development of the architecture that includes the development of new technologies 
and the risk of advancing a vehicle from the conceptual phase to a production design. 
Value would be achieved if propellant refueling can reduce the risk in developing such a 
complex and robust architecture.  
 The introduction of propellant refueling can greatly impact the reliability and 
mission success of the architecture. It however has little or no impact on the safety of the 
crew. The transfer of propellants always occurs in LEO. If a mission critical failure 
occurs, then the crew can simply return to Earth utilizing the CEV (unless a catastrophic 
failure occurs). The effect on the crew can also be minimized by performing the fuel 
transfer at a safe distance. The results in Table 47 provide the Apollo estimate for LEO 
propellant refueling. However, with propellant refueling, the payload can be dramatically 
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increased, which can be traded in the design for an increase in the redundancy of critical 
systems, provide engine out capability, and/or provide greater safety margins. These 
changes would result in a lower LOC and LOM for the architecture. These redundancy 
trades are beyond the scope of this dissertation, but will be included as possible future 
work.   
Table 47: Apollo Propellant Refueling Reliability [65] 
Event Reliability 10x Apollo 
Orient for docking maneuver 0.9925 0.99925 
Rendezvous Maneuver w/ depot 0.9749 0.99749 
Docking with depot 0.9795 0.99795 
Fuel transfer and separation 0.9835 0.99835 
Total 0.9676 0.99676 
 
 
 The main improvement in the LOM provided by propellant refueling is the ability 
to decouple the mission success from the propellant boiloff that occurs in LEO. In the 
baseline architecture, the EDS is required to handle a specific amount of propellant 
boiloff to account for the time between its deployment and the launch of the crew. Once 
this boiloff time is exceeded, the mission can no longer be completed as the architecture 
has insufficient mission propellants, which result in a loss of mission. The launch 
separation time between the CaLV and CLV has also been traded by NASA to help 
mitigate this risk. The closer the two vehicles can be launched, the less likely an outside 
or unexpected event can influence the launch of the second vehicle. In many cases, it is 
easier to predict the weather over a 90 minute period than over a 7-day period. The 
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problem with launching two vehicles so close together is that two separate count downs 
must be running at the same time increasing the launch operational costs.  
 The introduction of propellant refueling eliminates the dependency of the 
architecture on the boiloff rates and allows the EDS and lander to remain in LEO for an 
extended period of time. This could also be accomplished by utilizing cryo-coolers, but 
would required them to be placed on all architecture elements in order to eliminate all 
boil-off concerns. Refueling accomplished this without adding the additional mass to any 
of the elements. Refueling increases the separation time permitted between the two 
launch vehicles, resulting in a more simplified operational timeline to be developed. The 
probabilities of a successful launch of both vehicles within the required timeframe are 
provided in Figure 82. It is evident that, the longer the stay time built into the mission, the 
more likely the mission will be completed successfully. There is a considerable drop off 
in reliability as the required stay time decreases, dropping to close to a 1:5 chance for a 
15 day stay time with a 7 day launch separation. This probability can be greatly increased 
by shortening the stay time to 90 minutes, as was discussed in Chapter 5. The probability 
curves tend toward a maximum rate of success that is highly dependent on the separation 
time between the two launches. In the case of a 7-day launch separation, the maximum 
obtainable probability is approximately 95:100, while the chance of losing a mission is 
almost eliminated when a launch separation of 90 minutes is used (998:1000). The 
theoretical best solution is to achieve a 100 percent mission success rate while designing 
for the minimal LEO stay time and allowing for an adequate separation between launch 
of crew and cargo. This solution can not be achieved with the current architecture, as an 
improvement in one area directly leads to degradation in another. The addition of 
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propellant refueling decouples these design factors, allowing the best case for each to be 
achieved simultaneously. The concern with the addition of propellant refueling is that it 
adds an additional point of failure during the refueling phase, however this can be easily 
offset with the subsystem redundancies as discussed above.  
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Figure 82: Risk and Cost of a 2-Launch Solution 
  
 This additional point of failure may reduce the overall reliability of the 
architecture; however a more reliable solution can be achieved as long as the reliability of 
the refueling event is greater than the chance of losing a mission due to LEO propellant 
boiloff. The Apollo program estimated the reliability of the LEO refueling event at 
0.9676 [65]. The refueling event was broken down into the four phases shown in Table 
47. It is likely that the reliability of these systems has been improved in the past 50 years 
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due to an increase in experience with LEO operations and therefore the Apollo reliability 
numbers likely represent a highly conservative estimate.  
 The Apollo reliability has been plotted in Figure 83 to show how it compares 
against the probabilities of losing a mission due to a launch delay. The bold red lines 
represent the calculated reliability of propellant refueling. The blue and green curves 
show the probability of losing a mission due to a launch delay as a function of the 
designed LEO stay time. These are the same curves discussed in the previous section. In 
this figure, it is evident that the addition of propellant refueling always provides a more 
reliable architecture for the 7 day launch separation case no matter the designed LEO stay 
time, up to 100 days. The improvement in reliability increases as the stay time decreases 
due to a decreasing window of opportunity for the EDS. In the case of a 90 minute 
separation, the 10x Apollo propellant refueling prediction provides a more reliable 
solution for stay times under 30 days. For stay times greater than 30 days the two 
reliabilities are almost indistinguishable. Using the original Apollo reliability estimate, 
propellant refueling only provides a more reliable solution for stay times less than 15 
days. These results show that, unless the architecture is designed with a high LEO stay 
time or a short launch separation time, the introduction of propellant refueling provides 
an improvement to the architecture LOM. These two solutions have severe negative 
effects of the design of the architecture, increasing the cost of the launch and lowering the 
capability of the launch vehicles. The introduction of propellant refueling allows the 
reliability goals to be met without compromising on the capability of the architecture or 
increasing the complexity of the launch countdown.  
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Figure 83: Improvement in LOM vs. Risk of Refueling Maneuver  
 
  The second area of risk that must be taken into an account when designing a new 
and complex system is the risk of advancing a concept from conception to production. 
There are a number of factors that could lead to the demise of the project, including: 
under performing systems, mass growth, failure to mature required technologies, and 
exceeding budgetary constraints. These and a number of other factors can push the design 
into an infeasible region, forcing a reduction in mission requirements or a redesign of the 
system with advanced technologies. Redesign can lead to considerable program delays 
and cost increases that further hamper the development of the program. A  common 
factor affecting the design of a program between conception and production is the 
increase in mass that occurs throughout the life of the development process, unacceptable 
reductions in system level performance, and inadequate maturation of technologies. 
These all have an impact on the progression of the total system mass. Mass growth is a 
part of all new vehicle designs and must be accounted for during the initial design phase 
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of the program [66]. The concern is that most programs include 18 to 20 percent of mass 
margin reserves [67] while most aerospace programs experience closer to 30 percent in 
mass growth and can be as high as 50 percent for systems that have limited historical 
background (heritage). Wilhite’s paper discussed in Chapter 1 provides the background 
for these results and also looks at how mass growth on one area affects the rest of the 
architecture. This section will investigate what the cost of mass growth is on the 
development of the architecture and how this can be mitigated through the use of 
propellant off-loading and refueling. A discussion will also be provided as to the benefit 
of utilizing propellant refueling to help close the architecture if the CEV and/or lunar 
lander exceed the maximum capability of the launch vehicles  
 This study looked at increasing the mass growth on the lunar lander and the cargo 
launch vehicle to determine how this would affect the overall size of each systems and 
what the corresponding increase in development and production cost would be. These 
results are provided in Figure 84. The additional dry mass percentage is on top of the 17 
percent margin assumed during the ESAS study. These results show a significant increase 
in cost as the additional growth increases the mass and overall size of each vehicle. Based 
on the reference lunar campaign, a 10 to 20 percent additional growth on both vehicles 
would increase the total campaign costs by $3.0 to $6.3B.  
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Figure 84: The Effect of Vehicle Growth on Development Costs  
 
 These costs assume that the vehicle is able to grow to accommodate the increase 
in dry mass, but in some situations the vehicle is physically constrained and can not grow 
as needed. In this case the vehicle would have to find an alternative and likely more 
expensive route to gaining the additional performance such as the addition of advanced 
technologies like composite structures or a higher specific impulse propulsion system. 
The cargo launch vehicle is a perfect example of this type of constrained problem. The 
size of the launch vehicle is currently being constrained by the entry way to the Vehicle 
Assembly Building (VAB). While it is possible to still increase the width of the launch 
vehicle, the height has reached the limit that the VAB can handle. Any additional growth 
would have to be grown horizontally, but eventually this limit will be exceeded as well. 
The physical growth of the launch vehicle as a function of an increase in the dry mass of 
the system is provided in Figure 85. The two curves represent the increase in vehicle size 
needed in order to achieve the same mission requirements under the given mass growth. 
The two curves are independent and assume that the growth only occurs in one dimension 
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while the other remains fixed. These results show that a 30% increase in dry mass can 
lead to a 5ft increase in the diameter and a 75ft increase in the height of the launch 
vehicle. These are undesirable results, the height due to the limitations of the VAB and 
the diameter due to manufacturing and VAB limitations.  
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Figure 85: Increase in Cargo Launch Vehicle Dimensions as a Function of Growth 
  
 If the vehicle is unable to grow to meet the increase in system mass, then the 
payload capability has to decrease in order for the vehicle to reach the desired orbit. In 
this case a 30 percent increase in the system mass would result in a 26,000 lb decrease in 
the payload capability of the cargo launch vehicle. This would represent a more than 25 
percent decrease in the mission payload of the CaLV. The addition of propellant refueling 
allows the mission payload to remain the same while the total payload capability is 
reduced.  
 This mass growth can be offset by reducing the amount of in-space propellant that 
the must be delivered to LEO for delivering the payload to the lunar surface. In the 
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current configuration, approximately 75 percent of the payload that is delivered to LEO 
via the cargo launch vehicle is propellant. If this propellant is delivered separately, the 
payload requirements on the architecture can be reduced, allowing it to handle additional 
mass growth without increasing the size of the different vehicles. The architecture can 
then mitigate any mass growth by simply reducing the propellant requirements and 
purchasing the needed propellant from a low cost commercial operator once reaching 
LEO. Depending on what is meant by “low cost” determines if this solution provides a 
lower cost solution than redesigning the vehicle to be capable of handling the additional 
mass growth. In some cases a redesign may not be possible, and propellant refueling may 
offer the simplest or only means of handling the system mass growth. The results in 
Figure 86 show how the cost of refueling the architecture compares to the case where the 
vehicle size is increased to handle the additional mass growth. The curves represent the 
total savings to the lunar campaign at the given propellant price. At a propellant price of 
$1,500/lb or less the cost of offloading propellant is less than the cost of growing the 
architecture elements. In this case it makes more sense to remove the in-space propellant, 
therefore reducing the requirements on the vehicle, rather than paying the additional cost 
associated with vehicle growth. This is a propellant price that is on the lower end of what 
may be achievable in the next 20 years and would be a risky decision to develop a vehicle 
dependent on achieving this propellant price. At a propellant price greater than $1,500/lb, 
the delta campaign cost is negative indicating that the propellant refueling costs are more 
than the cost of increasing the size of the vehicle to handle the additional growth. While 
this option provides a benefit to the architecture by maintaining the initial payload 
capability even when the architecture experiences significant mass growth the cost are 
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likely to be to large to for this to be the primary reason refueling is introduced. It however 
is a secondary benefit that further improves the value of adding propellant refueling to the 
architecture. It can be added for a small additional cost as the development and operation 
of the propellant depot is already a aspect of the exploration architecture.  
There is a problem if there is mass growth with the LSAM, as propellant refueling 
cannot eliminate this growth through offloading. It can help by reducing the number 
maneuvers the LSAM must perform as noted previously. The real value of implementing 
refueling into the exploration architecture is that it allows the payload requirements to be 
decreased while still achieving the mission goals of the architecture. The same lunar 
surface payload capability can be achieved without increasing the size of the launch 
vehicle even though the system may under go a mass growth of 30 percent.  
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Figure 86: Cost Comparison of Propellant Offloading vs. Increase in Vehicle Size 
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Another example of how propellant off-loading can add value to the design of the 
architecture is the effect on the design of the CLV and CEV. In the baseline design, the 
CLV is designed to deliver the CEV and SM to LEO. Assuming mass growth on the SM, 
CEV and upper stage of the CLV either from requirements changes, design changes or 
underestimated mass during the initial design study, the CLV design may have to deliver 
a greater payload. In most cases, the CLV would grow in size to handle the additional 
requirements, but the use of a shuttle derived solid rocket booster on the first stage 
prevents this from happening. This system has very little design freedom and is all but 
fixed to its current design configuration. This makes it very difficult for the CLV to 
handle any increase in payload requirements. With the introduction of propellant 
refueling, the methane and oxygen propellant on the SM can be removed from the launch 
configuration and provided to the architecture once the SM and CEV reach LEO. In this 
case, the additional margin needed to counter the mass growth is achieved by reducing 
the total amount of propellant that must be delivered to LEO. The cost to the architecture 
would be approximately $10 – $20M for every 5,000 lb of propellant that was removed 
from the SM at a propellant price of $2,000/lb - $4,000/lb. This additional capability can 
be used to counter the mass growth or to add additional capability top the system, such as 
an improved reliability on the CEV.   
 Utilizing propellant refueling in this manner allows the launch vehicle designer to 
build in insurance that can be drawn upon in situation where the mass growth becomes 
too large or the performance targets can not be achieved. This insurance provides a level 
of risk reduction that can help to secure the future of the exploration program. The 
development of a new architecture, no matter how related it is to current or past designs, 
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always comes with substantial risk. This risk is both from new launch operations and 
from the development of new design concepts. This section has shown that the addition 
of propellant refueling can help mitigate these risks. Since risk mitigation is one of 
NASA’s main concerns when conducting exploration missions, this capability provides a 
high degree of value to the entire program.  
 
7.1.4 IMPROVEMENT IN ARCHITECTURE EXTENSIBILITY 
The extensibility is measured by how easily an architecture can be converted from 
one mission to the next and much it can benefit other missions. In a perfect situation the 
architecture would be able to accomplish a various range of missions with a minimal 
increase in investment costs. In most cases this is not a practical solution, as the 
architecture would be over designed for it primary mission, increasing the initial 
development costs. Within a fixed budget, it is difficult to expend additional resources to 
achieve long term goals at the expense of the short term future of the program. While 
extensibility is an important factor in designing a long term exploration program it often 
gets overlooked and future missions are adapted to utilize the resources available. This 
section will discuss a possible means of increasing the extensibility of the architecture 
through the use of propellant refueling.  
 One possibility of building extensibility into the architecture is to develop 
variable components that are easily expanded as the program expands and are able to 
increase the capability of the architecture by simply expanding its operations. An 
example of this would be to use propellant refueling to provide additional propellant to 
the EDS once it is delivered to LEO. This would increase the performance capability of 
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this stage allowing it to perform a wider variety of missions. During the lunar campaign 
this depot could be used for any of the concepts discussed previously. The EDS and the 
upper stage of the CLV are enormous propulsive stages that can deliver significant 
payload to destinations beyond the Moon. The curves provided in Figure 87 show the 
payload capability of these vehicles for a range of delta-V. The requirements for a lunar, 
Mars and Jupiter mission have been labeled. A fully fueled EDS can provide more than 
300,000 lbm of payload through Mars TMI. This could provide a significant portion of 
the Mars outpost in a single launch. This would also eliminate the need to development of 
a NTP system currently being considered for the extensibility of the baseline architecture.  
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Figure 87: Max Payload Capability of ESAS Propulsive Stages 
 
 While the EDS can provide a significantly greater payload capability when fully 
re-fueled it slightly less efficient than the upper stage of the CLV, due to its large size, for 
smaller scale missions. This can be seen in Figure 88. For the same available propellant, 
the Upper Stage of the CLV can deliver slightly more payload capability than the 
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baseline EDS. The issue with the CLV Upper Stage is that it is delivered to LEO without 
any remaining propellant and thus requires refueling to obtain the same propellant level 
as the EDS, which is delivered partially full. The upper stage of the CLV is design to 
discarded over the ocean, this would require a change in trajectory and reduction in 
payload in order to design the upper stage to reach LEO. All of the EDS propellant can be 
used during ascent to increase the LEO payload capability. In this case the EDS would 
require a greater amount of propellant to deliver the same payload as the CLV Upper 
Stage because it has a higher inert mass. In general, the EDS is likely to be the better 
choice from a logistics standpoint because it is already attached to the payload assembly. 
The key point to take away from these two charts is the incredible payload capability that 
can be generated with these stages by simply providing additional propellant to LEO. The 
addition of propellant refueling allows these stages to be extensible to almost any 
conceivable exploration mission.  
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Figure 88: Payload Capability as a Function of Available Propellant 
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The ESAS report provided an initial concept for utilizing the exploration 
hardware to accomplish a Mars missions, based on Mars design reference mission 3.0 
[68]. The major change to the architecture, besides an increase in the required number of 
launches, was the development of a nuclear thermal propulsion stage (NTP) that would 
be used as the in-space transfer stage.  The concept of operations included the launch of 
six cargo launch vehicles and one crew launch vehicle. The six cargo launches are used to 
deliver the Mars outpost and crew living modules along with three NTP stages to LEO. 
The addition of the NTP stage is what allows the architecture to be extended from a lunar 
to a Mars mission. The extensibility of the architecture is then driven by the cost and risk 
associated with the development of this new propulsion system. A number of estimates 
have been performed to predict the development and production cost needed to produce a 
flight ready system. These predictions are based off of the Nuclear Engine for Rocket 
Vehicle Application (NERVA) program which estimated the total development cost to be 
on the order of $4 to $5B with the engine development and construction cost alone being 
$2.5B [69]. The TFU was assumed to be 20 percent of the development cost ($500M) 
[70] not including the lunch required to deliver the stage to LEO. This is a substantial 
cost to the program and requires dependency on a technology that has met heavy 
resistance throughout its history, severely limiting the advancement of the technology. 
This additional cost and risk can be avoided by utilizing the EDS instead of developing a 
new in-space propulsion stage that provides no additional capability to the architecture. 
Introducing this capability into the Mars architecture reduces the number of cargo 
launches from six to three and the number of NTP stages from three to zero. The 
reduction in the number of cargo launched is because the three NTP stages are no longer 
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delivered to LEO. This alone would be a savings of $2.6B/mission, but a propellant cost 
must be paid that decrease this savings to around $2.7B/mission. A breakdown of the cost 
used in determining these estimates is provided in Table 48. In this example the 
architecture elements used of the lunar campaign are used to transfer the crew and cargo 
to Mars (EDS) and provide the return transportation for the crew (Upper Stage of the 
CLV). Utilizing these stages allows the Mars architecture to be operated without relying 
on the development of a new advanced propulsion system. If the EDS and CLV Upper 
Stage can be used as the in-space propulsion stages then almost no additional costs are 
needed to extend the current lunar architecture to a Mars architecture. The exception to 
this would be the Martian lander and outpost, but these additions would be needed no 
matter the initial architecture selected. All other costs should be similar between the two 
architectures concepts and so are not included. 
 
Table 48: Comparative Cost for Mars Mission 
 Baseline Refueling 
Cargo Launch Vehicles 6 x $379M 3 x $379M 
Crew Launch Vehicle 1 x $500M 1 x $500M 
NTP DDT&E Costs $5,000M -- 
NTP Stage Costs 3 x $500M -- 
Propellant 0 400,000 lb x $2,000/lb 
Total $4.2B/mission $2.4B/mission 
 
 
 There are a number of assumptions in the calculation presented in Table 48 that 
effect the difference in cost between the two mission scenarios. The most important are 
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the number of launches needed to deliver the Mars mission hardware to LEO and the cost 
of propellant to re-fuel the EDS and CLV Upper Stage. The trends presented in Figure 89 
show how these two parameters affect the cost savings of switching to a Mars 
architecture that utilizes propellant refueling. There are two notable trends to consider in 
this chart. The first is that, as the number of required cargo missions increase, the greater 
the saving of switching to a propellant refueling architecture. This is because for each 
additional cargo mission required an additional NTP stage must be built and delivered to 
LEO. The second trend is the savings between the two scenarios is a function of the 
propellant delivery price. It is shown that even for a propellant delivery price of $3,000/lb 
there is still a large cost savings when refueling is used. This is because the development 
of an advanced NTP system is removed from the Mars architecture. The savings for the 
refueling architecture becomes increasingly more significant as the price of propellant 
delivery drops because this architecture requires that a significant amount of propellant 
be delivered to LEO.  
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Figure 89: Increase in Mars Mission Payload Requirements [71] 
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 These results assume that CLV Upper Stage can be used for the return maneuver. 
This allows the NTP stage to be completely removed from the design of the Mars 
missions. In order to utilize this stage the propellant required for the return journey must 
be stored on the stage for as long as 2-years, depending on the design of the mission. This 
would either require additional propellant be placed on the Upper Stage or the use of 
zero-boiloff cryo-coolers. Based on the information discussed in Capter 5 and 6, the use 
of cryo-coolers would likely provide the lowest cost solution. This is a study not provided 
in this research and requires additional study. Even if this can not be achieved an NTP 
stage is still required there is a savings to the architecture as shown in Table 48 as the 
number of cargo launches is decreased. The ability to eliminate the NTP stage complexly 
would further reduce the development cost by $5B.  
 
7.2 ESTIMATING THE VALUE AS THE TOTAL EFFECT ON LIFE CYCLE COST 
 The results presented previously in this chapter discussed the impacts of 
propellant refueling on each of the FOMs. Because each of these metrics utilize a 
different scoring system (payload, cost, reliability, risk, and extensibility), it is difficult to 
interpret the total value added to the architecture. An evaluation standard is needed in 
order to develop a consistent measure of how an improvement in each of the FOMs 
affects the total value of propellant refueling. This section will discuss how the life cycle 
cost can be used to represent the impact that propellant refueling has on each of the 
FOMs. This metric was selected because any impact on the FOMs can be represented by 
a corresponding impact on the life cycle cost of the architecture. The major drawback of 
propellant refueling is the additional cost to the architecture, which directly leads to an 
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increase in the LCC. Utilizing this metric allows both the benefits and costs of propellant 
refueling to be represented utilizing a single decision making criterion.   
 The impacts of propellant refueling have been characterized in this chapter by 
four main effects on the NASA exploration architecture. These include: improvements to 
the LEO and lunar surface payload capability, the ability to mitigate system mass growth 
and design changes, improving the architecture reliability by decoupling propellant 
boiloff from the probability of a mission success and extensibility to future exploration 
missions. The first three will be evaluated by their effect on the life cycle cost of the lunar 
campaign that was outlined at the beginning of this chapter, while the extensibility to 
future exploration will use the cost reduction for a single human Mars mission. The 
following sections will outline the total value of propellant refueling as it applies to each 
of these figures or merit. 
7.2.1 LIFE CYCLE COST VALUE FOR MASS MITIGATION 
 Decreasing the amount of propellant that must be delivered to LEO by the 
architecture provides value to NASA by reducing the uncertainties during development. 
These uncertainties affect the performance of the architecture and generally lead to an 
increase in the mass and size of the design. It was discussed previously how the 
introduction of propellant refueling can help mitigate this mass growth by decreasing the 
amount of propellant the architecture must deliver to LEO. Using propellant refueling to 
minimize the mass growth effects provides value because it allows unforeseen challenges 
to be addressed without requiring substantial changes to the baseline design. As such, it 
can be considered as a design insurance policy and helps reduce both development cost 
and risk of the exploration program. The total value of introducing propellant refueling to 
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mitigate the mass growth experience by the architecture is the ability to prevent: an 
increase in development and production costs, an increase in the number of technologies 
required to achieve the new performance requirements, the ability to prevent the 
architecture design from becoming infeasible, and preventing a reduction in architecture 
objectives. These are typical design concerns in any new engineering problem, but are 
particularly difficult to overcome in large aerospace projects due to the increase in cost 
and size that can result from substantial design changes.  
 It is difficult to quantify the total value that this propellant refueling strategy can 
provide NASA. The increase in cost of the architecture elements can be determined as a 
function of mass growth and additional technology cost can be estimated, but quantifying 
the effects of development and schedule risk is not within the scope of this thesis. For the 
purpose of providing an estimate of the value that can be achieved when mass growth is 
mitigated with propellant refueling the following equation is provided (Equation 7). This 
does not include the value of preventing an infeasible design or maintaining the 
architecture objectives, both of which provide significant benefit to the program.  
 
PropellantesTechnologiProductiontDevelopmenMitigationMass CostCostCostCostV −+∆+∆=      (7) 
 
 The increase in development cost includes the additional work required to design 
larger architecture elements plus any additional re-design that must be performed to take 
into account a large vehicle design. The production costs include the increase in cost to 
manufacture and assemble the vehicle, and the technology costs include the development 
cost required to introduce a new technology into the design and achieve the required 
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performance levels. NAFCOM is used to calculate the change in DDT&E and TFU and a 
percentage increase in DDT&E is used to estimate the cost of re-design and new 
technology programs. Since these costs are not known, a range of 0 – 30 [72] percent was 
used to estimate this increase in development costs. The savings of preventing system 
mass growth for the CaLV and LSAM is provided in Figure 90. The initial blue bar 
represents the effect that an increase in DDT&E and TFU have on the cost of the lunar 
architecture, and the remaining bars represent the increase in development cost to account 
for new technologies and re-design work. The greater the mass growth and the more re-
design work that is required, the greater the potential benefit of this refueling strategy.  
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Figure 90: The Savings for Mitigating the Effects of Mass Growth 
 
  
These results, however, do not include the additional cost of providing the 
offloaded propellant to the architecture. The additional costs of providing propellant to 
the architecture in LEO are provided in Figure 91. The difference between the two bars 
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represents the value of this refueling strategy. The required propellant delivery price is 
calculated by determining the mass of propellant that is required to maintain the same 
initial system mass for a given mass growth percent. In these results a propellant deliver 
price of less than $2,000/lb is required in order to achieve a positive value for mitigating 
the mass growth.  
 
 
 
Figure 91: The Costs for Mitigating the Effects of Mass Growth 
 
 At a propellant price of $2,000/lb, the cost of propellant and depot is more than 
the increase in development and production cost that would result from a 10 – 30 percent 
increase in system mass. This is because the marginal cost of increasing the size of the 
CaLV and LSAM is less than the cost of providing propellant to LEO (Figure 86). If the 
additional development costs are also included (re-design and technologies) than a value 
of 1 - $2B can be obtained assuming a propellant price of $2,000/lb. This represents a 
small initial estimate of the value and is likely within the uncertainty of this preliminary 
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estimation. These results suggest that there is little value in utilizing propellant refueling 
to mitigate architecture mass growth, as the cost of propellant is comparable to the 
increase in vehicle costs. The primary benefit may not be the ability to reduce the cost of 
the architecture elements, but rather the ability to limit the development risk to NASA.    
 There is a small but almost insignificant value that can be obtained by utilizing 
propellant refueling to mitigate mass growth that results from an increasing in vehicle 
size. Unless a large increase in additional development cost is experienced, the cost of 
providing propellant to LEO is more than the increase in the total architecture cost. The 
true value is not to limit the increase in vehicle cost, but rather to decrease the risk in 
developing a new complex system. Utilizing propellant refueling to limit the impact that 
design uncertainty has on the development process potentially provides a greater level of 
value. This can prevent substantial schedule slip due to additional design and re-design 
work, and can prevent the design from becoming infeasible or not being able to meet 
program level requirements. A gap between design capability and program requirements 
generally leads to the addition of new technologies which increase program cost and risk. 
If new technologies can not achieve the required increase in performance than a reduction 
in program requirements may be required. Offloading propellant can eliminate this gap 
without relying on new technologies and without decreasing the capability of the design. 
Eliminating this development risk is difficult to quantity, but it provides a high level of 
value to NASA as it reduces the likelihood that large design changes are needed through 
the development process.  
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7.2.2 LIFE CYCLE COST VALUE FOR REFUELING PROPELLANT LOST TO BOILOFF 
  The second major source of value is related to the dependency of the architecture 
on the LEO propellant boiloff, and how it affects two major FOMs. The first is an 
increase in payload capability both to LEO and to the lunar surface, and the second is an 
improvement in the Loss of Mission (LOM) of the architecture. These architecture 
improvements have been discussed in great detail, in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. It was shown 
previously in this chapter how an increase in payload capability can provide value to 
NASA by lowering the cost and reducing the length of the lunar campaign (section 
7.1.2), but how is an improvement in LOM quantified in terms of a total cost or savings 
to the architecture. The cost of a LOM to NASA includes: the money and time spent on 
deployed hardware, effects of delays on the exploration program, re-design work needed 
to prevent future failures, and other political and social factors associated with losing a 
multi-billion dollar mission. Assuming that a LOM is due to propellant boiloff and not a 
catastrophic design failure, then the additional re-design work and schedule slip is small. 
The total cost to the program can then be approximated as the cost of the hardware that 
was deployed and not salvageable for future missions. This would include the cost of the 
CaLV and LSAM which are deployed prior to the launch of the crew. The value to 
NASA is the total cost saved by eliminating this LOM scenario multiplied by the number 
of times it will occur over the course of the campaign, minus the cost of providing the 
propellant to the architecture. This is depicted in Equation 8. The probability of a LOM 
as a function of the designed LEO stay time was provided in Figure 82.   
   
elingCPxC RefuPropellantLOMhardwareBoiloffRefuelingV −=    (8) 
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 A summary of this value as a function of the designed LEO loiter period and the 
launch separation time is provided in Figure 92. It is evident in this chart that the greater 
the launch separation time, the more value propellant refueling offers NASA. This is 
because the longer the separation time, the more likely an event will occur that will 
prevent the launch of the crew from occurring on schedule. In this case, implementing 
propellant refueling for a mission with a seven day separation has a seven times greater 
value than for a mission designed with only a 90 minute separation. It also must be noted 
that is the order of the launch is switched so that the crew are delivered before the cargo 
than the value of refueling the architecture is greatly reduced. It still has a payload 
benefit, but no longer a LCC savings. There is also a decrease in the value for missions 
designed to remain in LEO for longer periods of time. The probability of losing a mission 
becomes less likely as the LEO stay time increases because more time is available to 
resolve the issue which caused the delay. Thus the mission could continue within the 
allowable time. These results do not consider the value gained by increasing the payload 
capability or decreasing the size of the vehicle due to the reduced mass of propellant that 
must be carried to LEO, but these have been outlined separately. This would further 
increase the value for missions with a longer LEO stay time. It is also evident that value 
is not always provided when utilizing propellant refueling in this manner. In the cases 
where short separation times and long LEO stay times were considered, a negative value 
is seen because the costs to the program are greater than the potential benefits.  
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Figure 92: Value of Eliminating the LEO Boiloff LOM Scenario 
 
7.2.3 LIFE CYCLE COST VALUE FOR AN INCREASE IN PAYLOAD CAPABILITY 
 
 The total savings achieved through an increase in payload capability was 
discussed in detail in Section 7.1.2; it improved the deployment of the lunar outpost and 
the operation of the extended stay missions. The total value, however, includes the cost 
savings to the lunar campaign, the reduction in campaign time, possible increase in the 
science capability per mission, a greater payload capability to achieve extensibility to 
future missions, and risk mitigation through an increase in allowable design margins. The 
value obtained through an increase in the payload capability extends throughout the 
design of the entire architecture. The value of the risk mitigation and extensibility are 
discussed separately as they address a particular design FOM. The value of reducing the 
length of the campaign enables NASA to either increase the number of missions it can 
complete within the current schedule or to reduce the time frame before human Mars 
missions can begin. The ability to increase the science output during the extended lunar 
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missions also provides value but to a less extent than a reduction in the life cycle cost, 
because it does not address a particular FOM. A qualitative discussion of the impact that 
these have on the architecture is provided in Section 1.3. The result of these 
simplifications is that the total value of an increase in payload capability can be closely 
approximated as the total savings to the architecture by decreasing the number of 
missions needed to complete the lunar campaign. A summary of these results is provided 
in Figure 93. In this case, the total value is represented by the difference between the 
benefits and costs of implementing propellant refueling. The colored bands correspond to 
an increase in cost as the price of propellant increases. An increase in propellant price 
represents a small increase in the total cost and therefore has a small impact on the value. 
These results again show that an improvement in payload capability always provides 
value to NASA. It would require a substantial increase in the development cost and the 
price of propellant in order for these benefits to be erased. These results also show that 
allowing the EDS to perform the LOI maneuver provides the greatest value since this 
option provides the greatest improvement in payload without significantly increasing the 
propellant requirements over the other options.   
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Figure 93: Value of Increasing the Payload Capability of the Architecture 
 
7.2.4 LIFE CYCLE COST VALUE FOR INCREASING EXTENSIBILITY 
 
 The introduction of propellant refueling can also provide considerable value to 
missions designed to go beyond the Moon, specifically a human Mars mission. The 
biggest change from the lunar campaign to a Mars mission is the quantity of cargo that 
must be delivered to LEO. The total payload that must be delivered to LEO for Mars 
DRM 3.0 is in excess of 440,000 lbm of mission payload, plus three 150,000 lb Nuclear 
Thermal Propulsion (NTP) stages [71]. This totals almost one million pounds of payload 
that must be delivered to LEO before each Mars mission. The use of propellant refueling 
can improve these large cargo missions by increasing the amount of payload that can be 
delivered to LEO on the cargo launch vehicle, and by providing an alternative in-space 
transfer vehicle. The value is a reduction in the number of launches needed to complete 
the mission, and thus a large reduction in the total cost of a Mars campaign. The major 
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issue is that a considerably larger amount of propellant is needed than for the lunar 
campaign, though the risks would be less assuming the capability had been fully 
demonstrated during the lunar campaign. The cost versus benefit for introducing 
propellant refueling for a set of Mars missions is provided in Figure 94. The details for 
the cost estimation used in this analysis were presented in Section 7.1.4. The value can be 
interpreted as the difference between the “No Refueling” curve and the three propellant 
price curves. The benefit is a summation of the savings achieved through a decrease in 
the number of launches, and the cost is the propellant required to re-fuel each mission 
plus the development of a larger LEO propellant depot.. The large depot will also have to 
be delivered to LEO, but would likely require multiple launches as the size of a single 
propellant depot would be to large to deploy in a single Ares V launch. The number of 
launches refers to the number of cargo launches required to complete a Mars single 
mission. The reference mission considered during ESAS called for three cargo missions. 
The increase in the number of launches represents a growth in the Mars campaign 
requirements or additional Mars missions. These results show that the value to the Mars 
architecture increases as the number of cargo launches increases, because a greater 
number of NTP stages can be replaced with a re-fueled EDS, saving both the launch and 
production costs of this engine, but the biggest savings is the elimination of the 
development of the NTP system.  
Even with the large quantity of propellant needed to perform the trans-Mars 
injection maneuver, the cost of propellant is less than the cost of building and delivering a 
NTP stage to LEO. The total savings of replacing the NTP system with propellant for the 
EDS is small on a per mission basis, but as the number of required cargo missions 
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increases, the use of the EDS as the Mars transfer vehicle has the potential to provide a 
significant value to NASA. An additional benefit is that the development of a NTP 
system is no longer required for Mars missions, which could save an additional $5B [69] 
in development costs. Eliminating the NTP completely from the Mars architecture 
requires that an additional EDS or CLV Upper Stage be used for the return segment of 
the Mars mission. This increases the amount of propellant required, but reduces the total 
cost of the missions. These results show that the use of propellant refueling could provide 
value to a Mars mission by simply replacing the NTP stage with the already deployed 
EDS. These results are also not very dependent on the cost of each cargo launch as the 
majority of the savings comes from the ability to eliminate the need to develop the NTP 
stage.  
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Figure 94: Value to Extending the Architecture to a Mars Mission 
 
A summary of the total value that propellant refueling can provide NASA is 
provided in Figure 95. This figure illustrates the overall effect of implementing the “best” 
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refueling strategies into the exploration architecture, under the assumptions in this work. 
These refueling strategies can help simplify the development of the architecture elements, 
reduce the effect of program level requirements, and improve the concept of operation on 
both the lunar and Mars exploration missions.  
It is evident that the greatest value to the architecture is the ability to increase the 
payload capability because it can achieve the greatest benefit by increasing the flexibility 
of the architecture. In Section 7.1.2 it was shown that this increase in flexibility can 
decrease the length of the lunar campaign resulting in a decrease in LCC of $2.6B to 
$13B depending on the assumption for the price of propellant and the fixed versus 
variable cost. By contrast, the use of propellant refueling to help mitigate mass growth 
has a large cost associated with it because of the amount of propellant that must be 
provided for each mission. There is still a small benefit to LCC that can be achieved, 
though generally less than $500M and only for a lower propellant price and high increase 
in mass growth. The primary value of this method is the ability to reduce the 
development risk of the architecture. This method can provide a secondary benefit of 
introducing propellant refueling to the architecture. Propellant refueling can also help 
lower the LCC of Mars missions by reducing the number of cargo launches. The total 
value is dependent on the number of cargo missions and the decrease in savings by 
eliminating the NTP stage ($3.5B + $1.8BxMissions). These results assume that each of 
these changes is implemented separately, but all of these options are capable of 
simultaneously being applied to the architecture. In fact, any number of propellant 
refueling strategies can be implemented together. This would help further increase the 
value as the development cost would only need to be accounted for once. The Pareto 
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frontiers discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 provided evidence that the best propellant 
refueling strategies utilize a number of propellant refueling techniques to combine the 
benefits they provide to the architecture. The following section will outline the final value 
proposition that propellant refueling offers NASA’s exploration program.  
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Figure 95: Total Value of Propellant Refueling 
 
7.3 THE VALUE PROPOSITION OF PROPELLANT REFUELING FOR NASA 
The work presented in Chapters 5, 6, and the first half of Chapter 7 outlined the 
effects that various propellant refueling methods have on the baseline architecture. The 
goals of this thesis are to develop the value proposition of propellant refueling. This 
requires that the work presented thus far (the characterization of how propellant refueling 
effects on the baseline architecture) be translated into a set of statements that outline the 
specific improvements made to the baseline architecture. These statements should 
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convince NASA of the potential improvements to the baseline architecture that can be 
achieved by implementing propellant refueling. The value proposition is broken down 
into five categories that summarize the work presented in this thesis. The categories 
include: an increase in the LEO payload capability, an increase in the lunar surface 
payload capability, decoupling the mission reliability from the cryogenic propellant 
boiloff, increasing the functionality of the EDS, decreasing the size of the architecture 
elements, and enabling the development of a reusable launch vehicle market.  
 
7.3.1 INCREASED LOW EARTH ORBIT PAYLOAD CAPABILITY 
 The results presented previously in this thesis discuss three potential means of 
increasing the LEO payload capability. These options include: eliminating the need to 
carry additional propellant to LEO to account for boiloff, increasing the EDS propellant 
used during ascent, and offloading the EDS or LSAM propellant prior to liftoff. The 
value of increasing the payload that the architecture can deliver to LEO can be broken 
down into three components. This includes an increase in the lunar surface payload 
capability, the ability to mitigate mass growth without limiting the capability or changing 
the design of the architecture elements, and providing a greater capability for high mass 
exploration missions. The increase in lunar surface payload capability is a direct result of 
a greater mission payload being delivered to LEO. The additional capability can be used 
to increase the size of the LSAM, and the payload that can be delivered to the lunar 
surface. The size of the LSAM is limited by the capability of the CaLV. The addition of 
propellant refueling can provide a means to improve this capability, thus resulting in a 
greater lunar surface payload.  
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 One of the most significant improvements that propellant refueling can offer is the 
ability to mitigate the effect of mass growth on the development of the exploration 
architecture. The concern with mass growth is that it reduces the capability of the 
architecture and often results in the design of the architecture temporarily becoming 
infeasible. In a traditional design problem, an unexpected increase in system mass would 
result in a number of required design changes. These can include changes to the 
architecture elements or changes to the requirements placed on the architecture. Design 
changes to the individual elements lead to an increase in the development cost and often a 
delay in the program schedule. These can both be particularly detrimental if large 
technology development programs are required. The other option is to reduce the 
requirements on the architecture, which will help to eliminate the effect of mass growth. 
It will also, however, reduce the original objectives of the architecture. The introduction 
of propellant refueling can increase the amount of payload that can be delivered to LEO 
without significantly changing the design of the baseline architecture elements. 
Increasing the payload capability above the baseline requirements provides a payload 
margin that can be used to account for an increase in system mass. This provides a single 
solution to mitigate any mass growth that occurs during the development process instead 
of introducing a number of new technology programs to reduce the mass and improve the 
capability of the architecture.  
 The third portion of the value is the ability to improve the capability of future 
exploration missions by providing a larger LEO payload. Future exploration missions 
will require a larger payload capability than is required for lunar missions. The ESAS 
study provided an initial Mars architecture that would require more than one million 
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pounds of payload to be delivered to Mars before a human mission could be conducted. 
The ability to provide a greater LEO payload would increase the extensibility of the 
current architecture, allowing it to better adapt to the needs of future missions. The main 
result is a reduction in the number of launches required to deliver the exploration 
payload. This would lead to a reduction in the cost of each mission, and potentially 
provide a more sustainable architecture.  
 
7.3.2 INCREASED LUNAR SURFACE PAYLOAD CAPABILITY 
Throughout this thesis, the discussion has focused on the ability of the propellant 
refueling to increase the payload delivered to the lunar surface. The results showed that 
increasing the LEO payload and increasing the functionality of the EDS can result in a 
greater payload delivered to the lunar surface. The value of increasing the payload 
capability can be categorized by three potential impacts on the lunar campaign. The 
improvements include: increasing the capability of each lunar mission (science, length, 
coverage, etc.), providing alternative solutions to deploy the lunar outpost infrastructure, 
and offering an additional means to mitigate system mass growth on the LSAM.  
 Increasing the payload capability that the LSAM can deliver to the lunar surface 
can increase the number of scientific objectives that are achieved during each lunar 
mission. A greater payload mass can allow more instrumentation to be used during each 
mission. This improvement in scientific equipment can provide either a more in-depth 
analysis or a greater variety of instruments to help understand the lunar environment and 
better prepare humans for future exploration missions. A greater payload mass can also 
allow longer lunar missions, especially in the case of the seven day sortie mission. The 
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length of the sortie mission is limited by the capability of the LSAM and does not utilize 
any pre-deployed outpost infrastructure. A larger payload capability can increase the 
capability of the life support systems, allowing the crew to remain on the lunar surface 
for longer periods. Increasing the length of the sortie missions would allow a greater 
amount of science to be completed during each mission and potentially reduce the 
number of mission required to achieve the scientific objectives of the architecture. This 
could reduce the cost of the lunar campaign because doubling the science completed 
during each mission requires a lower cost than conducting two lunar missions. A number 
of other potential improvements to the scientific capability of the architecture can be 
achieved by increasing the mass that the LSAM can deliver to the lunar surface. The 
value of this capability can be summarized by the ability to increase the scientific 
objectives obtained during each lunar mission, allowing NASA to increase its return on 
the large investment made to develop the exploration architecture.  
 The analysis in Section 6.1.2 discussed how the LCC of the lunar campaign could 
be reduced by decreasing the number of missions required to deploy and operate the lunar 
outpost. One potential outpost manifest, assuming the current architecture capability, 
requires nine missions to fully deploy the infrastructure needed to begin operating the 
lunar outpost. Utilizing propellant refueling to increase the payload capability to the lunar 
surface can potentially reduce the number of missions needed to deploy the lunar outpost 
to less than four missions. This can save the lunar campaign billions of dollars by 
eliminating more than half of the outpost deployment missions, which can be done 
without affecting the scientific missions that begin once the outpost is fully deployed. 
Considering that budgetary concerns are one of the main limiting factors in conducting 
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exploration missions, this reduction in cost can provide substantial value to NASA. 
Another potential improvement, depending on the lunar surface payload capability, is the 
ability to deliver the crew and cargo needed for each lunar outpost mission in a single 
launch. The current capability requires that two missions be conducted, the first to deploy 
a PLM to the outpost and the second to deliver the crew. Utilizing the EDS for the LOI 
maneuver increases the lunar surface payload capability such that, from mass standpoint, 
both the crew and cargo can be delivered in a single mission. This would save the 
architecture the cost of a CaLV and LASM for each outpost mission, further reducing the 
cost of the lunar campaign. A complete description of these results can be fund in Section 
6.1.2. The value is summarized as the potential to decrease the cost of the lunar outpost 
missions by utilizing an increase in lunar surface payload capability to reduce the number 
of required missions, or by increasing the number of missions that can be conducted over 
the same time period. 
 The final impact that a greater lunar surface payload can have on the lunar 
architecture is to provide another potential means of mitigating mass growth on the CaLV 
and LSAM. The previous section discussed how mass growth could be mitigated by 
reducing the amount of propellant that the CaLV delivered to LEO, while keeping the 
mission payload constant. The mission payload mass is the mass of the LSAM plus the 
lunar surface payload. It was shown in Section 6.1.1 that propellant refueling can be used 
to decrease the mass of the LSAM while increasing the lunar surface payload. This 
allows the mission payload to remain constant while increasing the lunar surface payload. 
If the mass of the LSAM increases, the lunar surface payload can be decreased without 
increasing the mission payload the CaLV must deliver to LEO. The additional payload 
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capability achieved by utilizing propellant refueling provides the architecture with an 
additional payload margin. This margin can be used to allow an increase in LSAM mass 
without reducing the original payload requirements of the architecture. In most cases, the 
mass growth can be mitigated while still achieving a greater lunar surface payload. The 
value is the ability to accommodate mass growth on the LSAM without increasing the 
requirements on the CaLV or reducing the lunar surface capability. Without this payload 
margin, the decision maker would have to reduce the requirements on the LSAM or 
accept additional growth on the CaLV.  
 
7.3.3 DECOUPLING MISSION RELIABILITY FROM PROPELLANT BOILOFF 
 One of the major benefits of propellant refueling discovered in this thesis is the 
ability to replace the propellant lost to boiloff while the EDS and LSAM loiter in LEO. 
The introduction of this strategy has been shown to provide a greater payload capability 
and to achieve improved mission reliability. The value of an increase in payload 
capability was discussed in the two previous sections. This section will outline the value 
of decoupling the success of each mission from the amount of propellant lost to boll-off.  
 In the baseline architecture, the crew and cargo are delivered to LEO separately. 
The EDS and LSAM are designed to be delivered seven days prior to the crew. Based on 
previous launch systems, it is likely that the CLV will experience a delay that could 
prevent it from launching on time. The EDS and LSAM are designed to carry additional 
propellant to account for the boiloff that occurs during this delay. These vehicles may be 
required to carry enough additional propellant to account for somewhere between fifteen 
and ninety five days of propellant boiloff. If the CLV is delayed beyond this period, then 
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the EDS and LSAM will not have sufficient propellant to perform the remaining mission 
maneuvers. The result in the EDS and LSAM being discarded, and an additional launch is 
then required to deploy a new set of vehicles. This is a significant increase in cost to the 
architecture. The introduction of propellant refueling eliminates the dependence of the 
architecture on the amount of boiloff. The EDS and LSAM are now launched to LEO 
without any additional propellant, and the propellant lost to boiloff is replaced once the 
crew is delivered to LEO. In this case, the CLV can be delayed for any period of time and 
the EDS and LSAM still have sufficient propellant to complete the remaining mission 
maneuvers. The value to NASA is that the cargo elements of the architecture (EDS and 
LSAM) are never lost because of a delay in launching the CLV. This has both economic 
and political value because discarding billion dollar hardware elements would appear to 
be an insufficient use of public resources.   
 
7.3.4 INCREASING THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE EARTH DEPARTURE STAGE 
 The EDS is designed to function as both the 2nd stage of the CaLV and as the in-
space transfer stage between Earth and the Moon. This provides the EDS with the 
capability to hold 500,000 lbm of usable propellant. This stage, once re-fueled, has the 
potential to provide a very large propulsive maneuver that can be used to transfer large 
payloads for various exploration missions. It was discussed previously that the EDS can 
be used to provide the LOI and TLI maneuvers, resulting in an increase in the lunar 
surface payload capability. It is unlikely that the full potential of the EDS could be used 
for lunar missions because high mass payloads are not needed. The payload capability for 
Mars missions, however, is much higher and will require a significant propulsive stage to 
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meet the estimated demand. The baseline Mars mission requires the development of a 
new Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP) system to transfer cargo between the Earth and 
Mars. This new system would require an initial investment between $4B and $5B to 
develop a flight-ready vehicle [69], plus the additional cost to produce and launch the 
stage to LEO. Utilizing the EDS would require no additional development, production, or 
launch costs since the EDS is already utilized to deliver the Mars cargo to LEO. The EDS 
would only need to be re-fueled with sufficient propellant to complete the trans-Martian 
injection (TMI) maneuver. The baseline Mars mission requires six cargo launches: three 
to deploy the cargo elements and three to deliver the NTP stages required to transfer the 
cargo to Mars. The value offered by increasing the functionality of the EDS is the ability 
to eliminate the development of the NTP system, as well as, a reduction in launch cost 
because the transfer stage is deployed along with the cargo elements and does not require 
a separate launch.  
7.3.5 DECREASING THE SIZE OF THE ARCHITECTURE ELEMENTS 
 The work in this thesis has primarily focused on the value of utilizing propellant 
refueling to improve the payload capability of the architecture. The results in Chapter 6, 
however, showed how the architecture could be improved by utilizing propellant 
refueling to directly reduce the LCC by decreasing the size of the architecture elements. 
This can be accomplished by reducing the amount of propellant delivered to LEO. While 
this work has primarily focused on the CaLV, reducing the propellant delivered by the 
CLV can also lower the cost of the architecture. The drawback of this solution is that a 
reduction in LCC comes at the cost of future extensibility because the LEO payload 
capability is reduced.  
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 The ability to decrease the size of the architecture elements can offer a number of 
improvements, and therefore value, to the design of the exploration architecture. The 
most notable improvement is the ability to decrease the development and production cost 
of the architecture elements. Chapter 6 discussed how a significant cost savings can be 
achieved by decreasing the size of the LSAM.  
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7.3.6 SUMMARY OF NASA VALUE PROPOSITION 
 
Table 49: Summary of Propellant Refueling Value 
Effect on Architecture Value to NASA 
Greater LEO payload  o Provide a greater lunar surface payload 
o Mitigate against potential mass growth during 
architecture development 
o Provide a greater payload for future exploration 
missions 
Greater lunar surface payload o Increase scientific capability for each lunar mission  
o Enable alternative deployment strategies that can 
reduce cost and length of the lunar campaign 
o Mitigate against potential mass growth during 
architecture development 
Increase mission success  o Eliminate any missions being lost because the CLV 
is delayed beyond the design LEO loiter time 
o Remove dependence of the architecture on the 
propellant boiloff 
Increase functionality of EDS o Eliminate the need to develop a new NTP system 
o Decrease the number of launches requires for 
exploration missions 
o Increase usability of current hardware.  
Decrease size of vehicles o Decrease size and cost of architecture elements 
o Reduce physical constraints on launch vehicles 
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CHAPTER 8                                                                          
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 The goal of this research was to develop a thorough understanding of how 
propellant refueling would impact NASA baseline exploration architecture, providing a 
more in-depth analysis than is available in the current literature. This goal has been 
accomplished by developing a parametric architecture model that can be used to evaluate 
the changes in the architecture FOMs when various propellant refueling strategies are 
added to the baseline design. A number of refueling strategies have been identified that 
show an improvement to each FOM, while other strategies have been shown to adversely 
affect one or more of the FOMs. It was also shown that many propellant refueling 
strategies have a larger impact on the architecture than other design variables considered 
(thermal mitigation, LSAM ascent engine, and LEO loiter period). A value proposition 
was finally presented to summarize why an architecture that utilized propellant refueling 
was better equipped to meet the goals of the Vision for Space Exploration than the 
current baseline design. The following will outline the original goals of this thesis and 
describe how they were accomplished during this work.  
 
8.1 GOALS OF THE DISSERTATION 
 The objectives of this research were specified in three different goals set out in 
Section 1.3. These goals are restated below: 
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• Goal 1: Develop a lunar architecture model capable of evaluating various 
propellant refueling techniques.  
 
 This goal was established to provide a foundation for analyzing the effect of 
propellant refueling on the exploration architecture. During the literature review, it was 
found that a detailed analysis of propellant refueling had not been performed. Most of the 
previous work on propellant refueling had been limited to single architecture designs or 
relied solely on a qualitative discussion. This model provides a means to evaluate a large 
number of propellant refueling strategies and measure the effects on the design of the 
entire architecture. While this model specifically focuses on the CaLV and LSAM, it can 
easily be expanded to include the remaining architecture elements. 
 A detailed discussion of this model was provided in Chapter 4. This model was 
developed using the ModelCenter© design framework to simplify the integration of the 
analysis modules and to provide an automated process for evaluating a large number of 
trade studies. This framework is provided in Figure 96. Any propellant refueling strategy 
can be selected, and the parameters passed into this simulation environment. The impact 
on the architecture elements is first determined, and then the FOM can be evaluated and 
compared against the baseline design. This allows the decision maker to understand how 
different refueling strategies impact the exploration architecture, and thus which of these 
strategies provides the greater level of value to NASA.  
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Figure 96: Propellant Refueling Design Space Simulation Environment 
 
• Goal 2: Explore and understand the effects that propellant refueling have on 
NASA’s baseline exploration architecture.  
 
 This goal was accomplished by developing a set of design variables that could be 
used to investigate the impact of a wide variety of propellant refueling strategies on the 
exploration architecture. These design variables provided the basis for the different 
refueling strategies that were considered in this thesis. The impact of each was measured 
against the baseline design and the relative impact of each was compared against the 
other potential refueling strategies. A Morphological Matrix was used to illustrate these 
design variables and the respective ranges used in this work. The Morphological Matrices 
for Scenarios One and Two are provided in Figures 97 and 98.  
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Figure 97: Trade Study Morphological Matrix, Scenario One 
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Figure 98: Trade Study Morphological Matrix, Scenario Two 
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 Five of the design variables directly investigated a particular propellant refueling 
strategy, and four additional design variables are parameters that could also be affected 
by the introduction of propellant refueling. The inclusion of both categories of design 
variables showed the relative impact of propellant refueling compared to other design 
variables important to the design of the architecture. The propellant refueling design 
variables were shown to have the largest impact on the architecture FOMs. One of the 
primary results missing from the propellant refueling literature is a comparison of various 
refueling strategies with respect to a common architecture design. Having this 
information would allow a decision maker to understand which refueling strategy could 
be used to improve a particular FOM and which would help provide the greatest 
improvement to the design of exploration architecture.  
 
• Goal 3: Determine the costs and benefits of adding propellant refueling to the 
lunar architecture and determine what approach has the greatest effect on the 
over all design of the architecture.  
 
 The final goal was to utilize the design space and simulation environment 
developed for Goals 1 and 2 to determine if propellant refueling could improve the 
baseline lunar architecture. It was also of interest to determine which refueling strategies 
provided the greatest value to NASA. This was accomplished in two phases. The first 
was to determine which refueling strategies had the greatest impact on the baseline 
design. This was achieved by developing a Pareto frontier for LCC and payload 
capability for both Scenarios One and Two. The LCC and payload capability were the 
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only two metrics initially considered because the reliability, risk, and extensibility 
metrics were addressed later as a part of the overall value proposition. The conclusion 
from the Pareto frontier analysis provided three attractive refueling strategies for 
Scenario One and two for Scenario Two. These strategies are provided in Table 50.  
 
Table 50: Summary of Preferred Refueling Strategies 
Best Strategies Scenario One Scenario Two 
Re-fuel propellant lost to boiloff Yes Yes 
Utilize EDS for LOI maneuver Yes Yes 
Reduce propellant delivered to LEO Yes No 
 
 
 The second phase was to determine the value provided by these preferred 
refueling strategies, measured by their impact on the architecture FOMs. In the case of 
the LCC, it was shown that two separate effects could improve this metric. An 
improvement in the lunar surface payload capability was shown to have the potential to 
reduce the cost of the lunar campaign by reducing the number of missions required to 
deploy the lunar outpost, and perform the six-month extended stay missions. It was also 
discussed how the LCC could be reduced by eliminating the dependence of the 
architecture on the amount of propellant lost to boiloff.  
 The introduction of propellant refueling can also provide an increase in the LEO 
and lunar surface payload capability. This increase in payload capability can directly lead 
to an improvement in the effectiveness of the exploration architecture. The increase in 
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effectiveness is a result of the ability to perform a wider range of lunar missions. This 
stems from the ability to use the increase in payload to perform a greater level of science 
during each mission and to reduce the number of mission required to achieve the 
objectives of the lunar campaign. The increase in payload capability is also the primary 
means used to improve the other architecture FOMs. An increase in flexibility provides 
the architecture with a greater design freedom that allows overall design changes to be 
made that were not possible with the baseline architecture design.  
 The reliability of the architecture can also be improved because propellant 
refueling can be used to decrease the chance that a mission will be lost, although the 
architecture becomes dependent on achieving a successful propellant transfer. This 
improvement in reliability is achieved by utilizing propellant refueling to replace the 
propellant lost to boiloff, and thus eliminating this LOM scenario. Introducing any 
refueling strategy does impact the reliability of the architecture, but as shown in Section 
7.1.3, an overall improvement in reliability can be obtained.  
 The introduction of propellant refueling has been shown to decrease the 
development risk associated with the NASA exploration program. This is achieved by 
providing a means to mitigate unexpected design issues, such as mass growth, without 
requiring substantial design changes. The current architecture has experienced a number 
of design changes, especially with the Ares V, that have lead to the addition of a number 
of advanced technologies. The inclusion of propellant refueling would eliminate the need 
for a number of these design changes, as well as reduce the need for new technologies to 
be added to the design of the architecture. There is a level of risk involved with maturing 
the technologies required for propellant refueling (fluid transfer, long term propellant 
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storage, and automated docking systems). This risk, however, is likely offset by reducing 
the number of other advanced technologies that the architecture relies upon. The 
development of a single technology program has a lower risk and cost than the 
development of multiple technologies that result in the same closed vehicle design.  
 The final FOM discussed is the extensibility of the architecture. The introduction 
of propellant refueling improves this metric by utilizing the EDS for missions beyond the 
Moon. Section 7.1.4 discussed the payload capability of the EDS, assuming it could be 
refueling once delivered to LEO. It was shown that this stage could provide large 
payloads for various missions beyond the Moon without the development of a new NTP 
system. The extensibility of the architecture is improved because a greater portion of the 
current lunar architecture can be used for missions in the next phases of the NASA 
exploration program.  
 
8.2 HYPOTHESES DISCUSSED IN THIS DISSERTATION 
 The hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two are provided below. These hypotheses 
have been explored during this dissertation and conclusions for each have been 
developed. These conclusions are outlined below.  
 
• Propellant refueling can be used to reduce the payload requirements on NASA’s 
baseline launch vehicles. 
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• Utilizing propellant refueling in LEO can increase the propellant on the EDS, 
allowing it to perform a wider variety of missions and increase the lunar surface 
payload capability of the baseline architecture.  
• A propellant depot in lunar or Martian orbit can improve the extensibility of 
NASA’s exploration architecture.  
• A low cost propellant delivery price is needed to make refueling affordable to 
NASA’s exploration program. 
 
Offloading propellant from the EDS and LSAM has been shown to be an effective 
means to increase the payload capability of the architecture. It was also established that 
offloading propellant to reduce the size of the architecture elements only slightly 
decreased the LCC, while dramatically reducing the extensibility of the exploration 
architecture.  
One of the greatest improvements to the baseline architecture is the ability to 
utilize the EDS to perform mission maneuvers in addition to the TLI required by the 
baseline architecture. Utilizing the EDS for the LOI maneuver was shown to greatly 
increase the lunar surface payload. The EDS can also be used to perform the injection 
maneuver for other exploration missions, reducing the number of launches required to 
extend the architecture beyond the Moon.  
A propellant depot in Martian orbit can be used to re-fuel the EDS and allow it to 
provide the Earth return maneuver. This would completely eliminate the need for the 
development of a Nuclear Thermal Propulsion system. This allows future exploration 
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mission to rely solely on the current architecture elements, providing an improved 
extensibility.  
The final hypothesis was that low cost propellant delivery was essential to the 
affordability of propellant refueling. This was a common requirement discussed in much 
of the literature. It has been shown that even a conservative estimate of the propellant 
delivery costs can lead to an overall reduction in the LCC of the exploration architecture. 
This is because, while the introduction of propellant refueling adds additional cost to the 
architecture (depot development and propellant delivery), it also provides an avenue to 
lower the cost of other areas of the exploration architecture. The cost of propellant 
refueling is small compared to the cost of the architecture elements and therefore can help 
lower the LCC by reducing the number of missions needed to complete the lunar 
campaign. 
  
8.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The primary goal of this research was to develop a definitive understating of 
propellant refueling and how it applied to exploration missions. This goal was established 
after an extensive investigation of the literature revealed that no comprehensive analysis 
of propellant refueling existed. The propellant refueling studies found in the literature had 
three inherent limitations which were addressed in this research. These limitations 
included a minimal investigation of how propellant refueling can be applied to 
exploration missions, the use of only a single evaluation criterion, and the lack of a 
reference baseline architecture from which to make comparable conclusions across 
multiple studies. These shortcomings have been addressed in this research through the 
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use of system engineering practices, which allowed a larger design space to be 
considered, and a number of FOMs to be used to develop overall conclusions about the 
value of this new capability. The NASA baseline architecture was then used as a non-
refueling reference point to access the overall value of propellant refueling. This provided 
a means of understating how future exploration missions could be improved by 
implementing this capability, and allowed the determination of the price of propellant 
needed in order to provide a greater value than the current architecture design.  
 The contributions if this research were the development of a unified analysis of 
propellant refueling that went beyond the cope of the previous design work. This resulted 
in a number of refueling strategies that were shown to improve the design, and thus add 
value, to the current baseline exploration architecture. This value was achieved by greatly 
improving the flexibility of the architecture without substantially increasing the mission 
costs. This improved flexibility was shown to reduce the overall cost of the lunar and 
Mars campaigns while improving the surface payload capability. As a result of this 
research, a greater confidence in the application of propellant refueling to future 
exploration mission has been achieved, and a number of methods have been presented 
that offer improvements to the design of the current architecture.  
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Table 51: Lift Coefficients, without Solid Rocket Boosters 
 Mach Number 
alpha (deg) 5 8 10 15 20 
-10 -1.2642 -0.8871 -0.7426 -0.6265 -0.5809 
-5 -0.5598 -0.3589 -0.2764 -0.2002 -0.1673 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
5 0.5598 0.3589 0.2764 0.2002 0.1673 
10 1.2642 0.8871 0.7426 0.6265 0.5809 
15 2.113 1.616 1.4363 1.3049 1.2978 
20 3.1013 2.5344 2.3349 2.2539 2.2167 
 
 
Table 52: Drag Coefficients, without Solid Rocket Boosters 
 Mach Number 
alpha (deg) 5 8 10 15 20 
-10 0.4582 0.6194 1.1054 1.0692 1.0444 
-5 0.2784 0.475 0.996 0.9751 0.9568 
0 0.2378 0.4599 0.9721 0.9614 0.9457 
5 0.2784 0.475 0.996 0.9751 0.9568 
10 0.4582 0.6194 1.1054 1.0692 1.0444 
15 0.8071 0.9271 1.3628 1.3091 1.1045 
20 1.3881 1.4441 1.8316 1.5911 1.491 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
Lift and Drag Coefficients (APAS) 
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Table 53: Drag Coefficients, with Solid Rocket Boosters 
 Mach Number 
alpha 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 2 4 5 
-10 -1.822 -2.479 -3.819 -4.980 -2.918 -3.626 -1.822 -1.514 
-5 -1.497 -2.153 -3.490 -2.534 -1.421 -1.728 -1.497 -0.670 
0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
5 1.497 2.153 3.490 2.534 1.421 1.728 1.497 0.670 
10 1.822 2.479 3.819 4.980 2.918 3.626 1.822 1.514 
15 2.265 2.914 4.238 7.572 4.418 5.557 2.265 2.534 
20 2.788 3.420 4.708 10.092 5.947 7.474 2.788 3.720 
 
 
Table 54: Drag Coefficients, with Solid Rocket Boosters 
 Mach Number 
alpha 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.5 2 4 5 
-10 0.711 0.885 1.239 1.497 1.020 1.218 0.614 0.577 
-5 0.513 0.629 0.867 0.846 0.618 0.738 0.364 0.361 
0 0.377 0.437 0.557 0.650 0.487 0.593 0.299 0.312 
5 0.513 0.629 0.867 0.846 0.618 0.738 0.364 0.361 
10 0.711 0.885 1.239 1.497 1.020 1.218 0.614 0.577 
15 1.013 1.244 1.715 2.658 1.703 2.057 1.092 0.995 
20 1.446 1.733 2.317 4.261 2.708 3.275 1.844 1.692 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Mass Estimating Relationships 
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Cargo Launch Vehicle Mass Estimating Relationships 
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Figure 99: Example Mass Breakdown of CaLV 1st Stage 
289 
 
Figure 100: Example Mass Breakdown of CaLV 2nd Stage 
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Lunar Surface Access Module Estimating Relationships 
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Figure 101: Example Mass Breakdown of LSAM Descent Stage 
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Figure 102: Example Mass Breakdown of LSAM Ascent Stage 
293 
 
Table 55: Lunar Architecture Reliability Estimation 
Event Reliability 
Phase 1 - Delivery  0.9861 
CaLV 0.9884 
CLV 0.9977 
  
Phase 2 - LEO 0.915697 
LEO Circulization 0.9863 
Orbital Coasting 0.987 
Orient for Docking 0.9925 
Rendezvous 0.9749 
Docking 0.9795 
Orient for Injection 0.9925 
  
Phase 3 - Re-Fueling 0.9676 
Orient for Docking 0.9925 
Rendezvous Maneuver 0.9749 
Docking 0.9795 
Fuel Transfer and Separation 0.9835 
  
Phase 4 - Transfer 0.7617 
LEO to LLO Transfer 0.7617 
  
Phase 5 - LLO  0.9820 
Navigate in LLO 0.9990 
Separation 0.9907 
Orient for Descent 0.9922 
Separation 0.9907 
  
Phase 6 - Lunar Mission 0.9551 
Lander 0.95515 
 
APPENDIX C 
Apollo Reference Reliability Values 
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